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According to “The State of the Nation’s Housing 2001,” published by the Joint
Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University, approximately 2.65 million
multifamily housing units nationwide were either converted or demolished dur-
ing the 1990s.  Between 1985 and 1999, only about 2 million such new units were
created — a net decrease of 650,000 units.  
This clearly illustrates the need for new construction of affordable multifamily
housing and a greater focus on preservation of existing housing.  Moreover, it is
often the quality of the multifamily housing stock that ultimately determines the
fate of a neighborhood.  Excellent multifamily housing is an asset that often
attracts consumers and investors; conversely, poorly managed multifamily hous-
ing can be a major barrier to community revitalization. 
With this in mind, I am proud to present to you these proceedings of a sympo-
sium entitled “Strengthening Neighborhoods by Creating Long-Term Multifamily
Assets.” Earlier this year, this day-long symposium brought some of the brightest
minds in the business of financing, developing and managing multifamily housing
together to discuss how multifamily housing can be acquired, developed, redevel-
oped and operated so that it yields positive results for the owners, managers, resi-
dents and the surrounding community. 
The ultimate goal of Neighborhood Reinvestment’s NeighborWorks®
Multifamily Initiative, which convened the symposium, is to create sustainable
excellent affordable multifamily housing. I wish to thank, especially, Frances
Ferguson, manager of the NeighborWorks® Multifamily Initiative, who put
together the symposium, as well as  the Neighborhood Reinvestment training
department staff who worked to make the symposium so successful. 
I also wish to thank the Fannie Mae Corporation for their generous financial
support, which enabled the Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation to conduct
this important event.  
The five papers that follow were written by five lead presenters at the sympo-
sium and distributed in advance to symposium participants to provide a frame-
work for each panel discussion.  Reports of the panel discussions are also
provided, which includes many valuable insights offered by audience members as
well as panelists.
I believe these papers and panel discussion reports offer valuable lessons and
ideas about how to create multifamily housing that improves as it ages and helps
lift families and individuals out of poverty and into a world of greater opportunity.  
Ellen Lazar
Executive Director
Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation
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Introduction
What is sustainable, excellent, affordable multifamily housing?
In Austin, Texas, the Sierra Ridge Apartments was purchased by Foundation Communities
(formerly named Central Texas Mutual Housing Association) from private owners in 1991. At the
time of purchase, the property was in poor condition, with weekly water interruptions, dangerous
playground facilities, and frequent criminal activity.  Ten years later, it is 
a) physically sound and attractive: in good physical condition, with regular capital
improvements and a soundly funded replacement reserve; 
b) affordable: home to 148 very low-income families (each has an income below 50 percent of the
area median income at the time they move in); 
c) economically viable: the complex operates at full occupancy with strong collections;  it
generates positive cash flow for the owners; and 
d) socially positive: the positive cash flow has enabled Foundation Communities to provide a host
of services for the residents through the on-site computer learning center, including scholastic
success programs, individual development accounts, and homebuyer preparation. 
In sum, the nonprofit corporation’s balance sheet remains strong, enabling it to withstand market
fluctuations and to access loan capital if necessary; and the property remains affordable, despite a
steeply rising housing market in the area, and socially it is known as a place where children are
succeeding in school and families are saving for homeownership
We’ve seen how neighborhoods thrive when this kind of housing — serving as a cornerstone for
building healthy neighborhoods — is present. 
So why isn’t this the norm?
Places like Sierra Ridge are neither rare exceptions, nor, sadly, the rule among today’s inventory of
multifamily housing. We know it’s because the dollars are scarce and the need is so great, and so to
get more families served, we — the affordable housing community — spread the subsidies thinly and
operate these properties on tight margins. All too often, we get it built or we acquire it, but these
tight margins do not allow for the true demands of capital replacements and market fluctuations
within the affordability constraints the revenues must honor.  The property is not financed by
design to improve in quality over the following five, 10, 15 or 20 years. And, if the situation goes
unabated, too often the property declines, the owner declines and the neighborhood is harmed,
resulting in the multifamily property being viewed as an undesirable force in the neighborhood.
Changing the Way We Operate
The participants of the symposium, held in Chicago in April 2001, all agreed that successful
affordable multifamily properties often are the cornerstones of healthy neighborhoods and of
neighborhood revitalization efforts. So how do we make such properties the norm? 
Symposium participants came “loaded for bear” on this subject. 
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Financing Programs and Allocation Methods: Some took aim at  our financing programs —
programs, they alleged, that were largely aimed at building affordable multifamily housing, but
with subsidies too thin and regulations so numerous that the owner-operators had little chance to
achieve a sustainable level of excellence in their affordable multifamily properties. 
Ownership Strength: Others took aim at the wisdom of the affordable multifamily housing sector
for trying to accomplish too much with small owners, calling out the need for sizeable ownership
entities that could bring the institutional strengths of personnel and financial depth needed for long
term operational success. 
Social Role: Yet a third group aimed at those they viewed as cynics for their single-minded desire
to equate success in terms of a financial return to the owner. They advocated that equally
important to cash flow projections was dedication to providing quality affordable housing plus a
layer of services for residents, so that residents and neighborhoods thrive. These voices called out
the fact that in the current environment, we force a Solomon’s choice on cash flow: reserves and
capital improvements or fund these necessary services.  
Realistic Expectations: Finally there were strong voices from the finance community.  Their
argument called on us to recognize that in many non-appreciating, modest income markets (e.g.
rural or small towns), affordable housing simply won’t throw off enough cash flow or build enough
equity to self-fund the reserves or refinancing needed for capital replacements.  Some injection of
subsidy capital every 15 years or so should be expected.
What is the NeighborWorks® Multifamily Initiative?
The NeighborWorks® Multifamily Initiative, a collaborative portfolio management program of the
NeighborWorks® Network, was privileged to play host to this discussion among a distinguished
group of housing professionals on the panels and in the audience.  
Currently, 43 NeighborWorks® organizations, serving 30 states, are initiative members. These
independent, locally led, nonprofit NeighborWorks® organizations collectively own 20,000
affordable multifamily housing units. The largest organization owns more than 1,800 units; the
smallest owns less than 100 units. All have ongoing growth plans to develop and preserve housing
to serve the needs of their communities. Whether urban or rural, all strive to promote community
revitalization through the development and maintenance of properties that are affordable,
physically sound, economically viable, and socially empowering.
Why host this symposium?
The Multifamily Initiative has some inspiring examples of excellent sustainable affordable
multifamily housing. Here is what we see, and some of the things we convened this symposium to
explore:
Capital planning for long term maintenance, replacement, and improvement. If sustainability
of affordable housing is to be feasible, this cost pattern must be realistically and honestly
anticipated in the financing and operating budgets.  
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Highly accountable ownership that receives adequate compensation. Development fees are
accepted as a requirement, but that is not the case with asset management fees (ownership fees).
These should be viewed as an “above-the-line” expense that must be paid if you want effective,
competent owners.  Designing the asset management fee to create the economic incentive to own
and operate a full portfolio of affordable multifamily housing makes sense. If asset management
fees are to some degree performance-based, then owners could increase their return by improving
their property performance in a comprehensive way.
Restricting the property for long term sustainable affordability.
Simple long-term deed restrictions are essential, if we are to avoid the 15-20 year struggle to keep
existing properties affordable in appreciating markets, where it is so badly needed. Subsidy
allocation can provide points, which provide incentives for development of affordable housing in
strong sub-markets.  Then long-term deed restrictions could be designed so that appreciation in a
strong sub-market environment could be strategically employed over time to maintain
affordability, fund capital needs and expand social services. 
Services that truly advance personal assets (education, employability, savings, leadership,
home ownership), actually help property performance and long term market viability.
Services can promote personal asset building among residents, as well as long term operational
strength of the property. Subsidy programs should allow as a reasonable operating expense a per-
unit allocation for the coordination and delivery of these services. Owners could be compensated
based on their success in delivering services that produce measurable outcomes. And finally,
Simpler and easier financing. We are not alone in noticing that complexity equals increased cost.
With today’s long-term debt financing and many-layered subsidies come a host of competing
compliance terms that result in more time (cost) in pre-construction period, and in every phase of
development and operation thereafter.  In addition to the direct costs incurred in dealing with
extended timeframes for capital aggregation,  the layers of complexity add significant operational
costs in the form of increased training and turnover among management and staff, and increased
internal costs for verification of compliance.  Perhaps a process by which the regulations of the
largest funding source could  “rule” on each property would simplify matters for all concerned.
Conclusion
We have come to learn the cost of not pursuing sustainable excellence – it appears to be the loss of
support of the larger body politic, the larger community for affordable housing.  Yet we have begun
to learn what it takes to achieve this excellence and suspect that, in the long run it is more effective
policy. That’s where we begin this symposium. We hope the day’s proceedings, presented here in
abbreviated form, will become a springboard for action in the near future.
Frances Ferguson is the manager of the NeighborWorks® Multifamily Initiative.
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W
e e have learned a lot over the years about
what makes a property desirable for the
residents, the neighborhood and the owner
over the long term. So why aren’t these properties
the norm?…
…[A]affordable housing is more successful today
than thirty years ago:  
Professionalism – today, we have a large and
diverse group of affordable housing specialists:
accountants, architects, attorneys, developers, prop-
erty managers, regulators and syndicators, to name a
few. Most of these professionals have 10 plus years
of experience in affordable housing. Education and
training opportunities are diverse, readily available,
and responsive to professionals’ needs.
Allocation of Funds – the tax credit, volume-cap
tax exempt bond, HOME and CDBG programs fea-
ture localized allocation processes, with local ability
to set priorities within broad federal guidelines. This
in turn leads to useful experimentation and vigorous
competition.
Reliable Funding – tax credits, volume-cap
bonds, HOME and CDBG provide a stable base of
funding. In turn, this allows a larger number of
organizations to specialize in affordable housing,
thereby enhancing competition, improving quality
and driving down costs.
Lessons Learned – we now have structures in
place to prevent the recurrence of some of the major
problems of the past. It’s unlikely we will ever again
combine above market rents, project based assis-
tance, and government guaranteed mortgage debt.
We seem to have resolved not to concentrate the
poorest of the poor in isolated communities.
Long Term Capital Needs – we know how to
determine the ongoing major repair and replace-
ment needs of properties. In a few cutting edge pro-
grams, such as Mark to Market, we are actually
using capital needs assessments to set adequate
reserve deposits.
Non Housing Services – although much remains
to be learned and done, we are well on the way to
understanding when non housing services should be
offered at or through an affordable housing property,
and how to do so.
Project Based vs. Tenant Based is now regarded
as a false choice. We now understand that we need
both approaches. A few of us are even inventing
hybrid approaches.
Curb Appeal is now regarded as an important
part of affordable housing. For the most part, we
now recognize that it’s a bad idea to develop afford-
able housing that looks ‘cheap’.
However, our funding programs are flawed.
Vigorous competition has sometimes allowed rose
colored glasses to substitute for sound underwriting.
Many lessons from the past are evident but are not
yet incorporated into affordable housing practice.
Some of our experimentation with non housing serv-
ices and mixed income communities is fundamen-
tally unsound. Our unavoidably schizophrenic
identity – pursuing an anti-poverty mission through
a businesslike real estate system – often means that
we act like bankers when we should act like social
Excellence in Affordable
Multifamily Housing
Properties
by Charles S. Wilkins, Jr.
Prepared for the panel: What Can our Products Be? 
Characteristics of Excellence in Affordable Multifamily Housing
focus on:Multifamily Housing Excellence
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workers, and vice versa.
…[A] look at the best affordable multifamily hous-
ing [shows that] sustainably excellent affordable
multifamily housing:
1. Is owned and managed by professional
affordable housing organizations that are com-
petent, committed to affordable housing, and
have access to adequate capital. These organiza-
tions have the ability to survive market fluctuations,
to survive in the absence of development opportuni-
ties, and to survive the departure of key staff. They
monitor their properties closely, heading off most
problems before they occur. I believe that the for-
profit or not-for-profit status of the owner is largely
irrelevant, by comparison to the characteristics
noted above.
2. Is truly affordable for its actual residents.
Excellent affordable housing is developed:
• For a particular target market, with a thorough 
understanding of customers’ household sizes, 
incomes and housing needs. Not “build it and 
they will come.”
• With rents that are affordable based on the 
actual incomes of the target households, taking 
into account other demands on their incomes, 
and when there are a sufficient number of target 
households. Large numbers of tax credit proper
ties failed because there were too few households 
with incomes low enough to be eligible but high 
enough to afford the rents.
• With rents that are materially below prevailing 
market rent levels in the neighborhood. 
Otherwise, don’t ask me to justify the governmen-
tal cost to develop the housing.
Is efficient. High development costs, high operat-
ing costs, slowness, sloppiness, and lack of profes-
sionalism are our own worst enemies. If we don’t
defeat these enemies, the people who pay our bills
will take their money somewhere else. Shame on us
if that happens.
Is located in a viable neighborhood. The neigh-
borhood mix of homeownership to rental, and resi-
dential to nonresidential uses, is appropriate and
reasonable. The neighborhood’s housing, trans-
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portation, jobs, schools, public safety, shopping,
recreation, and public spaces form a smoothly func-
tioning network that supports residents and commu-
nity.
Fits into the neighborhood. Its architecture
echoes that of nearby residential buildings. The
number of dwelling units is neither too few nor too
many, in comparison with other nearby rental prop-
erties.
Has an attractive, low maintenance design. A
‘zero maintenance’ exterior adds a lot of value.
Simple construction is better than complicated con-
struction. Simple mechanical systems are better than
complicated mechanical systems. Slab-on-grade
construction is better than crawl space. Pitched roofs
are better than flat roofs. Individual unit entries are
better than common hallways.
Is a community. Residents value the opportunity
to live here. All members of the community expect to
be treated fairly and courteously, and this mutual
expectation creates an informal but powerful force
for community cohesion.
Is subject to an appropriate, long-term, use
agreement. The availability of the property for long
term affordable housing use is assured through a
binding covenant running with the land. The long-
term affordability of the property is not dependent on
the identity or motivations of the sponsor, and is
assured even if the property fails financially and
undergoes a workout or a foreclosure. The length of
the use agreement term and the level of affordability
it requires are appropriate for the property, its target
resident population, and the subsidies with which it
is financed.
Is physically sound over the long term. The
operating budget contains sufficient funds to operate
and maintain the property to high standards, not just
in the early years but over time. From the beginning,
the property makes reserve deposits that are suffi-
cient to fully fund expected major repairs and
replacements.
Does not rely on appreciation in value. The
mortgage financing is fixed rate and self amortizing,
so that the property is not exposed to interest rate
risk or refinancing risk. The property’s debt burden
(from all loans, not just the first mortgage) declines
over time, at a rapid enough rate to avoid the risk of
over-leverage. The property’s long term physical and
financial viability can be supported by the projected
stabilized cash flow, even if this cash flow does not
grow over time. This gives the property the potential
to improve its affordability over time, but the flexibil-
ity to increase rents as needed to respond to unantic-
ipated problems.
Is financed appropriately. By comparison with
market-rate apartments, affordable housing requires
lower rents and may require higher operating
expenses. Moreover, affordable housing requires a
reserve deposit that is adequate to fund 100% of rea-
sonably expected major repairs and replacements.
As a result, an affordable housing property generates
a much smaller net operating income than an other-
wise similar market rate apartment property, and
can support only a very limited amount of mortgage
debt. The remaining development costs must be
financed with grants.
Has an adequate operating margin. This is not
merely a matter of debt service coverage in an
underwriting spreadsheet. The projected rents must
be achievable, with room to spare. The vacancy and
collection loss allowances must be reasonable and
must recognize that real estate markets fluctuate.
Projected operating expenses must be at or above the
level that good management will need in order to
operate the property successfully, not just in the
early years when nothing breaks, but over the long
term. There must be adequate debt service coverage,
without regard to the amount of cash flow the owner
is allowed to distribute. Basically, the property must
be able to withstand the sorts of income, expense,
and capital needs shocks that frequently impact
affordable apartment properties.
Our unavoidably schizophrenic identity – pursuing an anti-
poverty mission through a businesslike real estate system –
often means that we act like bankers when we should act like
social workers, and vice versa.
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focus on:Multifamily Housing Excellence
Is financed through grant programs that com-
bine flexibility, adequate funding, accountability
and competition. Each grant program recognizes
the full array of development costs that are reason-
ably required to produce the desired affordable
housing. Where appropriate, multiple grantors will
collaborate to create ‘one stop shopping’ grants for
the development of unusual properties (e.g., mixed
income / mixed use / service enriched) that would
otherwise have to assemble multiple funding
sources. Each grant program is capable of funding
the entire gap between supportable debt and total
development cost. Failure to comply with program
requirements produces adverse results that are pre-
dictable and that occur rapidly. A successful grant
program attracts a reasonable (but not excessive)
number of highly acceptable proposals.
Increases rents in line with property needs.
Initial rents are adequate. Subsequently, rents are
increased modestly each year, in line with inflation
in operating costs. Operating costs are well con-
trolled but are not squeezed.
Is crime resistant. The property’s design incorpo-
rates ‘defensible space’ approaches. All common
areas are easily observed from several different resi-
dents’ homes. Lighting is adequate. The manage-
ment plan, and the budget, include initiatives to
create, maintain and enhance residents’ social ties to
each other.
Is in compliance with reasonable regulatory
requirements. Wherever possible, regulatory
requirements utilize market mechanisms such as
incentives and disincentives. If the property utilizes
more than one subsidy or financing program, pro-
gram requirements are coordinated to eliminate con-
flicts and redundancies. Compliance is monitored
through regular and standardized reviews, per-
formed by qualified third parties who are trusted by
owners, residents and regulators but who are inde-
pendent.
Incorporates appropriate non-housing serv-
ices. A successful affordable housing property pro-
vides opportunities to deliver no-cost and low-cost
services that are needed by large numbers of resi-
dents and can be delivered effectively at or through
the property. For example, properties for low income
families may provide before-school and after-school
activities for children, job search or job skill develop-
ment for adults, or may simply provide space in
which third party providers can deliver such pro-
grams. To the extent that the property itself should
provide the services, the cost to do so is built into the
property’s operating budget.
Generates cash flow for its owner. An affordable
housing property doesn’t need to be wildly prof-
itable, but it does need to generate at least enough
positive cash flow to cover the owner’s asset man-
agement costs and to fund needed reserves. An
affordable housing portfolio needs to generate
enough additional cash so that the successful proper-
ties can support properties that are temporarily
struggling.
So Why Aren’t These Properties The Norm?
It seems to me that...
It’s difficult to produce housing this good, even in
the best of circumstances.
Existing financing and subsidy programs aren’t
designed to produce housing this good.
We don’t yet have good benchmarks or good per-
formance measurement systems.
Much of the conventional wisdom about afford-
able housing is not only unwise but backwards.
And, worst of all, as an industry we don’t set our
sights high enough. u
High development costs, high operating costs, slowness,
sloppiness, and lack of professionalism are our own worst
enemies. If we don’t defeat these enemies, the people who pay
our bills will take their money somewhere else. Shame on us if
that happens.
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O
nce upon a time, an affordable housing
sponsor could prosper without being a great
owner – insulated by a guaranteed income
stream, residents that lacked practical choices, and
quiescent regulators, the owner had few worries
after initial rent-up. Today, affordable housing is
harder to own and sustain than conventional: 
• It is developed in more marginal neighborhoods
and serves an economically vulnerable tenancy.
• It tends to be older and to operate with lower
cash surplus margins.
• It faces a schizophrenic double mission, both
financial and social, and is vulnerable to social mis-
sion creep.
And affordable housing ownership is getting
harder. As mark-to-market works its slow-motion
avalanche of changes, income is not guaranteed and,
residents have many more choices. Meanwhile, with
resources scarce, regulators are much more frugal
when awarding funds and (properly) much more
demanding once they have done so. As a commu-
nity,  owners – whether for or nonprofit, whether
new buyers or long-standing holders – need to get
better, and get better quickly.
Surprisingly, we have devoted very little effort to
studying:
• What constitutes excellence in affordable hous-
ing ownership.
• What barriers to excellence we have built in to
our programs and policies.
• What we can do to create a climate where inepti-
tude is punished, mediocrity languishes, and excel-
lence thrives. This paper opens these topics for
discussion.
How do we recognize capability in affordable
housing ownership?
1. Results
Ownership capability is more than just being able to
show pretty pictures and tell a good story; it is
shown only over the long term as demonstrated by
results at the property. There are six dimensions of
affordable housing viability
A. Physical — The property provides a safe, clean,
habitable, defensible physical environment. It must
be well cared for and it must look well cared for.
B. Community — The property represents its own
healthy little community of people.
C. Operations — The property’s ongoing income
sources exceed its recurring operating costs.
D. Financing — The property has enough working
capital to cope with the normal ebb and flow of
receivables and payables.
E. Compliance — The property’s compliance rules
are equitable, creditable, observed, and enforced.
F. Downstream responsiveness — Both rules and
operators must have escape hatches or change pro-
cedures that can cope with on-the-fly redesign.
The property’s success across these six dimen-
sions is seen in three ways:
• Sustainability over time. The property is viable
as above over a 10-year or longer horizon.
• Resident satisfaction. Residents like living in the
property and seek to remain.
• Allocator satisfaction. Resource providers
Excellence in Affordable
Housing Ownership
by David A. Smith
Prepared for the panel: Who Are Our Producers? Characteristics of Excellence in Ownership Entities
focus on:Multifamily Housing Excellence
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believe they are getting value for money.
2. Owner Behaviors
In our experience, some owner behaviors are almost
always leading indicators of excellence:
A. No bad surprises — They seldom bring bad
news surprises because they know their properties
and markets well. If bad news arrives, the owner
brings it, usually with a thoughtful exposition of both
the causes and the potential solutions.
B. Property improvement over time — They
improve their properties over time. Old ones look
just as good as new ones.
C. Advocates for the property — They create equal
levels of discomfort in all stakeholders: residents,
regulators, the community, partners. Ideally they
create equal levels of (modest but persistent) dis-
comfort in all other stakeholder groups. Being an
owner is not a popularity contest; it consists of dili-
gently, consistently, and wisely doing a series of
unpopular visible things (raising rents, evicting
lease-violating residents, challenging regulators on
operating budgets, reinvesting rather than distribut-
ing cash flow) because they are the right thing to do.
D. Tight financial control and accurate reporting
— They know where every dollar comes from and
goes to and can report that information in many
ways on very quick turnaround.
E. Commitment to learning and innovation —
They constantly seek new ideas.
F. Unsatisfied — They are seldom smug, usually
unsatisfied.
G. High ethical standards — There are many easier
ways to earn a living. Those who succeed in this
field do so out of a sense of personal and corporate
satisfaction that goes hand-in-glove with a strong
ethical sense.
3. Skills or Attributes That Seem Inescapably
Necessary
In our experience the following skills or attributes
are inevitable byproducts of the path to expertise in
ownership:
A. Mission heart — Wanting affordable housing to
succeed as affordable and for benefit of the residents.
B. Business head — Rigorous, indeed confronta-
tional, approach to the myriad business decisions a
property demands.…These two attributes are neither
independent of one another nor are they in conflict.
Rather they are both necessary; absence of either
dooms the owner to mediocrity or worse:
• Mission heart with no business head generates
good feelings early on but spends far too much
money and the property either deteriorates or needs
chronic income supplements.
• Business head with no mission heart makes a
profit but creates no sense of community and
destroys its goodwill with residents and regulators.
Why is Outstanding Ownership So Scarce?
Some possible culprits:
1. Development is complicated and earns the big
fees; ownership does not. Cash flows are constrained
by regulation or stripped out to pay soft debt.
Ongoing ownership earns modest fees (and asset
management is not universally recognized as a legit-
imate cost item), so ownership skills are not devel-
oped with the same zeal.
2. Until recently, we thought ownership was easy
so allocators seldom emphasized ownership capacity
(as distinct from development).
3. Rent-setting mechanisms tend to starve a prop-
erty of resources, especially if the original develop-
ment was capital-squeezed.
4. Markets and property needs change much faster
than owner capacity.
5. Allocated awards go to fence-swingers not con-
tact hitters — When only one in four properties is
funded, to win award, an applicant often feels com-
pelled to use the most optimistic projections, not the
most realistic ones. Allocators thus risk funding
properties based on nonsustainable rosy scenarios.
6. Ownership changes hands very slowly. Many
owners who would like to cannot do so because
either (a) no one can afford to pay their economic
equity, or (b) there is little if any equity and the
investors will not leave unless they have their
federal contingent exit taxes paid.
7. The mission and business camps fear one
another so the normal cross-pollination that should
occur is resisted. And few of their advisors treat it in
the other camp.
8. Mission and business sponsors seldom partner
because they see themselves as competing for scarce
resources or they fight over the talisman of “control.”
9. Proven capability is seldom rewarded. Indeed,
diversity-oriented allocation plans can have the
unintended consequence of penalizing capable own-
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ers in favor of “giving someone else a chance.”
10. Winner-take-all allocation systems encourage
over-subsidy and gold-plating on the front end
rather than economizing and emphasizing stream-
lined operations.
11. Absent cash motivations for good performance,
we devolve to process-oriented regulation and thus
train owners to follow the rules rather than achieve
outstanding results.
12. Few people can distinguish ownership (asset
management) from property management. As a
result, property management often serves as a care-
taker surrogate for property ownership capacity.
Where should we be trying to head?
Ideally, we should have properties owned by entities
that have all these attributes:
1. Centralized decision-making rather than divid-
ing it among multiple stakeholders and groups who
often have competing if not downright contradictory
objectives. Innovation is a key to remaining competi-
tive and efficient, and fractured decision authority
destroys innovation.
2. Private investment for inherent checks and bal-
ances. At the same time, unchecked decision-making
invites abuse. Instead the private-investment model,
where private capital is channeled via tax-motivated
investment, has provided ongoing oversight and
compliance monitoring without government
involvement. There thus is an ongoing tension
between the value of centralized decision-making
and the benefits of an internal check and balance
provided by the investors’ involvement.
3. Holders not converters. Owners who want to
keep the property affordable under a viable eco-
nomic configuration so that they are not looking for
upside predicated on a market conversion. (It has
taken almost 30 years for this view to evolve. The
original programs contemplated a finite term of
affordability – 15 or 20 years – and explicitly made
residual value after conversion a critical ongoing
owner’s incentive. When the term ran out, inevitably
a political and policy struggle arose as owners
sought to realize on their contractual rights and
unprepared government sought to prevent conver-
sion. A better model provides permanent affordabil-
ity but makes that ongoing affordability
economically viable so that conversion is no longer
an essential action.)
4. Viable ongoing economics so that holder-own-
ers are properly compensated for holding.
5. No amateurs need apply. Only owners who are
capable across all the major disciplines.
6. Efficient use of resources, whether scarce or
freely available.
How might we get there?
The following ideas are offered as brainstorms. They
are in no particular order, they are not necessarily
feasible, they are not necessarily all internally
compatible, and they are not necessarily my
personal views. But they are logical possibilities and
thus worth exploring:
1. Differentially allocate resources in workout,
preservation, and sale, not by arbitrary monikers
like for-profit or nonprofit but by ownership capac-
ity.
2. Overhaul financing to emphasize lower debt
and better cash flow.
3. Incentivize reinvestment so that a healthy chunk
of available cash flow is redeployed into replace-
ments and new improvements that could not have
been anticipated originally.
4. Create certification/ ranking systems that make
transparent who is doing a better job and who is
doing a worse one.
5. Build in participant transferability so that part-
ners who want out can sell their position to those
who want in, and those who are not doing the job
can be and are rapidly removed before their failure
damages the property or takes its operations hostage.
6. Publicize results across geographies and pro-
gram types.
7. Offer contingent-tax one-time amnesty. Offer a
contingent-tax-relief amnesty window for transfers
from unsuitable owners (some of whom are hanging
on just to defer taxes) to preserving entities (who
commit to long-term affordability and economic via-
bility).
8. Stop differentiating for-profit from nonprofit. An
owner is an owner, and it either does a good job now
or it does not. u
Further discussion of these topics can be found at
our Web site, www.recapadvisors.com, in the articles
Renewed Affordability: A Paradigm for Existing
Affordable Housing and The New Breed of Affordable
Housing Owner.
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T
he financing of affordable housing has evolved
tremendously over the last twenty years from
the old HUD financing programs to today’s
low income housing tax credit transactions.
Transactions have increasingly become more com-
plex due to the sophistication of the market com-
bined with the dwindling resources in the
industry.…
As an industry, we all need to focus on some key
issues to ensure the continuity and sustainability of
this market.
The Ten Commandments of Creating Long-Term,
Sustainable Affordable Housing
1. At the end of the day, affordable housing is real
estate.
2. It is possible to overbuild affordable housing in
certain markets
3. Pay attention to cash flow; “value” may be
misleading.
4. People operate apartments and repay debt, not the
properties.
5. Prepare for the unexpected; interest rates will not stay
static.
6. Subsidy is not the same thing as equity.
7. Bailing out yesterday’s properties is bad for everyone.
8. Remember the lessons of the past.
9. Plan for the “back-end” at the beginning.
10. Don’t take CRA for granted….
1. Affordable Housing is Real Estate
Above all, affordable housing is real estate – as
lenders and equity providers we need to put real
estate back into the equation. Yes, affordable
housing can provide necessary below-market units
to the market but fundamentally; affordable housing
is multi-family real estate subject to all of the
vagaries and competitiveness of the market. As a
lender and investor, we need to be concerned about
future competition, market employment trends,
project amenities, availability of excess land etc.
Market studies may be valuable but we need to
provide standards for these documents to assure
quality. We need to be concerned about penetration
rates in certain markets – what are the “right” levels
of demand to ensure feasibility. Building new tax
credit projects to compete with older tax credit
projects does not make sense. Too often, the
philosophy of “if you build it, they will come”
transcends the affordable housing market. We have
seen that many early projects that were targeted to
tenants at 60 percent of AMI have failed especially in
softer real estate markets where 60 percent AMI
rents are truly market rents or above. Both investors
and lenders have become comfortable with
affordable housing rents that are a minimum of 10
percent below market. However, real estate markets
certainly can shift and 10 percent below market can
erode quickly.
Production Finance:
Key Concerns Regarding the
Long-Term Sustainability of
Affordable Housing
by Wendell Johns and Phyllis Klein
Prepared for the panel: Production Finance: Financing Sustainability
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2. Overbuilding Affordable Housing
It is possible to overbuild affordable housing.
Investors and lenders hungry for deals haven’t been
concerned about overbuilding tax credit units.
However, with the increase in the tax credit and the
bond cap, we may begin to see tax credit projects
compete for tenant base. Amenities may become a
more crucial factor in the competitiveness of
affordable housing projects in certain markets. The
project needs to provide the appropriate services for
the population in order to compete in the general
market should market rents fall.
Real estate development typically assumes some
level of appreciation. Not only is a stable net operat-
ing income (NOI) important, but an increasing NOI
as well. Some sponsors, due to mission driven con-
cerns, may choose not to increase rents despite
increases in the market and median incomes. This
may further unfeasibility and reality may force these
projects to increase rental rates. We need to evaluate
markets where median incomes have not risen in
proportion to the rest of the country. In those mar-
kets, expecting increasing rents may not be feasible.
Demand factors also come into play – rents cannot
be increased in a market where there is not sufficient
demand to support those rents. Subsidies are not
infinite. Thus, increasing market rents is a source for
future rehabilitation, for increases in expenses and
for unexpected issues that arise, such as the rising
energy costs faced in California.
3. Focus on Cash Flow; Value may be Misleading
Financial stability is key – with affordable housing it
is important to recognize that the stream of rental
income coming to the project may not substantially
increase, but certainly expenses can accelerate.
Therefore, great consideration must be given to debt
coverage especially in any market. A cushion on
NOI of 10 to 15 percent can whittle down to nothing
very quickly. The reality of projects with a
predominance of three and four bedroom units is big
operating expenses. NOI must be structured to
reflect the wear and tear on projects created by a
large population of children. Security is also a drain
on cash flow. The need for security at a project
reflects more on the need to insulate the project
from outside forces. Neighborhood renewal is not
overnight, as such; many projects may require an
extra watchful eye. Utility costs may also become an
increasing drain on project resources. Low-income
focus on:Multifamily Housing Excellence
T
H
E
 N
E
IG
H
B
O
R
W
O
R
K
S
®
JO
U
R
N
A
L
SU
M
M
ER
 2
0
0
1
13
tenants will not be able to absorb huge utility bills.
Replacement reserves are crucial – certainly one
cannot rely on the cash flow to generate sufficient
monies to fund major repairs unless they are
budgeted.
The real estate property tax exemption remains a
crucial unknown in the industry. In many states, the
exemption is a “given” – however, lawmakers could
eliminate this favorable treatment to ensure the sta-
bility of NOI. Both lenders and investors must under-
take careful analysis of the likelihood of this type of
event. As an industry, we must be careful not to
abuse this privilege – the abatement of taxes is a cru-
cial financial resource but has great impact on the
tax base.
Lenders have a tremendous responsibility for
their overall portfolio performance. In many ways,
the affordable housing market segment has had a lot
of lenders chasing a limited number of deals.
Lenders need to be diligent about underwriting to
prevent project failures. Loan to value truly has very
little meaning for affordable housing. Low-income
housing tax credit projects do not trade in the gen-
eral market – therefore, a cap rate analysis is also of
very little value. The value of favorable financing on
a tax-exempt bond transaction has also very little
proven value in a sale. Adequate debt coverage
becomes critical.
4. People Repay Debt not Projects
Project sponsorship is another key to long-term
sustainability. Strong project sponsors understand
their marketplace, focus on asset management,
screen tenants appropriately and are committed to
the long-term success of their project. Unfortunately,
due to the equity and capitalization structure of
affordable housing projects, there are barriers to
entry into the business. As such, tenure and track
record in the business is key. Overall, strong
sponsorship cannot be categorized into non-profit
versus for-profit developers. There are strong and
weak non-profit sponsors as well as strong and
weak for-profit sponsors. The quality of the
development entity is reflected by the staff, the board
of directors, their experience and their financial
health.
5. Prepare for the Unexpected; Interest Rates will
not Remain Static
The secondary market’s role is to provide guidance,
standardization and ready liquidity for lenders to
encourage the production of affordable housing and
to mitigate its perceived risk. The discipline of
underwriting guidelines encourages long-term
sustainability by attempting to size debt effectively
without over-leveraging and therefore, burdening
the housing. For instance, Fannie Mae’s interest rate
reset is set at an 18 year term versus an industry that
has now accepted 10 year interest rate resets. Many
projects will be impacted by interest rate resets
during the tax credit compliance period. What will
occur in year 10 if a project is faced with 100 to 200
basis point increases in rates? Who will cover the
shortfall? We are not currently in a rising interest
rate environment, however, this could well occur.
Rising interest rates will greatly impact investor
returns as investors may be forced to cover debt
shortfalls or make reductions in principal to protect
their investment. Lenders may be forced to
restructure loans to prevent foreclosures.
6. Subsidy is not the same thing as Equity
The public sector also provides a significant role that
can help to ensure long-term sustainability. The
allocation process for tax credits and bonds should
be based upon criteria that ensure quality housing.
Subsidy money serves a most crucial role by filling
underwriting gaps that cannot be met by other
sources. Subsidy funds are increasingly important in
a rising real estate market, as projects cannot reach
lower income levels without gap funds. The
public/private partnership in affordable housing is
invaluable – debt and equity providers have
significant economic hurdles to achieve that are not
required by public subsidy. Subsidy funds greatly
ensure the economic success of affordable housing
by providing the gap money necessary to lower the
costs of the project or by increasing the NOI with
operating subsidies. For example, it is absolutely
infeasible to build housing for mentally ill at 30
percent of area median income (AMI) with merely
low income housing tax credit equity and debt
financing. A project with rents at that level should be
structured to be debt free to encourage project cash
flow to provide necessary services for the tenants.
Subsidy for these projects is a necessity to ensure
feasibility. The public sector can also be the
conscience – the monitoring and oversight by public
agencies serves as a watchdog over the industry.
Equity in tax credit projects is like conventional
real estate equity even though return on equity is not
typically in the form of cash returns but rather tax
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benefits. These tax benefits, tax credits mostly, must
still provide a sufficient economic incentive to the
investor — a return that is comparably better than
alternative investments. Sponsors of tax credit prop-
erties structure their investments in a variety of cre-
ative ways to derive market returns. Fannie Mae, as
the largest equity investor and debt provider of hous-
ing that qualifies for the low-income housing tax
credit, views large losses, even on paper, as a nega-
tive reflecting a weak financial structure of the proj-
ect. Although its equity investment horizon is only 15
years, Fannie Mae seeks investments with the long-
term viability and a sponsor’s intention of perma-
nent affordability.
There are disconnects between the equity and the
debt side. For example, 10-year rate resets may make
sense for lenders, but at the 10-year mark, the
investor would suffer tremendous recapture and
penalties should a foreclosure occur. If the project
could not support the rate increase, many lenders
presume that the investor will solve the financing
gap. However, some equity investors feel strongly
that they are not appropriately paid for assuming the
balloon risk on these projects and will not invest in
such deals.
7. Using Current Allocations to Bail out Past
Problems – Bad for Everyone
Allocation processes vary across the nation.
Although most of the tax–exempt bond and tax
credit programs are competitive, states have chosen
a variety of ways to allocate the resource. States need
to provide more “one-stop shopping” for housing
resources and link subsidy and compliance
programs together to lessen the burden on sponsors
and development costs. States may need to begin to
look closely at the resource provided by bonds and
credits and evaluate how to address restructures and
refinancings of existing projects, particularly those
that may not be performing. Today’s funding
resources are limited, while demand for affordable
housing remains high. What will happen to the
production of new affordable housing units, if the
tax credit and bond caps are utilized to restructure
problem projects? Many tax-exempt bond projects
are merely a refinance or purchase of a project with
lower financing costs and no developer equity. In
exchange, the market receives a “light rehab” of an
existing project and rents that are restricted. In some
markets, 60 percent of median income rents may be
equal to market rents, therefore, limited public
benefit is provided by the use of the bond.
Allocations to these projects may not be the best
public policy in light of the housing shortage of
today.
8. Remember the Lessons of the Past
What has been the cause of troubled projects?
They are the same reasons for the failure of any mar-
ket rate multi-family project – poor underwriting
including misjudging expense factors such as secu-
rity and repairs, market issues from increased com-
petition to employment losses, rents that didn’t
increase combined with increasing expenses, under-
estimating rehabilitation needs for long term sus-
tainability etc. As such, it is incumbent upon lenders
(and investors) to “just say no” – oftentimes, realism
needs to be injected into the equation. Lenders need
to monitor critical signs of project deterioration –
deferred maintenance, tenant turnover, vacancies,
new market competition, rising expenses, decreas-
ing net operating income, etc. Lenders need to take a
hard look at the “light rehabs or spruce-ups” which
are occurring. It is crucial to ensure that the useful
life of a project be extended through the financing
period at a minimum. Lenders cannot ignore warn-
ing signs even if the debt service is being met. It may
be prudent to restructure the financing early to avoid
future problems.
9. Plan for the Back-End NOW
As an industry, we are faced with many issues of
We need to be concerned about penetration rates in certain
markets – what are the “right” levels of demand to ensure
feasibility. Building new tax credit projects to compete with
older tax credit projects does not make sense.
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the long and short term that impact long-term sus-
tainability. The first issue is what will happen to low
income housing tax credit projects when the tax
credit investor has no more financial incentive in the
deal. The rental restrictions for most projects will
not end for another 15 to 40 years beyond the initial
15-year period when investors receive their benefits.
So-called “back-end” structures are numerous rang-
ing from giving the project to the sponsor to struc-
tures that include the payoff of debt plus
appreciation to the investor. As an industry, many
projects may need new allocations of tax credits or
tax-exempt bonds to be financially viable. Using the
tax credit program to restructure older projects will
greatly impact the future production of new afford-
able housing. The concept of preservation will be
greatly expanded.
At the end of the fifteen-year tax credit benefit
period, the reality for most projects will be:
• Very little of the long-term debt associated with the
project will have been repaid;
• No ability to increase rents given minimal
increases in HUD median incomes;
• No significant real estate appreciation given flat
rents;
• Increasing expenses due to project wear and tear;
• Minor rehabilitation may be needed using replace-
ment reserves, if available; and
• Interest rates may have risen.
What should the exit strategy be for affordable
housing projects? The lesson of the HUD 236 pro-
gram has not been learned – many of the resources
available to subsidize affordable housing are being
utilized to preserve the units created under these old
HUD programs. We may learn that although we
would like to encourage long-term affordability, it
may not be possible without an increasing level of
resources. Absent more subsidies, converting proj-
ects to market rate developments may be the only
viable alternative.
10. Don’t take CRA for-granted
What will occur if project sponsors do not pro-
duce quality housing? Workouts, restructures, fore-
closures, etc. As a result, banks will begin to shy
away from providing new financing for projects.
Although the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) is
a reality for financial institutions, compliance with
CRA can be met with other products such as small
business loans, credit cards, home loans etc. There
has been a decrease in the impact of CRA on banks
over the last couple of years with the reduction of
merger activity. If this trend continues, there’s a risk
that the increased credit and bond caps may go
unused.
Conclusion
In summary, to ensure long term sustainable
affordable housing, lenders and investors must
focus on providing some discipline to the
marketplace to prevent the failure of projects.
Focusing on underwriting, real estate market factors
and sponsorship will create successful projects that
can be sustained in the future. This discipline
involves the sizing of debt and equity to provide
appropriate returns and ensure realistic cash flow.
The challenges we face in creating long-term sus-
tainable affordable housing are great, but worthy of
solving. We need to come together to address these
issues head-on.
• Is long-term affordability congruent with long-
term sustainability? Is it possible?
• Subsidies are crucial to long-term sustainability,
but unfortunately they have a finite life. To create
incentives for longer-term subsidies, should appreci-
ation become the “return” for the risk taken by the
subsidy provider? If so, how do we ensure both a
return and an incentive to the sponsor to operate
these projects?
• How do we prepare and underwrite for unex-
pected events such as earthquakes, rising utility
costs, changes in legislation?
• Is mixed income housing the answer to provide
units targeted to renters with incomes below 30 per-
cent of AMI? Does that mix of tenant incomes work?
• How do we deal with or change the inherent
conflicts between the tax credit rules and affordabil-
ity and project economics?
Can we merge some programs together to
encourage efficiencies, compliance monitoring and
reduce complexities? u
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O
ver the past few years, much has been written
about the vexing dilemma of housing poor
renters in a time of prosperity. Many of us
have taken the time to describe the real estate “Catch
22" that occurs when rents outpace inflation. The
nation’s affordable housing need actually deepens in a
time of prosperity. That profound crisis, together with
the impending expiration of Section 8 contracts cover-
ing well over 1 million apartments has rightfully
turned our attention toward “preservation” of all types
of affordable housing.
Unfortunately, not nearly so much has been writ-
ten about the capacity of purchasers to preserve and
improve thousands of units of affordable housing.
This paper focuses on that issue, with particular atten-
tion paid to how excellent nonprofit housing providers
are created and, once created, sustained. I essentially
argue below that the type of “at risk” capital deployed
to create a sustainable entity is different than that type
of capital required to sustain an “excellent” not-for-
profit real estate company.
Finally, a word about “sustainability and the role of
government.” I very much believe that government
has a unique role to play in both providing financing
for properties and helping to create sustainable capac-
ity, especially in the not for profit sector. It is not my
thesis, however, that the government guarantees sus-
tainability. Both the properties and the owners must
be “long term sustainable” without reliance on gov-
ernment funding. Otherwise, what’s the point?
I. The Case For Building Sustainable Preservation
Organizations
The case for creating capacity is an easy one. During
the next five years tens of thousands of apartments
will be placed on the market by owners of
governmentally assisted and/or insured housing, in
particular housing now assisted by HUD or Rural
Housing Services, and/or properties with expiring low
income tax credits. Moreover, portfolios of
unsubsidized, but affordable, properties are coming
on the market in an increasing number. According to
the Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard, over
the past four years we have lost over 1 million
unsubsidized affordable apartments to market forces
or deterioration
As current owners look for an exit from their
affordable multifamily investments, the demand for
capable, mission driven, owners of multifamily hous-
ing — particularly housing that shelters very low-
income households and seniors — is embarrassingly
apparent. A core national policy objective should be
At-Risk Capital and the
Creation and Sustenance of
Excellent Preservation
Entities
by Michael Bodaken
Prepared for the panel: Production Finance: Risk Capital for Preservation Acquisition
“In the end, a vision without the ability to execute
is probably a hallucination” (Steve Case, quoted in
The Mind of the CEO, Basic Books, 2001)
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the assembly of a new group of interested, vigorous
owners willing to invest new resources into this
housing. How do we create and sustain such entities?
What institutions will invest in these new owners?
We start with this premise: Strong, business
minded/socially motivated, preservation entities
(either nonprofit or for-profit) are essential to the
preservation and improvement of affordable hous-
ing. Indeed, any business model for sustainability
requires the presence of such entities. Put another
way, we can’t save affordable housing unless there
are capable stewards willing to take on this impor-
tant responsibility.
Unfortunately, it is precisely this – a large, diverse
community of capable purchasers dedicated to a
mission of affordability – that is lacking in today’s
market. We desperately need a dramatic infusion of
venture capital to create new preservation organiza-
tions and expand existing preservation entities. For
that, we need capital. What types of capital can be
deployed for the formation of such entities? For their
growth and expansion?
The political economic environment in which we
operate
Like all things, capital is much affected by the
political-economic environment in which it
operates. The situation in which we find ourselves is
fascinating. One would have to search hard to find a
more uncertain environment. Exogenous risks
include, but are not limited to,
• interest rate risk,
• the risk attendant to working with government
agencies that are inherently political and often
unpredictable;
• credit risk; and
• All the long term risks of late-life property acquisi-
tion….new property competition; potential of new
environmental risk materials; market obsolescence,
neighborhoods that generally are not ones in which
properties are rising rapidly, etc.
Perhaps the most complicated of these is the risk
that the government, once considered to be certain, if
somewhat bureaucratic and plodding, partner, has
become a most uncertain partner. Again, I am not
asking HUD to bail organizations out of incompe-
tence. Every time HUD changes hands, the bureau-
cracy recalibrates and reshapes itself at the upper
end. While all of this goes on, the middle and lower
echelons ossify. Ideology, rather than common
sense, often dictates the substance of legislation
and/or regulations affecting this housing. What mar-
ket player in its right mind would want to be associ-
ated with such an effort?
At the same time, the business and social oppor-
tunity is simply unprecedented. I believe a rational
argument can be made that, apart from health care
for all of our citizens, our inability to resolve how to
house poor renters is the most crucial policy issue of
our day. The fact that poor people don’t vote, particu-
larly poor renters, doesn’t make it any less crucial.
Moreover, the issue is easy to write large.
• Literally hundreds of thousands of apartments, 
many of them in your hometown, can be found on 
the Internet.
• And all of them have some type of contract or 
subsidy expiring in the next five years. Most of 
them happen to house poor senior and families.
• Billions of dollars in tax credit equity, debt and 
other financing awaits he/she who resolves this 
issue.
Hence, the siren call to “grow our own.”
Unfortunately, it is precisely this – a large, diverse community
of capable purchasers dedicated to a mission of affordability –
that is lacking in today’s market. We desperately need a
dramatic infusion of venture capital to create new preservation
organizations and expand existing preservation entities.
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II. Seeding The Creation and Operations Of a
Preservation Business Entity
Any business must have both “start up” funds and
initial operating capital to fund its initial operations.
At its most basic level, the creation of these
organizations, like any business, must have a
rational business plan. This plan must, at the very
least, demonstrate to “seed investors” of that
operating capital a reasonable rate of return and
return of their capital within five years.
Assuming such a plan exists, and the new entity
intends to conserve the housing as affordable over
the long haul, promised returns won’t be dramatic. If
drawn up honestly, without any start up grants, the
business plan, with appropriate hiring, administra-
tive expenses and real estate due diligence costs
associated with the start up acquisition effort, will
forecast a loss of revenue over the first two-three
years. Organizations like NHT/Enterprise and others
forecast potential losses of nearly $1 million over the
first three years of their existence. Thereafter,
returns should not be greater than 10 to 20 percent
per annum plus repayment of original principal.
That translates into a return rate of anywhere from
1-7 percent and return of investment over the first
five years of existence.
Available venture capital typically requires prof-
itability sooner, and high double-digit returns after
three years. This type of return is, I submit, antitheti-
cal to the provision of long term affordable housing.
What is required is non-speculative, “steady Eddie
capital.” Further, venture capital is far less venture-
some when asked to take on operational, as distinct
from real estate, risk. Finally, there is a legal issue:
Venture capital, by its nature, typically asks for an
“equity stake” in the newly capitalized organization.
Nonprofit organizations cannot typically provide
equity stakes to for profit partners. Hence, traditional
venture capital is ill suited for the “start up” or cre-
ation of preservation entities. Even a for-profit cor-
poration dedicated to this mission won’t be able to
provide returns commensurate to the risk demanded
by venture capital.
However, a number of sources are well worth ex-
ploring. Indeed, alternative finance sources are how
our nation typically creates socially minded entities.
1. The NCDI Model
The prudent matching of government and
foundation awards could help stimulate the growth
of preservation oriented businesses. Here, history
serves as an excellent teacher. When our nation
couldn’t find “a magic pill ” for urban decline, we
decided to foster the creation and sustenance of
local, community development corporations
(CDCs). These organizations promised success
where federal, top down solutions had failed. In
1990, a dozen national foundations joined the federal
government in creating the National Community
Development Initiative (NCDI). Over the past
decade, approximately $25 million annually in low
interest loans and grants have been pumped
through Enterprise and LISC into CDCs in 23 cities.1
There is no theoretical reason why this model of
“risk capital” couldn’t be replicated to build and sus-
tain preservation entities. Of course, we would have
to determine what types of preservation entities
should be promoted. For example, I’m not sure that a
CDC approach to this issue is necessarily the only
means to achieve success. While there are many
strong, capable CDCs in the nation who should be
encouraged to preserve affordable housing, there is
not necessarily a one to one match between where
housing stock needs to be preserved and where a
capable, local CDC is located or has preservation as
part of its mission. That means we need both CDCs
and national and regional organizations willing to
take on this responsibility. Nevertheless, a preserva-
tion initiative between the federal government and
major foundations could well be the type of financ-
ing that jump-starts this industry.2
2. The Federal Grant Model
To the extent we are discussing the preservation of
HUD assisted or insured  or Rural Housing Service-
financed housing, the federal government has a
significant financial and, arguably, moral
responsibility. It was, after all, the federal
government that financed and assisted in the
creation of these 3 million plus apartments. And it
was the government which put in place the perverse
incentives of increasing Section 8 subsidies beyond
market to pay for bloated budgets, while at the same
time starving owners from increases needed for the
rehabilitation of the stock itself.
No one seriously disputes the government’s role.
Indeed, the federal government has determined, as a
matter of policy, that many of these apartments
should be saved. Over the past two years, HUD has
developed a number of tools making it simpler for
nonprofit owners in particular to save these proper-
ties. However, capable, sophisticated entities must be
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focus on:Multifamily Housing Excellence
created and sustained to use these new tools and to
make this preservation policy more than a dead letter.
In 1999 and 2000, the 106th Congress considered
wide ranging elderly and preservation legislation
dubbed “HR202.” Among its many other provisions,
HR202 provided that $10 million would be set aside
for a national competition for preservation oriented
nonprofit entities.3 HUD would have administered
this program and any nonprofit, from a local non-
profit to a major intermediary or nonprofit owner,
could apply for the funds. This grant could be used
for operating support for nonprofit preservation enti-
ties. As the new Administration determines its
budget and as Congress debates the HUD/VA
Appropriations measure for Fiscal Year 2002, we
should demonstrate the need for significant grant
support for capable preservation businesses, particu-
larly nonprofit organizations.
I am not urging that government pour free money,
year after year, into organizations that can’t compete.
However, government does have the responsibility to
at least contribute the resources needed to create
sustainable preservation entities.
3. The Internal Seed Model
After determining the need for a ‘niche’ housing
preservation organization to purchase larger
properties and portfolios where there was no local
interest or capacity, the National Housing Trust and
Enterprise Foundation made five year internal
“program related investments” to launch
NHT/Enterprise Preservation Corporation. These
organizations’ willingness to do so attracted others,
including the MacArthur Foundation, willing to
support internal operations over the first five years of
its existence. Similarly, the National Capital
Corporation has been “seeded” with $2 million in
grant funds from its parent organization, the
Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation. NCC is set
up to act as a “private” intermediary, providing
technical assistance and predevelopment loans to a
number of larger, competent multifamily producers
in the NeighborWorks® Network.
III. Sustaining The Preservation Entity.
After the entity is established, an entirely different
picture emerges. In marked contrast to the need for
“special” alternative financing or grants to create or
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sustain the operations of a new start up, once the
entity has a proven track record, there are any
number of ways to justify its continued success. In
particular, to the extent the entity relies on cash flow
to support its internal growth, the successful
purchase and operation of affordable housing will
sustain its operations.
As we all know, in any particular real estate
transaction there is a simple relationship between
the expense of available capital and the risk to which
it is being exposed. One pays a much higher pre-
mium for capital that takes a much higher perceived
risk. Here, unlike the start up operation, the growth
and expansion of the preserving entity is much eas-
ier to finance. Based on perceived real estate risk,
capital is willing to engage in a much more open and
fruitful discussion.
Whenever a deal is on the table, the conversation
turns to internal risk adjusted returns. Real estate
professionals who would no more invest in a start up
business than fly to the nearest galaxy are ready,
willing and able to make a market rate loan on a
multifamily asset. The difference, apart from the
obvious, is that the capital markets with which we
typically deal are much more interested in real estate
than in internal operations.
It is the real estate transactions, and their related
development fees and cash flows that support and
sustain operating preservation organizations.
Consider the following illustrative examples, all of
which help deals get closed and enhance the bottom
line for the preservation entity:
• Bridge Finance: National Housing Trust/
Enterprise and other nonprofits often want to tie
down properties through a credit facility. The con-
cept is to take down the asset with a Revolving Fund,
then take out the fund within three years. Take-outs
will be facilitated with either 501(c)(3) bond financ-
ing or through a combination of private activity
bonds and 4 percent tax credits. Financial services
firms who can manage interest-rate risk and who
realize the synergies of both bridge and permanent
financing will invest in such funds.
• Permanent Financing: Lenders with investment
banking capacity can provide 501(c)(3) take out
financing for the bridge loan. If the bridge product
for the property has been underwritten by the same
financial services institution, the investment banker
and original underwriter should be able to better
manage interest-rate risk, and bring lower cost
financing to the ultimate consumer — in this case, the
nonprofit purchaser. To the extent these efficiencies
are realized in the marketplace, lower-cost financing
should translate into a more affordable multifamily
housing product in the form of lower rents.
• Letters of Credit: Some lenders provide standby let-
ters of credit to help enhance the credit rating of
501(c)(3) bonds. This is essential when used with so-
called “Lower Floater” type bonds where the interest
rate of the bonds varies. To mitigate risk, the pur-
chaser needs to buy a cap on the rate.
• Direct Purchase of 501(c)(3) Bonds: Some finan-
cial institutions will privately purchase the 501(c)(3)
bonds for their own portfolios, lowering transaction
costs. For example, Fannie Mae and others directly
purchase 501(c)(3) bonds.
• Purchase of Tax Credits: Low Income Housing
Tax Credits are increasingly being used to help pur-
chase and renovate existing multifamily housing.
The same firm that provides the bridge and the take
out financing can purchase the property’s tax credits.
A financial institution could purchase the tax credits
and extend the loans in these situations.
Conclusion
In the life of any affordable, multifamily property,
capital infusion and fresh, invigorated ownership is
required. Available real estate capital and competent
stewardship are necessary for that to take place. We
focus most of our attention on the “deal capital.”
Let’s not lose sight of the need to build preservation
entities. Otherwise, our vision may turn out to be
nothing more than a lofty, unrealizable dream. u
1   For a description of NCDI, turn to Comeback Cities, Paul S. Grogan and Tony Proscio (Westview Press, 2000).
2   I have deliberately not tread on the issue of what intermediaries, if any should be used in the Preservation Initiative. It seems best to me for that question to
follow the discussion of whether an NCDI type initiative should be undertaken.
3  NHDC, a national preservation entity based in Southern California, has been able to secure up to $2 million in operating funds and $10 million in other funds
in the set asides provided in the VA-HUD, Appropriations Bill. That type of funding is obviously helpful to individual organizations and should be pursued. This
paper concerns more generic forms of capital that can be used for the creation and sustenance of all types of preservation organizations.
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T
hose of us in the nonprofit housing develop-
ment business are in it because we generally
believe that a decent, affordable home is the
platform for helping low-and moderate-income peo-
ple move into the mainstream of American life.
After a few decades of practice, we seem to know
how to build the platform. But while providing
affordable housing is a noble thing by itself, many of
us have taken on the challenge of adding services to
promote family self-sufficiency. So what about this
human development part of our housing develop-
ment vision? How does the home actually lead to the
mainstream? What should be the focus for this part
of our work? And how do we pay for it?…
Focus
Human development activities are generally thought
to include everything — from prenatal programs to
soccer leagues to science clubs to drug-abuse
prevention to job readiness to home-ownership
counseling to site-based health care for seniors —
and anything else that a public or private funder is
or can be persuaded to believe will remotely help
the poor.
Yet the everything-and-anything approach doesn’t
necessarily lead to the promised mainstream. More
often than not, it perpetuates a patchwork of well-
meaning but disjointed programs, which too often
add up to little for the intended beneficiaries. It also
fails to prioritize a set of activities with realistic
outcomes that can be cost-estimated, budgeted and
assessed for success.
If this scope of activity doesn’t get the results we
want, what does? In our work with public and
assisted-housing residents we believe three things
are critical: (1) offering case management to families
in our housing; (2) focusing the case management
on employment and income; and (3) helping fami-
lies build financial assets for the future.
Our case management uses the methods of social
work to achieve narrow, concrete, economically
focused goals for families. It involves engaging well-
trained professionals — as an augment to and not
necessarily a part of property management — to help
residents of our housing mediate the maze of human
services out there and advance their family plans.
And these plans should be principally focused on
jobs, jobs, jobs. We believe what William Julius
Wilson has shown in his research to be right:
Employment provides coherence, structure and pur-
pose for those not in the labor market. It is really the
only way for them to achieve a family-supporting
income that can pay the rent, build a cushion for
contingencies, cobble together a down payment on a
house or realize other dreams.
Beyond the jobs themselves, there is the need to
facilitate access to a range of supports that make
work pay — from making sure that residents take
advantage of the Earned Income Tax Credit each
year to getting their children in the state child health
insurance program, to tapping available subsidies
for child care and transportation.
The glue that holds all this together is a case man-
Sustaining Human
Development Through
Housing Development
by Patrick M. Costigan
Prepared for the panel: Funding for Services
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agement approach embedded with a solid workforce-
employment development methodology. One of the
most proven approaches we have found was devel-
oped here in Chicago by an organization called
Project Match, which has a 15-year plus track record
in helping public housing residents succeed in the
job market. My organization is fortunate to have a
working partnership with Project Match. LISC is also
beginning to work with Project Match in Chicago.
Finally, there should be a focus on building tangi-
ble financial assets that afford families meaningful
choices about jobs, housing, schools, and supporting
their children. There are lots of ways to do that, from
mobilizing our friends in the financial services
industry and foundation community to help capital-
ize savings or individual development accounts; to
supporting children in the kind of academic perform-
ance, financial planning, and “resume building” that
leads to two-or four-year college; to preparing resi-
dents for homeownership or small business owner-
ship; to increasing financial literacy and access to
mainstream banking services.
From our perspective, these are the basics. Other
human services should be aligned to them. Day care
slots, transportation assistance and even substance
abuse treatment should be attached to workforce-
employment development programming. Family
development should always have a goal of building a
sustainable income for a family. Educational
enhancements ought to be primarily targeted to
building the skills of adult job seekers and out-of-
school youth. Where a minimum wage employment
base is the norm on a property, education enhance-
ments can focus clearly on the academic success,
financial planning, and “resume building” that leads
children into post-secondary education and thus the
kinds of careers that change the financial strength of
an entire family. All should help create what former
HHS Assistant Secretary Peter Edelman has called “a
pathway to work.”
Doing all of this is within our reach and certainly
in our interest. We have a direct working relation-
ship with families who live in our housing. We sup-
ply or facilitate their use of a basic economic benefit
— a housing subsidy. This subsidy can be leveraged
to influence behavior, generate additional subsidies
and create opportunities for our residents. And even
more in our interest, if undertaken at an appropriate
cost to the property, these services prove cost effec-
tive to both the owner and the public subsidy
sources. The return on investment includes improve-
ment in both the short term annual performance as
well as long term physical, social, and economic via-
bility of our properties, especially those properties
deeply skewed to serve families under 50 percent of
area median income.
Welfare Reform: Pushing Housing Providers In New
Directions
In the wake of welfare reform, assisting residents to
succeed in employment and build assets is now an
essential part of the work of creating sustainable
housing and strengthening neighborhoods. Resident
success in employment is critical if we are to meet
steadily rising operating costs from rent increases
rather than federal subsidies, to continue to provide
excellent quality housing over time, and to maintain
housing assets that contribute to the economic and
social strength of the neighborhood over the long
term. But consider three recent realities:
We believe what William Julius Wilson has shown in his
research to be right: Employment provides coherence,
structure and purpose for those not in the labor market. It is
really the only way for them to achieve a family-supporting
income that can pay the rent, build a cushion for contingencies,
cobble together a down payment on a house or realize other
dreams.
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Welfare Reform and the Work-Based Safety
Net. For better or worse, the nation has adopted a
new social policy under which able-bodied adults
are expected to work, and must do so to qualify for
transitional assistance during periods of unemploy-
ment. As the first wave of five-year welfare time lim-
its draws near this year, we must work to mitigate
major social and economic disruptions at our prop-
erties. As housers, we will face a convergence of
TANF benefits termination, a depressed job market,
and shrinking family-support resources from State
TANF programs as the economic slowdown crimps
state budgets.
Transitional Assistance. Along with tying work
to assistance, welfare reform replaces permanent
income support with transitional, time-limited assis-
tance. The expectation that families will take control
of their financial future demands that we do every-
thing we can through case management to make
work pay and build the assets through IDAs, savings
vehicles, financial literacy, technological literacy,
etc., in the short run.
Performance. It is no longer acceptable to most
funders for human service providers merely to
address human development problems; they must
be resolved in a cost-effective manner, often accord-
ing to terms of a contract. The new contracting envi-
ronment increasingly forces providers to specify
quantifiable, measurable outcomes, to meet industry
standards of performance and to deliver outcomes at
a competitive price. A critical challenge for housers
is to determine what works, document both the real
outcomes and the true costs of the work, and build
these costs into project budgets, funding plans and
the like.
Paying for It 
If case management, workforce development and
asset-building are critical strategies in helping the
residents of our housing move successfully into a
more demanding mainstream, protecting property
performance over time, and ensuring that our
developments are positive social forces in the
neighborhood, how do we pay for it? And how do we
pay for it not just once or on a scatter-shot basis, but
over the life of our projects? Some places to look
include:
Direct Funding: Don’t overlook HUD and other
public sources. Although HUD channels most of its
budget into brick and mortar and transaction costs,
it does offer some support for human development
activities through programs such as Resident
Services Coordinators in elderly and multifamily
developments, Drug Elimination Grants, Youth
Build and HOPE VI Community and Supportive
Services. But act fast. New HUD Secretary Mel
Martinez has signaled his interest in transferring
these types of programs to HHS.
More and more of HUD, DOL, TANF and other
federal funds have been “devolved” for state and
local administration. Many can be linked to housing
projects. In New Haven, as a part of our agreement to
redevelop a troubled housing project in the central
business district, the city pledged Empowerment
Zone and Workforce Investment Board funds to the
deal.
Development/Operating Budgets: Leverage the
deal. On the capital side, a tax credit project can
include a resident services reserve to fund core staff
or services at the site level. Funding sources may
For better or worse, the nation has adopted a new social policy
under which able-bodied adults are expected to work, and must
do so to qualify for transitional assistance during periods of
unemployment. As the first wave of five-year welfare time
limits draws near this year, we must work to mitigate major
social and economic disruptions at our properties.
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agree to further subsidy levels in a development deal
if one of the uses of funds is to help support residents
to succeed in their tenancy. Operating budgets, at
least those supported by project-based rent subsidies
or public housing operating subsidies, can include a
resident services coordinator in a base budget under
a HUD ACC or HAP contract. Operating budgets in
LIHTC projects can sometimes include incentive
management fees that can be used to enhance site
services.
When acquiring HUD-owned, Mark-to-Market or
other troubled properties there is often an opportu-
nity to leverage operating commitments from own-
ers and financial sources. In more than a few of our
deals, we’ve been able to secure $30,000 to $250,000
per year from these sources. At Plumley Village, for
instance, a 450-unit HUD-owned development
Community Builders acquired in Worcester, we
negotiated $250,000 annually for resident services,
taken from net operating income prior to servicing
the HUD debt.
Fees: Think like a for-profit developer. Substantial
fees can also be earned in structuring and managing
capital pools that channel tax-driven investor capital
into LIHTC projects or commercial development
under the New Market Initiative. LISC’s National
Equity Fund and the Enterprise Social Investment
Corporation have earned considerable fees from
equity syndications for a while, but many large-scale
developers can also do this. Fees can be earned from
syndicating not only LIHTC but also Historic
Credits, New Markets Tax Credits, and Work
Opportunity Tax Credits.
Developers can earn loan origination fees and
interest rate spreads on internal financing such as
equity bridge loans, project predevelopment loans,
construction loans, mini-perms, and permanent
loans. And why not think about structuring fees as
incentives for successfully performing both physical
and human development work? Perhaps a fee struc-
ture could be proposed to financing sources where a
developer earns, over time, 8 to10 percent on devel-
opment and 5 to 8 percent on service activities.
Financial Structuring: Think like a banker.
Program Related Investments (PRIs) from
foundations or CDFI-subsidized bank loans can
provide developers with low-cost capital that we can
lend to our projects at market rates, and earn
interest income on the spread between our cost-of-
capital and the market rate. With enough deal
volume, the interest income earned could support
ongoing resident services costs (delivered in-house
or through outside providers).
Real Estate Land Banking: Think like a speculator.
Land in revitalizing communities appreciates in
value. That value is most commonly captured by
existing property owners and real estate speculators.
For housers, more aggressive efforts to capture the
increase in property values that results from a
comprehensive neighborhood revitalization,
through land banking and speculative acquisitions,
could generate additional resources for future
redevelopment and service activity. 
...assisting residents to succeed in employment and build
assets is now an essential part of the work of creating
sustainable housing and strengthening neighborhoods. Resident
success in employment is critical if we are to meet steadily
rising operating costs from rent increases rather than federal
subsidies, to continue to provide excellent quality housing over
time, and to maintain housing assets that contribute to the
economic and social strength of the neighborhood.
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Proceedings of the Symposium 
Chicago, Illinois, April 18, 2001
Welcome and Opening Remarks
Ken Wade, Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation
Paul Mazzarella, Ithaca Neighborhood Housing Services and Chair of NeighborWorks® Multifamily
Initiative Steering Committee
Conrad Egan, Millennial Housing Commission
KEN WADE: Good morning everyone.… I am the
Director of National Initiatives for Neighborhood
Reinvestment.… We want to welcome all of you
today to.… talk about this very important subject of
strengthening neighborhoods by creating long-term
multi-family assets.
Today’s symposium is being sponsored by the
Neighborhood Reinvestment Multifamily Initiative,
as well as our national training institute.… The
multi-family initiative at Neighborhood
Reinvestment is one of many national programmatic
initiatives we have going.… Over the years we have
grown in our ability and interest and programmatic
efforts to support groups that are involved in multi-
family activity. And today we have groups in our
network that own over 25,000 units of multi-family
housing.…
We wanted to acknowledge and thank Fannie Mae,
our generous sponsor for this event, and then we
also wanted to thank a distinguished group of folks
who worked with us to do the planning for this
forum: Michael Bodaken from the National Housing
Trust; Conrad Egan, National Housing Conference;
[Shekar Narasimhan] from Prudential; Nicholas
Retsinas, Joint Center for Housing Studies and
former board member of Neighborhood
Reinvestment …; David Smith, Recap Advisors;
Leslie Steen, Community Preservation; Charlie
Wilkins, Compass Group. We want to thank that
group of folks for working with us over the past few
months and putting this program together. So, if we
can give them a round of applause....
We have a very power-packed agenda today. I have
the distinct pleasure of introducing Paul Mazzarella,
who is the Executive Director of the Ithaca NHS and
the Chairperson of the Steering Committee for the
Multifamily Initiative.
PAUL MAZZARELLA: Thank you, Ken....Our
initiative is composed of 43 NeighborWorks®
organizations that are spread all across the United
States.… and we’ve created a shared vision about
how affordable multi-family housing should be
developed and operated. Briefly stated, our vision is
to create the tools and knowledge that will lead
directly to the development of sustained excellence
in affordable housing.
Now, what do we mean by sustained excellence?
First, it’s our goal to develop affordable housing that
will serve as long-term assets for the community.
Second,...it means that we’re seeking to develop
housing that in addition to being affordable, is also
financially viable to the owners of the properties.
This means the creation of projects that are well
capitalized, that have adequate operating and
replacement reserves, and that are developed by
stable, well-run organizations. It also means that
once these projects are built, they must be well-
managed....Our purpose is to practice sound asset
management from the very beginning leading to
projects that are built on solid planning....
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One of our core values is that the residents of our
housing are very important, and that our obligation
to these residents extends beyond simply providing
shelter. We’re seeking to create communities, not
just housing. And the communities that we’re trying
to create have to be places where the residents have
a meaningful life. So, we’re looking to provide
services to the residents and to provide the
opportunity for residents to play leadership roles in
the communities that we’re building.
We also value the creation of well-designed and
well-constructed projects that will be assets to the
communities rather than liabilities.… 
Next, it’s my pleasure to introduce Conrad Egan.
Conrad has long been at the center of the Affordable
Housing Discussions at a national level in our
country. He currently serves as the Executive
Director of the Millennial Housing Commission and
prior that was the Director of Policy for the National
Housing Conference. Conrad. 
CONRAD EGAN: Thank you, Paul, for that very kind
and blessedly brief introduction. … I particularly
would like to thank — in addition to the
Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation leadership
— Francie Ferguson for putting this together.…
I’d like to make three quick points and then turn the
event over to the panel that follows. First of all, I
look forward to taking lessons from today back to
the commissioners of the Millennial Housing
Commission. We, too, are committed at the staff and
the commission level and the congressional level to
the same kind of goals, Paul, that you outlined so
well there. And we look forward to our small
opportunity to advance those goals by putting
recommendations forward to Congress which will
strengthen and support the objectives that you
stated. …
The second thing I’d like to do is advance a
theory....I’m supposed to project some framing
remarks and I would suggest that we...have gone
through three phases. We learned some things. We
forgot a lot of things. And now we’re in the process
of re-learning some of the things that we forgot.
I first got hooked to housing when I was doing some
work in the neighborhoods of Detroit.…  and I can
remember being involved in the production of some
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221 D-3 BMIR properties on the inner west side of
Detroit. And actually had a chance to go back and
look at them, which I do periodically. And, you
know, they’re still doing pretty good. 
And I think some of the reasons why they are is that
they were first of all, market-oriented. They filled a
niche. They were well-scaled to the neighborhood.
They fitted into the neighborhood. They were
conservatively underwritten, so in addition to
providing funds for reserves [they] also provided
cash flow for emergencies. There was limited
dependence on deep subsidy. I don’t necessarily
mean to suggest there’s limited use of deep subsidies
like Section 8, but there is limited dependence on
deep subsidies at the front end. Long-term
ownership committed to making the properties
successful, and availability of resources.
And then we proceeded to forget a lot of those
lessons. Along came things like 100 percent Section
8, 221 D-4 insurance. You put those two together and
you could take that to the bank and get your
financing without any questions being asked — long
term Section 8 contract, 100 percent FHA insurance
— hey, the lenders ate that up. BSPRA, for those of
you who go back to that era, Builders and Sponsors
Project Risk Allowance, … which really made the
deals from the developers standpoint. Properties that
they could get into without putting any of their
money into it. And also, of course, we had 50 to 70
percent tax rates back then which made the
syndication a lot easier. And it also guaranteed that
the investors really didn’t care about the properties.
In fact, my friend David Smith wrote a book during
that era called “Subsidized Housing as a Tax
Shelter.” And that really says it, doesn’t it....
We also had easy site availability, you know, we
could go almost anywhere and do most anything—
whether it fit into the neighborhood or not. And also,
of course, credit after the credit crunch passed was
relatively easy. Unfortunately it came to be too easy.
And then the crash of the late 80s came for a variety
of reasons. But coming out of that, I really think that
we are now in the process of relearning many of the
lessons that we forgot. And I won’t go back and
repeat the litany that I did a few minutes ago about
the earlier years of developing assisted housing. But
I do want to encourage you strongly...to look at the
papers that Charlie Wilkins and David Smith and
Wendell Johns and Michael Bodaken and Pat
Costigan have prepared, because they really are
amazingly consistent. I shouldn’t say that I’m
amazed that they’re consistent, but they all say
pretty much the same thing — that what really
matters are those hallmarks of success that I
indicated earlier and that Paul laid out so well in his
remarks.
The third thing I’d like to do … is to issue a
challenge. … I would hope that coming out of this
event — and it’s not going to be something that’s
going to happen here today, but maybe we could
commit ourselves to moving in this direction — the
development of what I’ve characterized as a
standard term sheet. Some of my colleagues agreed
to my use of that term. But it seems to me that if we
could get the allocators of the tax credits, if we could
get the syndicators, the lenders, the equity investors,
the debt investors, the secondary market purchasers,
the HFA, FHA, all on the same page when it comes
to the terms that need to be met when these deals
are either initially underwritten or when they’re
underwritten on a preservation basis where the
properties are put back on, hopefully, a healthier
track. 
And it seems to me if everybody who’s in the
business — on the debt side, the equity side, the
subsidy side, the development side, the community
side, the finance side — is more or less adhering to
the same set of principles, then those of us who are
in the business of putting together these deals can do
so within the context of a set of rules that’s going to,
hopefully, insure and guarantee better success. 
Let me close by saying that I look forward — if you
decide to move in that direction — eagerly to
incorporating elements of those principles into the
recommendations of the Millennial Housing
Commission so that when we present them to
Congress, Congress, hopefully, will also support
them and help them to be implemented not only at
the federal, but at the state and the local level. So,
thank you for giving me the opportunity to frame the
session. And I look forward to being with you the
rest of the day and to the power-packed …
presentations that we’re going to have.
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RACHAEL ISKOW: I’m Rachael Iskow, the
Executive Director of Sacramento Mutual Housing
Association, a member of the NeighborWorks
®
network and the Multifamily Initiative. And I
welcome you to our first panel about affordable
housing excellence.... 
First I’ll introduce the panelists. Georgia Murray will
serve as our moderator for this panel. Georgia is a
trustee of the Urban Land Institute and serves on the
boards of Capital Crossing, the Friends of Boston’s
Homeless and the Women’s Education Industrial
Union. She previously was the principal of Boston
Financial from 1973 through 1999.
Charles Wilkins of the Compass Group is our lead
presenter for this panel. Charlie is a consultant on
affordable housing policy, finance and management
as well as property management. He is a financial
advisor to HUD’s Mark to Market Program and is a
member of Public Housing’s Operating Cost Study
Team. As senior executive with the National
Housing Partnership, Charles was responsible for
asset management of that organization’s 60,000 units
of affordable housing as well as its relationship with
Congress and HUD.
Leslie Steen is President and CEO of Community
President—Preservation and Development
Corporation, a non-profit that creates and preserves
affordable housing. Formerly, Leslie serves as
director of Portfolio Finance for the National
Corporation for Housing Partnerships and was also
the first executive director of Twin Cities Housing
Development Corporation, a non-profit created by
the cities of St. Paul and Minneapolis and the St.
Paul/Minneapolis Family Housing Fund.
Daniel Burke, our second panelist, has served as
Vice President of Development for the Chicago
Community Development Corporation since 1988.
In this capacity, he has been involved in the
What can our Product be?
Characteristics of Excellence
in Affordable Multifamily
Housing
What makes a property desirable for the residents, the neighborhood and the owner over the long term, and why
aren’t these properties the norm? Owners of outstanding affordable housing discuss what resources and practices
are needed to make excellence the standard.
Lead Presenter: Charles Wilkins, Compass Group
Moderator: Georgia Murray
Panelists: Joy Aruguete, Bikerdike Redevelopment Corporation
Daniel Burke, Chicago Community Development Corporation
Leslie Steen, Community Preservation and Development Corp.
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acquisition and rehabilitation of over 1600 units of
HUD assisted apartments. Daniel is an attorney and
has served as the Development Consultant for
groups purchasing Housing under HUD’s
Preservation Program in Illinois and Wisconsin.
Joy Aruguete, our first panelist, has served as
Executive Director of Bikerdike Redevelopment
Corporation for the past six years. She also
supervises the work of Humboldt Construction
Company, a for-profit subsidiary of that
organization. She is president of the Chicago Rehab
Network and serves as one of the Mayor’s
appointees to the City of Chicago’s Community
Development Advisory Committee.
CHARLES WILKINS: …I have a career as an owner
and a manager. However, at this point in my career,
I don’t own any apartments, I don’t manage any
apartments, I haven’t made any loans on any
apartments and I don’t regulate any apartments.
Which qualifies me to advise everybody who does.
So, that’s what I do for a living now. I’m a consultant.
And my value is that I have personally made almost
every mistake it is possible to make in apartments.
And that proves to be valuable to folks because I can
help them not make the same ones.
Affordable housing is difficult. It’s really worth
doing. When you do it well, it works much, much
better than when you do it kind of so-so....I would
emphasize the difficult part because we’ll be
throwing a lot of rocks today at things that haven’t
worked and things we’ve all done that aren’t so
good. But a lot of this is the consequence of
attempting things that are inherently difficult to
accomplish....
I won’t be going through the paper point by point
because I’ve heard that most of you have read it
already. In the first couple of pages, I talk about
some things that are dramatically better now than
when I started my career in affordable housing
about thirty years ago. And I think it’s really
worthwhile to celebrate those things and I want to
single out one point for celebration which is that we
have a large number of funders and allocators now.
It isn’t just HUD. We have state housing finance
agencies, other allocators of the tax credit program,
local governments through CDBG and Home which
means there’s a tremendous amount of innovation
going on. People are trying different things, stubbing
their toes, learning from each other. And one of
things that I would hope might come from today is
some ideas about how we can speed up the
innovation process. How can we broadcast the
lessons learned, make sure that everybody who is
doing the experimentation is figuring out very
quickly what works, do more of it, what doesn’t
work, stop doing that, and I would be real interested
in ideas about how to facilitate that.
I want to talk a bit about two points in the paper that
I think are worth a little additional discussion. One
of them is underwriting, generally. A lot of the points
I talk about have to do with getting too aggressive in
the underwriting of affordable housing. And
partially, it’s because we really want to get the deal
done, partially, it’s because we may have a sense
that it’s easier to get it done and fix it later than it is
to get it done right the first time. And part of it is, we
may be working from rules of thumb that were valid
in the context in which they were created, but aren’t
valid in affordable housing. And I wanted to drill
down into those things a bit.
In my experience, underwriting is a lot like property
management. Everybody brags on their property
management. Everybody criticizes everybody else’s
property management. I know this. I used to run to
big property management companies. Same thing
with underwriting. If you talk to lenders or tax credit
allocating agencies, they talk about how great their
underwriting is. They throw stones at everybody
else’s underwriting.
Now, the real truth of the matter is that these things
operate in a competitive environment. They’re
inherently difficult. Everybody is under time and
cost and quality pressures. And nobody does it
really, really well all the time. So, when I throw
rocks at underwriters, realize that I understand that
this is tough and you have to make tough decisions.
And things that look clear when you fly like the
eagles at 35,000 feet become progressively less clear
as you get closer to the ground.
So, some examples. I actually am coming to believe
that while it’s possible to improve underwriting
from the bottom up,...there’s a real need for top-
down change in the way we underwrite affordable
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housing. And I hope that this symposium is going to
lead to what Conrad called a term sheet, which is
more agreement on how affordable housing ought to
be underwritten so that it will be viable, so that we
don’t have lots of folks in the industry working from
the wrong rules of thumb....
In my consulting business, I run into all kinds of war
stories. For instance, one of my clients said to me:
“You know, we compete for tax credits in this
particular state and we have to lie in the proposals,
because if we tell them what our operating costs
really are, we won’t get funded.”
So, the state is working from a benchmark that...isn’t
valid in affordable housing, and as a result we have
something goofy going on in the tax credit allocation
process. There ought to be a way of fixing that. I’m
not sure I know exactly what it is, but the sort of
term sheet approach Conrad was talking about
might help.
My pet peeve on rules of thumb, is operating
expenses as a percentage of income. That sort of
makes sense out there in conventional apartment
land, but it doesn’t make much sense in affordable
housing where our rents are all over the map. So,
you can have properties that are physically identical,
but have dramatically different rents because of who
they’re serving, what neighborhood they’re in. And,
of course, the operating expense ratio will be really
different in the property of the low rents as opposed
to the property with the high rents. So, that’s an
example of a rule of thumb that’s imported from
another context that makes no sense in our context.
And my big pet peeve is the affordable housing deal
that’s just wound too tight. It doesn’t have rents that
are really achievable. We have the rents that look
good on paper, but we all know we can’t get those
rents in the real world. There’s a vacancy allowance,
but it’s not really adequate. Maybe it’s based on the
vacancy we’ve seen in the last year or so in our hot
as a pistol market. But real estate markets change.
Over about a six year cycle, we normally see up
markets and down markets and the vacancy
allowance should reflect that. 
We’ve seen underwriting with unrealistic operating
expenses. The operating expenses that might occur
if you had the most wonderful site manager on the
planet and if the most wonderful property manager
in your portfolio was watching the property full time
all the time. And if nothing went wrong. And if the
utility rates didn’t change.…And if nobody who lived
there had any pets or kids or parties. 
You want to get the deal over the goal line. You
convince yourself you can actually make it work,
and you really shouldn’t. And your lender shouldn’t
and your tax credit allocator shouldn’t, but we all do
it. And somehow or other we have to get past that.
I’m hoping that some of the work that Georgia and I
and others are doing with the public housing
operating cost study may help with that. We’re doing
fairly advanced statistical analysis on huge data
bases of apartment operating expenses and I’m
hopeful we’ll come up with some useful rules of
thumb and some more sophisticated ways of looking
at operating expenses that’ll help us all to get that a
little closer to the mark.
Reserve deposits. The FHA standard for reserve
deposits will fund about half of the on-going capital
needs of the property. This was a valid rule of thumb
in the 1960s when it was developed because people
I run into all kinds of war stories. For instance, one of my
clients said to me: “You know, we compete for tax credits in this
particular state and we have to lie in the proposals, because if
we tell them what our operating costs really are, we won’t get
funded.” –CHARLES WILKINS
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could resyndicate properties every five or 10 years.
You could raise cash. You could put half of it in the
property and half of it to the seller or the buyer or
whomever. And you could supplement the reserve.
In the conventional apartment world, we use reserve
deposits — 250, 300, 350 dollars a unit a year. It’ll
fund about half the ongoing needs of the property. It
works just fine because in the conventional world,
we’re using low debt amounts and we’re typically
using short loan terms. It may be a thirty-year
amortization, but it’s due in ten 10, due in 12 due in
seven. 
So, it makes sense there. But, guess what, in
affordable housing, we try to do long-term, fixed-
rate, self-amortizing financing, we’re not planning
on raising the rents dramatically fifteen years from
now to pay for fix-up. We can’t resyndicate every
five or ten years like we could thirty years ago. So, I
have come to the view that we have to have a much
bigger reserve deposit in our deals than other people
have in their deals. And this is part of figuring out
our rules of thumb that have to be different from
other people’s rules of thumb.
I’m actually a big fan of capital needs assessments.
These are these fancy, twenty-year engineering
studies that tell you what the real number is. I’m a
huge fan of those and I think that those have to be
part of the way we do affordable housing going
forward. 
So, those are some ideas about underwriting, and I
guess where I’m coming to is we need to develop
our own rules of thumb, talk about them, adopt
them....Our business is developing its own way of
looking at things so that our properties don’t have to
get reworked every ten years or fifteen years or
twenty years. Because I get worried about this. We
can’t do affordable housing unless [Congress] gives
us lots of money every year. Because affordable
housing is always worth less the day we open the
door than it took to build it because we’re working
with lower rents, because we want to serve people at
rents they can afford. So, we always need half or
two-thirds of the construction and development
costs to be paid for with grants. And the grants come
from government.
I worry that the government is going to be reluctant
to keep giving us all this money if we have to keep
bailing out the properties we’re doing. Because if
[Congress] thinks the properties they’re funding
today are going to need another bite of the apple ten
or fifteen years from now, it’s going to make them
much less enthusiastic about giving us the money to
do our deals now. So, I think it’s incumbent on us to
do deals that will work for the long term, say no if
they won’t work, keep working on them until they
do, so that we have better stories to tell to people
who give us all this money.
Second thing I wanted to talk about was
neighborhoods. It’s my theory that ten years from
now when we talk about affordable housing
underwriting and affordable housing development,
people will start by looking at the neighborhood. You
know, right now, people start by looking at the
sponsor and the design and the pro-forma. I think
we’re going to start looking at the neighborhood
first. So, we ought to start looking at the
neighborhood now. 
And what kinds of neighborhoods make for really
wonderful, affordable housing properties. I’m
coming down on the side of viable neighborhoods as
the site for affordable housing. There are some
really powerful things that come from that. First, the
market rents in the neighborhood are north of the
rents [that] it takes to operate our properties. This
gives us much more flexibility in operating the
properties. It attracts a mixed income clientele
naturally without having to jump through hoops and
stand on our heads and spit jellybeans. We have a
community, not just a collection of people who live
next door to each. The real estate value is likely to
increase over time which, again, gives us flexibility
and improves the sustainability of the property over
time.
So, the corollary question for me is, can we do
wonderful, affordable housing in bad
neighborhoods? And I think the answer is yes, but.
And the first but is you really have to have 100
percent deep subsidy to do great affordable housing
in a tough neighborhood. And that constrains a lot of
things. It means you aren’t going to get a mixed
income profile more likely than not. It means you
probably are heavily dependent on the government’s
good will for the next 20 or 30 years, which you
wouldn’t be in the better neighborhood. I also
believe history shows we need more operating
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expenses in the tougher neighborhoods. So, our
underwriting has to be a little more generous.
There’s more things that can go wrong. You’re more
likely to need non-housing services in the tougher
neighborhoods. So, I guess we can do wonderful,
affordable housing in difficult neighborhoods, but
we have to be careful about it and realize it’s going
to cost a little more and we have to build a more
robust property financially, physically, socially and
in every other way.
Final thing I would say is before we go charging into
this bad neighborhood to do affordable housing, I
believe ten years from now, the community
development folks will believe that the saving grace
for a bad neighborhood is to let the real estate values
drop to a point that private investment will come in,
that new, private citizens without subsidies will
willingly invest their dollars in the neighborhood for
home ownership or rental or business or whatever.
And that that’s the point where the neighborhood
will come back. And a lot of what we do when we
intervene in difficult neighborhoods is we are
delaying the decline of value and we are getting in
the way of the revival of that neighborhood. So, I
think we have to be careful about how we move into
difficult neighborhoods. Affordable housing can be
part of it, but we need to take some care.
Final point on neighborhoods—I’ve done a lot of
teaching at the University of Maryland lately in
combination with a part of the solution, lady named
Jacqueline Rogers who was Secretary of Housing for
the State of Maryland. And we do a lot of case studies
on affordable housing development in pretty good
neighborhoods. The lesson that comes from that is
you can get past neighborhood concerns in viable
neighborhoods. There will be more concerns in the
viable neighborhoods than in the difficult
neighborhood. It takes longer. You need another
year in your pre-development process to work with
the neighborhood. But when you come out the other
end, you have a much better property. And I think
that’s probably the future for affordable housing: To
realize that to do it the right way it’s going to take a
little bit longer. We do need to consult the
neighborhood up front and have a more inclusive
process.
As Conrad [Egan] said, thirty-years ago, we could go
anywhere, do anything. You pull the right political
wires, you could get your site control and everything
was fine. And it doesn’t work that way now. We need
to work with the stakeholders and take a little more
time. I’ll close with that [thought] and Georgia, back
over to you.
GEORGIA MURRAY: Thanks, Charlie. With
Charlie’s great sort of setting the framework, we’re
going to get the panel and give everybody about two
to four minutes for their personal pet peeve in terms
of what should change or their wonderful story
about how they’ve done everything right...and then
we’re going to open it up to some audience questions
and some discussion. It’s not like we have all the
answers. But we do want to give everybody a
chance. So, Leslie.
LESLIE STEEN: Okay, when I was asked to join this
group, I explained it to other people that I was asked
to be on a panel to tell people the things that I’ve
done wrong as a developer that I [now] know better. 
Anyway, Charlie has raised many, many good
points. And I think [that in] the world we’re living in,
we are so constrained by our limited resources that
there are lot of decisions that happen that aren’t
right. I know that all of us have difficulty with public
agencies. One of my pet peeves is the public
agencies that we all negotiate with when we’re
putting together whatever piece of the financial
puzzle it is. You go in, you put together a pro-forma,
you explain it to people and they say, “Oh, no, it can’t
cost that much.” And “Oh, no, you can’t have
operating expenses that high.” Or, one of the things
that I did 10 years ago when I started working in the
State of Maryland. I walked in the door with a
replacement reserve of 250 per unit and they went,
“Oh, no, we do it at...” — I don’t remember the
number — but 125 or something like that. And I said,
“Oh, no, that’s not realistic.” Well, 250 isn’t realistic
either. And Charlie knows that. And I think many
other people know that as well. 
We look for long-term, fixed financing — typically a
30-year loan. We go in and we do as substantial a
rehab as we can afford to do. And I like to do a whole
lot because I say there’s one bite at the apple. Well,
then somebody comes along and says, “Why don’t
you do a forty-year mortgage? FHA will give you a
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forty-year mortgage.” And I go, “Well, you know,
thirty years…the mortgage is paid off, I can
refinance. I can get some more money into this
project when it needs it because the replacement
reserve hasn’t been adequate.” You make decisions.
We’ve learned mistakes but we’re still making
mistakes today.
I wish we could recognize grants for what they
really are because we often operate in an
environment using tax benefits, we do contorted
things that turn grants into loans.…And that’s
foolishness. Let’s recognize it.…I think what’s
probably deepest in my heart of lessons that I have
learned over the years — and let me say I started out
as a market-rate developer doing historic renovation
in changing neighborhoods. I became a condo
developer. I was on the for-profit market-rate side
and it wasn’t until the early 1980s that I moved into
affordable housing. A lot of similarities between
working in older, deteriorating neighborhoods doing
market rate things and doing affordable housing. If
you look at revitalizing neighborhoods. I moved
from doing market rate into doing 100 percent low-
income. Today, if there is anything I can do, I will
not do 100 percent low-income because I’ve spent
ten years now going in and fixing broken projects.
And one of the most important things is that we need
a mix of incomes—not in every circumstance. Let me
say that what I believe is not one-size-fits-all. And
what Charlie [Wilkins] was saying … look at the
neighborhood and look at what your goal is. … [Is]
your primary purpose to create housing for low-
income people? Are you trying to do some
revitalization? Are you trying to attract people back
into a neighborhood? Or are you trying—the project
that’s near and dear to my heart is Edgewood
Terrace in Northeast Washington. We were trying to
serve a group of very, very low income tenants, and
at their request, attract higher income people back
into the community. The projects like that have to be
hand crafted. And our lenders, our equity providers,
our public agencies, have to recognize that and work
with us on it.
DANIEL BURKE: …I like Charlie’s point that
difficult inner-city properties can succeed. And one
of the perceptions, I think that’s been out there is
that either they can’t or are not succeeding. And
sure, there are examples to point to. I like to look at
the cup being a little bit half full and look at some
success we can have. And one example is what I call
the “McDonalds factor” [where a company] invested
in a deal in a very difficult community based on the
fact that they saw a McDonalds in the neighborhood
after seeing a fair amount of things I didn’t want
them to see. And they… had the view that if it could
sustain a McDonalds, it could sustain a credit
investment.
And luckily to date it has succeeded and it’s next to a
large site that the city is [now] redevelop[ing], not
solely because this project got done, but I think if
this project had been demolished or continued to
decay, the USX site would have some issues....
I think place-based service...is working.
Neighborhood network centers work. I—frankly,
there’s some people in the room that started that
program. I thought it was a little bit of a photo op
ribbon-cutting at the beginning as a developer. Great
to have. Will it work? And they really do work. And
we have about five of them and one guy who started
the first one is now actually doing the development
of the additional centers and has developed a
Often, people blame property management when, in fact, the
development was cut short the day that you closed on the
development when you under-represented your operating costs
because somebody told you that they were too high.  
–JOY ARUGUETE
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business in it. And so, I have found that the
computer technology...helps strengthen the
development, and strong multi-family strengthens
neighborhoods. It’s simple, but it’s true.
I guess the other aspects of place-based assistance in
a welfare-to-work environment...is having some
success at doing job training. And I think we have to
do more and more of that. We find people where
they are housed. They’re facing certain deadlines.
They have to have the skills to be able to face that
reality, and delivering those [skills] at the site is an
efficient way to do it.…
I really think we have to…look at our projects when
we’re not deeply subsidized with Section 8. Are we
hitting people at 40 percent of median? I think that’s
my benchmark. If I can get rent at 30 percent or 40
in the deal, then I think I’m doing affordable
housing. If I’m at 55, I’m at $950 for a two-bedroom
apartment in Chicago and I don’t think I’m really
adding too much to the system. So, I think that may
cost more in soft money. It may mean fewer total
units get done, but I think that’s a price worth paying
to get to a target where you’re really serving people
who need the federal assistance.
GEORGIA MURRAY: Thanks, Dan. Joy, do you want
to wrap up the—this part of the panel for us?
JOY ARUGUETE: Okay. Well, let me start off by
saying I really want to emphasize and agree [that]
people involved in affordable housing development,
not look at ourselves as affordable housing
developers, but to look at a broader perspective of
developing communities and looking at the
residents who live in those communities. And
building the kind of housing that is suitable for those
kinds of families. So, for instance, if we’re in a
community that has larger families, despite the fact
that all of us know it’s much more difficult to
manage large units, it—it also is what’s suitable to the
families in those communities....
I want to talk about this idea of capping total
development costs. And while I think we need to be
disciplined as community developers, developers of
affordable housing, I think that we are often placed
in a position of not making good development
choices when we are forced to adhere to total
development costs that we know don’t bring
sufficient revenue up front to do a good job in the
development.… I agree with what Leslie said. We
also try to do substantial rehab on all the properties
we do unless, of course, it’s new construction…. But
if we don’t put in enough money up front, then it
does have an impact in the life of the property and,
ultimately, drives our operating costs up.
So, I think that it’s a worthwhile fight to have with
our state and our city here in Chicago.…[L]imiting
total development costs…has put many properties in
jeopardy.
…Often, the reason that government wants to limit
total development costs is because they want to try
to stretch their HOME dollars further and there’s
obviously a lot of competition for tax credits and
HOME.… But it’s important to try to bring enough
money in up front… and I just want to
acknowledge…that good property management is
absolutely essential to any affordable housing
development. But often, people blame property
management when, in fact, the development was cut
short the day that you closed on the development
when you under-represented your operating costs
because somebody told you that they were too high.
And so, it’s important not to under-represent...those
operating costs because it really cost that much to
operate the development and it’s worth having that
fight....
We’ve heard a lot about development in
communities that are dilapidated….We work in
gentrifying communities…preserving housing for
people who are being forced out of the
community….And there are a lot of speculators in
this type of environment. This is a special condition
that we’ve had to really talk through with everybody
involved in putting money into the development.
Yes, acquisition costs are going to be higher. It’s
going to drive total development costs up. 
And that’s just the way that it is.…the fact of the
matter is that lower-income people have to live
somewhere and there’s no housing being built for
them. And they’re just getting pushed around. And
we’re not actually improving our economy for
everyone. We’re just improving the economy in
certain neighborhoods. So, I’ll stop there.
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GEORGIA MURRAY: Okay.…one of the things that
you’ve all touched on is sort of the unreality of
underwriting and what do we do about that…. [I]f
excellence in affordable housing means really good
underwriting and we’re all kind of lying to each
other in terms of what the costs are—in terms of
running the property or the costs of replacement
reserves—what are some of the strategies that we can
use to have that change?
CHARLES WILKINS: Well, I think a lot of it has to do
with transparency. We have to have more
information out there that’s readily accessible to
everybody, so that funders and lenders and cities
can look at actual data for development costs or
operating costs and see that the costs that are being
proposed are within the range of what’s actually
occurring in similar properties. So, I think some of
the work that we’re doing with the cost study may be
helpful in that regard and some of the work that
HUD has done in collecting information about tax
credit properties may be able to be expanded on to
make those data bases available so people can say,
oh, yeah, well, if you do this kind of property in this
kind of neighborhood with this sort of unit, it really
is going to cost about this much. And it will be
helpful for people not to have to rely on imperfect
rules of thumb....
MOSSIK HACOBIAN: I just want to point out we’re
talking as if this is only about underwriting.…first of
all, I don’t think there is a tough neighborhood or a
bad neighborhood. I think it’s really a consequence
of a lot of decisions that sometimes are not made for
the right reasons.…there is this conventional
wisdom that if you’ve got the house in a big lot and
there’s no sidewalks and you can’t talk to your
neighbors, that’s somehow a good neighborhood. So,
I think we need to change the frame of reference
about how we’re talking about these places.
In a neighborhood, you don’t have the choice to
walk away from a six-unit or a twenty-unit building
that is bringing down the whole neighborhood. It
might not be a good underwriting decision, but if as
a neighborhood-based organization, you don’t do
that project, you’re not serving the neighborhood. So,
you have to look at the underwriting in a different
way. And I would suggest that…you should really
underwrite the organization that is doing the work.
In practice, that’s what we do. We are able to secure
financing to buy projects before we have a take-out
strategy because the lender or the investor trusts our
track record and our commitment to that neighbor-
hood.…what we’d like to see as NeighborWorks
®
organizations is the system’s willingness to continue
to increase their investment in us and let us
underwrite the neighborhood and let us underwrite
the project.
…Finally, on the underwriting, I don’t think we’re
lying to each other. I don’t think we can know what
the real number is. The fact is there is a threshold.
We just don’t agree with it. It’s not as if we’re not
being told what it should be. It’s not as if people don’t
tell us what the ratios are. When there isn’t enough
money to do everything you need to do, you make
certain best guesses now and then you build on that
over time….
GEORGIA MURRAY: Well, a couple of issues you’ve
raised. One is: It may not be one-size-fits-all on the
underwriting, but is there more that can be gotten
from knowledge of what’s happening, both in local
markets and national understanding of what it really
takes?…as Charlie pointed out,…if you make the
best estimate on rents, the lease vacancy,…
everything is going to run smoothly. My favorite
thing used to be that somebody would say, well, the
pipe broke that year…so don’t underwrite that. Tell
me a property that a pipe doesn’t break one year?
You know, you can’t do that….under-capitalized
properties can almost be as bad for a
neighborhood…because it brings the whole thing
down.
MOSSIK HACOBIAN: …real life example, twenty
years ago, we took on a scatter site, twenty-seven
unit development where we would basically make
the operating costs whatever they had to be to
support the debt….That was one of our first projects
[and] it was the wrong way to do things. Had we not
done that, one of the projects would have been torn
down because HUD had condemned it….the tenants
came to us and said, “Save our building.”
…We did it wrong in the first place. We fixed it ten
years later and we continued to fix it until now, it
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needs one more round of fixing, but we’re
negotiating that with the state....
GEORGIA MURRAY: But that brings up the whole
thing of resources. How do we look to Congress if we
keep going back and saying we have to fix what we
just fixed.
UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT: I’d like to point out
another problem as far as underwriting. We’ve been
developing, for about ten years, apartments in the
tax credit area. It used to be…that you built a five
million dollar project [and] you had a three [or]
three and a half million dollar mortgage on it. And
you underwrote it so you had sixty or seventy
thousand dollars cash flow. Now you raise more
equity, you put rents on, you put soft money on it,
and the same five million dollar project now only
has a million dollar mortgage and it’s got twenty
thousand dollars cash flow. There’s no cushion for
error….the chance of failure of projects are going to
be so much more today than deals that we did five,
six, seven years ago….
My other pet peeve…is,…should we be spending
$120,000 to rehab an old building versus building a
new unit the same size with modern conditions for
$60,000?…can we produce more homes and serve
more families?
And then [my] third peeve is…dispersal of
poverty….When you go back into the inner
city…and recycle, recycle, recycle,…but if you’ve got
greenfields out there with good school districts we
[could] disperse poverty [by] building new
construction, putting them in good schools in a
mixed income environment, smaller projects,
recreation centers, youth programs, support
systems, school bands and soccer programs,
baseball…and all these things that they get that
elevate that kid….you just can’t…rehab that old
shelter and expect everything’s going to change.
You’ve got to change the environment.
GEORGIA MURRAY: Thank you….Do you take all
that and put it into very low income, because that’s
where the real need is, or do you mix it to have a
sort of variance. Dan, do you want to talk about that?
T
H
E
 N
E
IG
H
B
O
R
W
O
R
K
S
®
JO
U
R
N
A
L
SU
M
M
ER
 2
0
0
1
37
DANIEL BURKE: Well, I think you’ve just framed
the issue. I’d welcome hearing what people think
about it in the field, because I think “mixed income”
is a mantra that…makes some sense….Conrad
[Egan] has advanced some ideas relating to tilting
[tax] credits—more credits for more lower-[income]
units….Is it a resource eater…or is it really building
strong communities?
GEORGIA MURRAY: Comments from anybody. All
you practitioners out there?
UNIDENTIFIED: I would like to pick up on
something that Charlie [Wilkins] said earlier
and…frame it slightly differently….Underwriters
simply respond to a set of givens, and we then
provide them with information based on those
givens. So, two points, and I’d like to hear the panel
respond to both of them. One is…much of what
we’ve been doing in the past [is] the production of a
unit that represented a price range that we defined
as affordable. And yet as we move forward and deal
with community and neighborhood issues and
resident issues, we’re finding that we’re trying to
accomplish a lot of other things that have cost
consequences…but weren’t necessarily built into
the…underwriting and therefore are not reflected in
any of the numbers.
The second is…we had to develop designs that
enabled us to only ask [for funding] once. And I just
have to say that is naïve, and not the way that
markets have worked for centuries….In a regular
market process, developments and communities get
continually reinvested in. The capital comes from a
variety of sources and nobody…presume[s] that they
can identify all of the needs for a future at one time.
So, what we have here is an incredible challenge…to
educate funders…so that they have a clear
understanding that this is an on-going process if
they want healthy neighborhoods and healthy
communities.
CHARLES WILKINS: I think…defining a different
outcome is a very productive way of looking at this
because maybe what’s been happening in the past is
the outcome that’s been desired is a property that
achieves a rent that we’re interested in at day one—
without much attention paid to whether it’s viable
ongoing. And that’s the outcome we have achieved.
And if we defined a different outcome, we could
achieve a different outcome. So, I think that’s very
perceptive….
As to whether it’s realistic, I ran a big portfolio of
properties that were aging and the thing that I
noticed is that when they needed to be re-invested
in, more often than not the resources weren’t there
because the resource cycles didn’t have anything to
do with the property[’s] needs. And this has lead me
to look for properties that are internally self-
financing. So,…not a forty year loan which pays
down nothing in twenty years, but a thirty or twenty-
five year loan that pays down a lot so that at year
fifteen or twenty, the property can refinance itself,
raise some capital and sustain
itself….because…[with] forty year financing and
inadequate reserves, only the government can
provide the funding it takes to redo the property at
ten or fifteen or twenty years, and my experience
suggests that we’ll have trouble with the properties if
we do it that way….
GEORGIA MURRAY: Great. Well done. Thank you
very much for your attention.
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JERRY SCHECTER: My name is Jerry Schecter. I’m
Executive Director of West Side Housing in Kansas
City, Missouri. The second panel will engage us this
morning with a different kind of a question. What
are the characteristics of excellence in ownership
entities? Who are our producers? What defines good,
better and best and what are the barriers to becom-
ing best. We’ll have a look at cross-currents among
for-profits, not-for-profits and investment banking.
But first let me introduce the people who will be
leading us in this discussion.
On my left is Helen Dunlap who’s the President of
Shorebank Corporation and CEO of Shorebank
Development Corporation, the real estate
development arm of Shorebank. Ms. Dunlap is our
panel moderator and I’m told, provocateur. 
To her left is David Smith, who’s a founder and
President of Recapitalization Advisors, which is a
Boston-based firm which specializes in finance of
existing, affordable housing. Mr. Smith has a track
record of designing and implementing innovative
and rigorously sound financial transactions. Mr.
Smith is our lead presenter this morning.
To his left is Wendy Dolber who’s the Managing
Director for Standard & Poors in Public Finance
Ratings. And she’s the manager of the Public
Finance Tax Exempt Housing and Structured
Finance Group. 
To her left, last but not least, Sister Lillian Murphy
who is President of Mercy Housing since 1987 which
is engaged in community development activities
across the country. 
HELEN DUNLAP: I’m going to turn it over to David
in one moment. I just want to reiterate that the focus
of this panel is excellence in ownership and we
assume that for this discussion we’ve inherited all
those interesting dilemmas that we discussed relat-
ing to the last panel.
Who are our Producers?
Characteristics of Excellence
in Ownership Entities
Long-term housing requires highly qualified long-term ownership structures, which prove capable at diversifying
their portfolio, handling problems, controlling their profitability and organizational viability, and accessing risk
capital. What characteristics define good, better and best owners? How can we encourage improvement in
ownership entities? Investors and preservation-owners will discuss how they address these characteristics, and
how the financing sources’ underwriting and terms affect their ability to grow these capacities.
Lead Presenter: David Smith, Recapitalization Advisors
Moderator: Helen Dunlap, Shorebank Advisory Services
Panelists: Wendy Dolber, Standard & Poors
Sr. Lillian Murphy, Mercy Housing
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DAVID SMITH: We’re in tab three of your hymnal,
and I’d like you to turn – well, I’ve got Sister Lillian
on the panel, so I can certainly make all of those
jokes….
Most of the affordable housing finance and
development and resource allocation systems that
we have in this country, and have had for
approximately 32 years, are built on the false
premise that to develop this stuff is hard and to
manage it is easy. Now, that was true in 1969. In
1969, FHA multifamily insurance was this “way-
cool,” hot new high-tech product. And it was the
only product that we had. And it delivered this way-
cool, hot new high tech-idea — cheap rents. And
everything was going to be great because we had
cheap rents. And budget-based rents so that the
rents would only advance in the little increments
that we needed to keep the developments healthy.
And that worked just wicked, awesome, fantastic
until the Arab oil embargo. And all of a sudden this
great program crashed and cratered and burned and
we had 93 percent default rates in Ohio and things
like that.
And then we did something else, which was a way-
cool, new, high-tech, hot solution. And it was called
Project-Based Section 8. Now Project-Based Section
8 was a warm toasty blanket. We wrapped ourselves
in Project-Based Section 8….We didn’t have to worry
about any outside environments. We had our
Project-Based Section 8 and we had… rents that
were way up there. And if you came into our
developments…you paid 30 percent of your income
for rent and if you quit your job the day after, you got
a 30 percent rent decrease. And I was getting $800 or
$900 a month in rent in a $400 neighborhood and it
was way-cool.
Well, as I discovered this morning at 6:15 when my
alarm clock went off, at some point, you have to get
out from the fuzzy blanket. And that happened in
1995 when our friends in Congress said, you know,
$900 rents in $400 markets is not way-cool
anymore….And since then, we’ve been living with
the consequences of this exciting discovery that the
Congress has provided us. And in effect, we are
being…evicted from the warm, fuzzy cocoon in
which we lived from about 1978 through about 1995.
We are being driven out into market land. And it’s
cold out there in market land. We empower tenants
and you know what they do? The first thing they do,
they get up and they leave….
But at the same time, we discovered that the warm
fuzzy cocoon was also a trap. We forgot that the
tenant was the customer. We forgot that charging
rent above market is not something to be proud of.
It’s possibly an indication of at least waste and
inefficiency if not anything else. We also forgot that
if you live in that warm fuzzy cocoon for a while, all
sorts of useful skills atrophy and wither away and
you forget about them. And you become convinced
that simply because you care about the stuff, you
must be a good owner.
And then along comes the bracing tonic of market
impact. And the loss of Property-Based Section 8 and
the federal government’s withdrawal from its
previous paternalistic approach. And even possibly
that …[a] recession might come up. And all those 85
percent debt-service coverage tax credit deals that
we’ve all been doing...might suddenly come
crashing down into default….
The paper I wrote…talks about the elements that
define a good owner....To some degree, a good
owner is somebody who isn’t one of the four things
Most of the affordable housing finance and development and
resource allocation systems that we have in this country are
built on the false premise that to develop this stuff is hard and
to manage it is easy.  –DAVID SMITH
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that [defines] a bad owner.
A good owner is someone who runs good projects
for a long time. Not the day we pro-forma it. Not the
day we finance it. Not the day it even reaches final
endorsement or construction completion or initial
occupancy, but for a long time….
… one attribute of a good owner…is that you
actually care about the housing….One of the tests I
have of a good property manager [or] good resident
manager [is when]you walk into the property, she
talks about “my property.” What “my property’s”
doing compared to the other property and how I’m
competing….
But a good owner in conventional is not the same as
a good owner in affordable. A good owner in
affordable has to do two things….The first thing is
you have to…care about the housing. You have to
have a mission heart. You have to believe that
affordable housing is a good goal.
But the second thing—the thing that is in my way of
thinking non-tradable, is you have to have a
business head….You have to advocate for the
property. And some of the people you have to
advocate…against are its residents, because they
don’t understand that it’s an organism and will die.
They do what’s known in business terms as the free
rider problem. They figure if I just do this, it doesn’t
make any difference. And…from their point of view,
it doesn’t. So, that business head means that you
advocate for the property…against virtually
everyone else who might be your funder, might be
your stakeholder, might be your constituent, might
be your elected official. You advocate for the
property….
I will close by telling you the four mentalities that I
think define the “bad owner.” …The first bad
mentality is brass ring mentality that says, I only
have a one in “n” chance of getting something, so
I’m going to do everything I can to lurch for the
brass ring. Brass ring mentality leads to deals that
are wound too tight. And secondary missions that
become more important than primary missions and
housing that gets messed up.
The second mentality that is understandable but is a
bad mentality is the “one bite” mentality. We get one
bite at the apple, so we’re going to take a big bite.
Well, the problem with taking a big bite is that not
many people can take a big bite and the unit costs
gets very large. And when the unit costs get very
large, the deal gets wound tight and we’re stitching
all the sources together and the big bite supports a
further big bite.
The third mentality that I’m not so fond of is the
“cash-out” mentality. Now, there are two times in an
affordable housing transaction when you can cash
out—at the beginning and at the end. I must say
having worked these things out, invested in them,
syndicated them, you know, done just about all the
things that Charlie’s done except rented apartments,
I have a problem with big cash development fees. I
don’t have a problem with some cash development
fees, but I have a problem with big cash
development fees because the day after a big cash
development fee has been paid, I’m now in a
negative position when it comes to motivating my
sponsor. And somebody who’s in for that cash-out
mentality at final endorsement or last tax credit
equity payment, I get worried about—particularly
because they normally have pledged that cash to
finance the next transaction. And if I don’t give it to
them, their whole development organization comes
down and the deals come down.
The other cash out is of course at the end. I don’t
want converters. I don’t want people who think
residual value and want to kick all the poor people
out is the way I’m going to get my value. Now, that
in turn imposes some disciplines on me. I have to
make it economic to develop a transaction without a
cash-out up front mentality and I have to make it
economic to manage a property downstream
without a cash-out exit mentality.
And the fourth mentality that defines a bad owner is
what I call the “unknown fib.” When is a lie not a
lie? When I put it in an underwriting application to
get myself an allocation. [laughter] But if I fall into
the trap of believing it, then I get into trouble. I’ve
been in this business for 26 years, and every
transaction that I have ever seen has had inadequate
operating expenses….But something I learned in the
second of the three recessions I’ve been through in
this career was that the smart developers knew they
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were fibbing, and set aside money for when the
inevitable…shortfall came....The dumb developers
believed that because the allocator approved it and
they sneaked it past the underwriters and…the
bureaucrat who wasn’t paying as much
attention…and gave me the FHA insurance, it must
therefore be true. And then they went to try to
accomplish the mission. 
So those are the four mentalities….I feel confident
the rest of the panel will…tell me where I’m wrong.
HELEN DUNLAP: Thank you, David….At this
point…I’m going to ask the other panelists to
respond to a question which we hope will begin a
series of questions and answers…so that we can
make this as interactive as possible....
Let me begin by asking Wendy—and I’m going to do
a bit of an introduction, again, for Wendy and Lillian
to share from their perspective...the characteristics
that they look for...as a manager and operator and
excellent affordable housing owner.... 
WENDY DOLBER: First of all I want to say I love
what I’m hearing here....It’s music to a rating
agency’s ears to hear about increased reserves and
the exposure of the unknown fib and taking the long
view….
…We do take the long view,…which brings up some
issues about…properties that are underwritten….
When we look at a bond issue, we have to feel that
everything is in place and is going to serve the
property well for the next thirty years if it’s a thirty
year bond transaction. That’s one of the reasons why
ownership is so critically important to us…and in
the last few years we’ve been rating a lot of
unenhanced, unsubsidized or partially subsidized
affordable housing properties. And I’ve come to
learn that no debt service coverage is high enough
when you have a weak owner....
And I just love what [David Smith] said about the
mission heart and the business head. And how they
really have to go together. And no amateurs; that is
so important. It’s sad to see a really good-hearted,
not-for-profit come in after the fact, after the deal has
been done, and have to admit that they bit off more
than they could chew, that they weren’t involved in
the underwriting, they were working with a team
that they had hired who basically brought a property
to them. They didn’t scrub the numbers. They didn’t
understand the numbers. And now they’re left
holding the bag after the fact. And they have to fix it.
And they want to stick with it, but they really don’t
have the resources. That’s a sad thing to see. And it’s
a sad thing for the investors, too….
HELEN DUNLAP: Lillian.
SISTER LILLIAN MURPHY: Thanks, Helen. First of
all, I want to say thank you to David for his very
insightful paper. I agreed with a lot of it and I
disagreed with some of it, too. But I think it’s really
helpful to put out different ideas at these kinds of
meetings so that we learn from each other. In
response to Helen’s question of what makes a good
owner — or the single most important factor….And I
think the most important characteristic of a good
owner is organizational capacity. And that has five
or six pieces to it that I think are important to
mention. One is having a very clear and focused
mission, knowing what you are about. And in my
mind, I don’t think mission and business are
different. They’re the same.
So, I would like us to continually say that, because I
think part of the difficulty we get into with the for-
profit, nonprofit conversation is that there’s a
misunderstanding because of the terms that we use,
of what we do. And when David just said that he
thinks one of the most important things is to care
about the housing, I would say I think one of the
most important things is to care about the people,
because that really determines what you do with any
of the resources in housing.
I think the other element is you need to have
incredibly competent, committed talented staff. The
work that we’re doing, while years ago it may have
been hard to develop and easy to manage, is now
hard to develop and hard to manage. So, we need
people who are even more skilled than they have
been in the past.
Another huge element is access to capital. As we
look at what’s coming up in the future in terms of
preserving the existing affordable housing, capital is
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going to be a major concern…so that we can make
deliberate strategic choices about what we’re going
to use our money for in the future.
Another element is sufficient reserves to cover
unforeseen, negative turns in markets, not just in the
properties, but also in the owner[s].
These are not necessarily in order of importance.
The next is to have satisfied partners. And we’ve
defined partners as residents, as financial partners,
as community partners, as political partners. And
the last one would be that we need to be incredibly
flexible. We are subject to the vagaries of the
political process in most of the funding that we use,
whether it’s on the HUD side or on the tax credit side
or the tax-exempt bonds. And so we need to be very
nimble. And that goes back to the talented people. To
be able to respond to whatever comes up out there,
although, I guess, my purist self would say I think
what we ought to be doing is being more active in
influencing the political process and public policy so
that we’re not having to deal with some of the fallout
of short term solutions to incredibly complex long
term problems.
HELEN DUNLAP: Thank you, Lillian. David, do you
want to add, respond to these comments before I
open it up?
DAVID SMITH: Only a little bit. There’s only two
thoughts that sort of connect together. My view is
that profit is the price that you pay for competence.
Now, profit doesn’t mean that it has to be a for-profit
developer who makes said profit. I mean, the
developments should cash flow. And that cash flow
should go back to the sponsor and the sponsor
should be able to use that cash flow for whatever the
sponsor thinks is a good thing to do. Plow it back
into the project, develop the next project, bet it on
something else [or] pay the talented staff. One of the
problems that nonprofits have is they have a tough
time retaining talented staff. Maybe if we paid them
better they would stay longer after they got married,
got a house, got kids, you know, suddenly acquired
liabilities, you know, as we say in financial terms.
[laughter]
The related thing…is that one of my tests of a good
sponsor is can you come up with fifty grand to chase
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a deal that’s a good deal that you don’t have any
sources of capital for. And can you do that fast
enough to catch up to the deal? And if you can’t, how
are you going to deal with the problem that comes
up after you’ve bought the deal. So, one of my
solutions...would be to create programs that seed
nonprofits with their own working capital once.
Give them a hundred grand a throw. Make them bet
it. Some of them would lose it. Some of them would
get it back. And you’d start distinguishing among
different capacities of nonprofits.
HELEN DUNLAP: Lillian, let me begin this
conversation by asking you to respond to David’s
last point….The whole issue of sustaining the
organization as well as the development….Then I
want to spend a few minutes on this whole
dichotomy between nonprofit and for-profit.
LILLIAN MURPHY: I agree with David’s
characterization of the fact that we need to make a
profit and these things need to be strong. But my
reaction to the hundred thousand was, yes, I think
we need to be underwriting the organization and
funding it to become good partners in this arena. A
hundred thousand isn’t going to do it. A few million
maybe, but not a hundred thousand.
HELEN DUNLAP: In the last panel they ended with
a conversation or at least the beginning of a
conversation about who makes the best owner…a
nonprofit [or a] for-profit.…I would be interested in
each of you commenting on the underlying issues of
character and quality….Wendy, do you want to start?
WENDY DOLBER: ...We don’t distinguish between
for-profit and not-for-profit generally. However, we
give credit to a committed owner who is committed
to maintaining the housing as affordable and we
would like it to be in the legal documents. We give
credit to an owner who can bring all the resources
available in the affordable housing community to
the property. We give credit to below market rents.
In that sense, you can have a for-profit owner that
could do all those things. That’s why we don’t
distinguish. And we do tend to have long
conversations with the owner to ask all these
questions and find out really what kind of
development is it going to be.
DAVID SMITH: To my way of thinking, for-profits
and nonprofits hedge against different risks. For-
profits hedge against what we’ll call market
conversion risk. In the gentrifying neighborhood, it’s
tough to have a for-profit as your owner because the
for-profit is seeking to do the very thing that the
community would like not to have happen. At the
same time, in recognizing that when you do do
business with a for-profit, do not denigrate the profit
motive and the desire for the fulfillment of the
bargain after twenty or twenty-five years. It is an
intrinsic part of the bargain that Congress cut. That’s
the price you get when you bring a for-profit owner
in there.
Now, having said that, why does anybody do
business with for-profits when there are nonprofits
around? Because for-profits hedge much better than
nonprofits do against the other side, the forgotten
side of the at-risk, which is the default side.
Nonprofits are not very good at coping in general,
with default-type situations. They don’t have as
much experience with it, they don’t have the capital
to bring to it. It strains the organization in ways that
the organization’s typically not so used to straining.
They tend to have smaller portfolios that they own.
In general, I would rather have a for-profit with a lot
of money in a troubled deal, than a nonprofit.
Whereas I would rather have a nonprofit in a
conversion-eligible project than a for-profit.
HELEN DUNLAP: Before we transition, I’m hearing
scale as a criteria in what you’re saying as much as
the motivation relating to profit.
DAVID SMITH: And I would accept that. If you look
at the trend in affordable housing—if you went back
to 1975, the biggest affordable housing manager
managed about 6,000 units. If you went to 1985, the
biggest affordable housing manager…managed 25 or
30,000 units. If you look at 1995 or 2000 the biggest
affordable housing manager…manages 300,000
units.
Today, the biggest nonprofit manager…maybe,
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10,000 units….Scale produces efficiency when it
comes to financial control and operating
compliance. Scale does not work well in
development, but it works real well in operations
and financial control.
Nonprofits and the allocation systems that we have
are very much anti-scale. And in that anti-scale is a
lot of inefficiency, and a lot of inability to deal with
trouble.
HELEN DUNLAP: So, Lillian, how do you as one of
those owners that owns 10,000 units — slightly more,
I believe, today — balance the community benefits
that I think many of us perceive in the nonprofit and
the scale efficiencies that David is describing. And
then, why weren’t you partnering more with for-
profits.
LILLIAN MURPHY: ...We have a mantra that says
need is not enough. The need is everywhere for
affordable housing in every community practically
across this country. And what we have to do is be
very astute about the markets that we are moving
into and make good business choices. So you can’t
say yes to every deal….And you have to underwrite
both the organization and the property, in my mind,
or it’s not going to be successful. We know that we
have entered some organizations and they have not
had successful properties, and we’ve underwritten
some really good properties and the owners haven’t
been that great. So, I think we need to do both of
those things. 
I think the scale is absolutely right….[I]f we were to
somehow build capacity in these reputable,
experienced nonprofit groups, we could make a
bigger impact….
...[T]o go to the for-profit, nonprofit piece,...when we
talk about nonprofits, I’ve heard a lot of people say,
“Well, they’re well-intentioned people, but they’re
really [not] good business people. It goes back to the
mission heart and the business head. When you talk
about for-profits, people think, well, their only
motive is profit. Well, that’s not true, either. We all
operate out of multiple motives, only one of which is
profit. We both need to make a profit to continue in
business. We both invest in the community. We may
do it for different reasons and we may use the profit
from that investment in different ways, but we
clearly share some of the same things, so, I think our
language continues to hinder understanding….
…[I]n choosing a partner, in my mind, the major
consideration is not whether they’re for-profit or
nonprofit, but whether they’re a good solid business
partner. That ought to be what determines
partnerships. And that it makes sense for the
community and that it makes sense for the
particular deal that you’re doing.
DAVID SMITH: Just briefly. I would say that one of
the indicators of…the maturation of an industry is
the extent to which different kinds of mission-
focused specialist organizations get really good at
something and then learn…to partner with other
complementary mission-focused specialized organi-
zations on targets of particular need. In other words,
the idea of the conglomerate, I think, is an indication
of an immature industry….For example…finance is
something you do once every 10 years or seven
years….You don’t do it every year. Whereas opera-
tions, you do day in and day out. And development,
you do one deal at a time or two deals at a time.
They’re different commodities. They lend them-
In the last few years we’ve been rating a lot of unenhanced,
unsubsidized or partially subsidized affordable housing
properties. And I’ve come to learn that no debt service coverage
is high enough when you have a weak owner....
–WENDY DOLBER
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selves to teaming.
HELEN DUNLAP: I think that’s a really important
observation, and it triggered in my mind another
example…and that is the increasing number of
organizational mergers that Mercy [Housing
Corporation] has been engaged in….For those of you
that are not aware, over the history of the
organization, it’s actually merged three times with
three different nonprofits, most recently with RCAC
[Rural Community Assistance Corporation], which
is one of the largest home builders and multifamily
developers in California. What’s particularly
significant about that merger is that it was very
desired by both parties and is perceived as an
organizational leverage and growth activity to build
some of those kinds of resources that support the
organizations.
Many of us think of mergers as something we have
to do because we’re in trouble, as opposed to a
strategy, frankly, for becoming a better owner in this
case.
Let me see if there are comments on this whole
conversation about organizational structure before
we go on to something else. George.
GEORGE KNIGHT: David, accepting your
distinction between a good owner and a bad owner,
how would I tell if I’m a [tax credit] allocator,
looking at a stack of applications….
DAVID SMITH: First and foremost I look at track
record. And I measure track record not in numbers
of properties, but in number of recessions and prob-
lems survived….You only find out who’s
good…through a recession or through a troubled
project. It’s how they behave in response to trouble....
Interesting problem number two. Did they ever fix
their own screw up and did they ever take on
somebody else’s screw up and, if so, make it, if not
perfect, at least better?
…One of the hardest things…when you have a
troubled property and a laboring owner [is] which
came first? Did the laboring owner put the property
in trouble or did the troubled property sink the
laboring owner. That is the hardest
question…in…underwriting…[and] it deserves the
most focus….
HELEN DUNLAP: Wendy, anything you want to add
to George’s question?
WENDY DOLBER: …We need to see for our-
selves….[F]rom our position, we get a lot of presenta-
tions from investment bankers and what-not, [but]
we go and kick the tires ourselves every single time
on affordable housing property. And we continue to
do that over the life of the transaction, because you
only know from talking to the owners and the prop-
erty managers what their track record is and what
they are willing to do and, really, how competent
they are.
But another key thing is it’s got to be a broad-based
operation with highly qualified people, and not a
single-operator type of situation...where there’s one
key person that does all the talking and has been
there for a really long time. That’s…just
not…something that we’re going to be really
comfortable with and investors are going to be
comfortable with over the long term....
MICHAEL BODAKEN: …[I]t seems to me some
critical mass thinking is going on relating to how
important ownership is and what kind of owners we
need to make sure that we have excellent affordable
housing….I don’t think anyone’s really responded
about the development-fee, cash-flow dilemma. And
I would like to hear some people—panelists or
others—talk about whether or not…developers are
willing to live with lower development fees and
increased cash flow. Because I think, personally, that
that’s something that would make sense in this
environment, that would sustain people through a
recession, David, [and] that would make sure that
we would have excellent, affordable housing going
forward. I know it’s somewhat controversial, but I
think it’s important that we bring that up.
And then second,…it’s not necessarily just a for-
profit, nonprofit teaming partnership that can create
a stronger team. We’re involved in a number of
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efforts where there’s a stronger nonprofit and a
weaker nonprofit, both of which bring significant
experience to the transaction for different reasons,
and I think both of which can actually result in
sustained excellence. I’d just like you to respond to
those two points.
HELEN DUNLAP: Let’s take the second one first and
then I want to broaden the topic of development fees
and open it up because I can’t believe that there
aren’t many opinions in this room. Wendy….
WENDY DOLBER: …We actually turn away a lot
more deals than we accept because of…weak
[organizations]. But it absolutely can work that you
can have a stronger not-for-profit supporting a
weaker one. And it’s great because then the weaker
one gets to learn as they go along and they become a
stronger one some day.…We love to see…a deal that
comes in where this arrangement is already in place
because the developers see that that’s the way that it
should go, as opposed to us being the ones to say,
“Look, you really need to partner with somebody.”
What we have found is when we’re the ones to say
that, they’ll come back with their partner, you know,
but it won’t really be a partnership....We want to
know, “Is it really a partnership?” And we do
everything we can to try to figure that out….
HELEN DUNLAP: Identify something you do to iden-
tify that there really is a partnership there. What
makes you feel comfortable that there is a partner-
ship as opposed to they’re just talking about it?
WENDY DOLBER: Well,…it’s a hard thing to
pinpoint and we do the best that we can — we really
need to hear it from them….I can’t tell you how
many situations where people have said to us, “How
should this work?” Down to the nitty-gritty of who
should do what. Come in and tell us. Don’t wait for
us to tell you. We want to hear from the people
involved exactly how it’s going to work, and we
want to see a lot of it down in black and white, too,
with agreements between them in writing.
DAVID SMITH: Once upon a time, perhaps in a
country not unlike this one, for-profit developers
figured out that they could get extra points for
having nonprofit partners. And they would recruit
nonprofit partners to be their partner according to
some governance document….And they don’t do
that anymore, which is why I can raise this question
because we can learn from this historical
experience. And the thing about the nonprofits that
came in under these arrangements was the for-profit
would say [to them], “Say you’re independent.”…”Say
you think for yourself.”…”Say you have
organizational capacity.”…I’m glad we don’t do that
anymore.
HELEN DUNLAP: So am I….
We haven’t dealt with Michael’s developer fee question….
FRANCIE FERGUSON: ...Many of our funders don’t
allow asset management fees above the line. So we
do not acknowledge that ownership is a function.
We allow property management fees above the line,
but not asset management fees above the line. And I
think that the tax credit industry has actually
…[I]n choosing a partner, in my mind, the major consideration
is not whether they’re for-profit or nonprofit, but whether
they’re a good solid business partner. That ought to be what
determines partnerships.  –LILLIAN MURPHY
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contributed to that because of it’s perversity of trying
to create losses….We actually are supporting owners
through the tax credit structure, but it would be
great if through the HUD structures and the rural
development structures, we could do that as well.
Another thing,…we might want to look at a
model…linking two entities together in these
partnerships, [so that] you end up having…local,
hopefully nimble capacity….When we saw the large
owner that owned everything but then had no local
context, you didn’t see great stuff happening, but
then you see small local owners and they don’t have
that depth to live through. And so I’m curious if…the
partnership structure actually offers a more flexible
ownership model for going forward....
DAVID SMITH: And if I can extend that, part of the
reason that asset management fees are such a
problem is first of all, nobody knows what asset
management is. You can’t really get two consistent
definitions of it. I mean, I have one which is the
objectively right one. But nobody agrees with mine. 
The second issue with respect to asset management
is that because nobody knows exactly what it is, a lot
of people claim to do it. Syndicators claim to do asset
management. They don’t. They do some kind of
mixture of compliance monitoring and crisis bell-
ringing and stuff like that. Regulators claim to do
asset management. They don’t. They do compliance.
The third problem with asset management is
traditionally asset management is essentially what
the owner does….The owner engages in asset
management because the owner sees a profit either
in cash flow or residual value. Well, to the extent
that we have financing gaps — and here I am
blatantly teeing up the question of financing for the
next panel — we tend to close those financing gaps
with soft debt or worse, grants that turn into soft
debt, as Leslie Steen was talking about. And then
over time, an unknown fib, somebody becomes
convinced that it’s real debt and should be repaid.
And in effect, we get deals that are operationally
sound and have negative residual value….If they’ve
got negative residual value, why do you asset
manage?…
HELEN DUNLAP: The reason…is it can get worse.
DAVID SMITH: And if I have no residual value, not
wishing to disagree, but rather to extend the
discussion…why is that my problem?
HELEN DUNLAP: Some owners…have multiple
motivations—both for-profit and nonprofit.
DAVID SMITH: …I’d like to know that there’s a
reason my sponsor will save this deal even when it
is uneconomic....And that could be a mission reason
or a track record reason, or a lender collateralization
reason, or an S&P rating reason, but I want a reason
he will do a non-economic salvage job on an
individual project rather than simply saying, you
financed it, it’s your problem….
KRISTEN FAUST: Hi, I’m Kristen Faust. And I was a
first mortgage lender—community development
lender — for many, many years, and it’s just
fascinating…that nobody has talked about the role of
the first mortgage lender and the fact that they can
be your eyes — the S&P’s eyes and ears closer to the
ground about who’s real and who isn’t. I strongly
believe that lenders and syndicators are the
Many of us think of mergers as something we have to do
because we’re in trouble, as opposed to a strategy, frankly, for
becoming a better owner in this case.  –HELEN DUNLAP
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gatekeepers of these deals and really do need to act
more in that role....
…David just said you’ve got to find out who your
borrower is that will do the uneconomic
thing,…which I happen to agree with....When I was
underwriting [tax credit deals], I would chose a
nonprofit over a for-profit developer if forced to....
I’m a big believer that we need for-profit housing
developers to solve affordable housing in this
county. But why would a for-profit developer put
money back in the deal in year nine and ten?
DAVID SMITH: Track record.
KRISTEN FAUST: Right. Track record, which gets
back to a kind of a classic underwriting characteris-
tic that first mortgage commercial lenders are
taught, which is something called character. And it’s
interesting. I would selectively underwrite for-profit
tax credit developers, but it was the ones who you
decided had character….
HELEN DUNLAP: You just turned on the audience.
So can we go there….
UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT: I’m just surprised
that over three hours, no one has said the magic
word “revitalization.” And no one has mentioned the
culture of opportunity, resident services. We’re
talking a lot about asset management and needing to
have a good business head, but I’m hearing that the
only differentiation between a good nonprofit owner
and a for-profit owner would be that somehow that
the for-profit owner would be a better business
person. It’s not just one problem we’re trying to
solve — affordable housing — we’re also trying to
solve troubled neighborhoods and troubled families
and trying to raise the incomes of the people who
are working, who are living in our units.
I’m curious as to how the panel would react to the
statement that nonprofits and for-profits are
somehow only different by their tax status?
HELEN DUNLAP: Lillian,…I think that the
gentleman’s question points out how quickly we fall
into the language and not what’s behind it for some
of us.
LILLIAN MURPHY: Yes,…if my comments gave the
impression that I thought the only difference was the
tax status, I don’t think that. I think there are some
fundamental differences. What I think we need to
do, though, is not so much concentrate on those
differences as on how we can complement each
other. That was my first point.
I think in terms of…character…and it goes to the
nonprofit, for-profit thing, I think that the nonprofit
perspective is a long-term,…integrated perspective.
It’s caring about both the financial bottom line and
the social bottom line….I think in regards to being
solid business people and making good deals, we
need to do that so that we can take on some of these
other uneconomic things that are absolutely
necessary to do in community revitalization.
I think another major difference in my experience
has been that [for] for-profits, the housing is a means
to an end….What we’re really about is building the
community and helping people empower
themselves…if that’s what they want to do. And so I
think the nonprofits are more likely to be willing to
take the time and the energy…to find resources to
provide service-enriched housing….Because in our
twenty years of experience at Mercy Housing, it
doesn’t work if you don’t have those two things
linked….And I think one of the measures… when
underwriters are looking at these deals is, “Is there a
service component to the housing?”
HELEN DUNLAP: And I would add that…we
actually demand and underwrite for those
outcomes, which are neighborhood revitalization
and resident related. And until we do that, we will
get them only because in my mind, people can get
away with it in a moment in time. And as the
environment changes or the resources change,
they’re not going to be able to do it and it’s the first
thing that goes.
Rachel, you want to comment…on this whole
dichotomy?
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RACHAEL ISKOW: Well, actually, I want to get back
to that issue of cutting developer fees….[T]o be a
great developer and operator of affordable housing
you need to have adequate reserves—both reserves
dedicated to the property and a great fund balance.... 
Everyone sits in a room like this and says “Let’s do
project-based capital reserve analysis.” But then
when you come up with those analyses,they’re too
high, way higher than industry standards. So, [they
say] “We’re not going to let you do that. We’re going
to cut your developer fee.” And it just goes back to,
“How do you build the capacity of any entity to be a
great operator if you keep cutting the fees and the
reserves?” You can’t.
And the other thing I wanted to say on for-profit
versus nonprofit, I used to work with RCHC and we
did our best to…venture with for-profit entities. And
I have for-profit entities—they only come to me now
when we’re going to work in an easy, good, high-
rent neighborhood. They do not come to low-rent
neighborhoods. They do not take on the hard
properties. And to do those hard properties, you
need those fund-balances and you need those
reserves. So, I’d like to hear about that.
HELEN DUNLAP: This gentleman’s been waiting.
Then we’ll come back and circle around here….
UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT: Kind of following
the same point…how to solve the problem when a
property gets in default…the serious developer, the
person that’s in for long range, whether it’s a not-
for-profit or for-profit, is going to take a hard look at
the negotiations, the terms of that syndicator and the
equity source. And the developer, be it a not-for-
profit or for-profit, can’t say, “Yes, I’m going to
guarantee all operating deficits. I’m going to
guarantee tax credits for the next fifteen years, and if
you don’t get them for the next fifteen years, I’m
going to make up the difference….”
…[I]f there’s a problem project, that equity source
has to work at it, too. So, our position’s always been
“Yes, we’ll agree to a ceiling of x number of dollars
that we’re willing to put back in the project…for
operating deficit or for loss of tax credits. After that
point, we want a matching program of some sort. It
may be 50-50. It may be 20-80, whatever. Some
arrangement says to that equity user… “If you want
to preserve your credits and there’s a problem to
solve, let’s get together and work on it and see if it’s
solvable….let’s talk it through and determine
whether it is feasible, and then let’s jointly work the
problem.”
HELEN DUNLAP: I heard first of all that we need to
be clear that when we make an agreement to set
something aside, it in fact gets set aside….
The second is that the equity partner has to be at the
table as part of that economic solution. And not just
as a pusher and a shover and a screamer.
David you wanted to comment?
DAVID SMITH: I started out reading partnership
agreements, as W.C. Fields once said of the Bible,
“looking for loopholes.” I got the deals after they
were done and I discovered that most of what [was]
negotiated wasn’t worth dog meat. Economic reality
was what dictated. So, in fact, lenders have…
HELEN DUNLAP: So how do you create that at the
front end of a deal?
DAVID SMITH: …The best way you create equity
terms is the syndicator keeps some amount of its
money in his pocket over a period of time, which is
about four or five years….The second thing is that
I’m surprised in this whole discussion…that nobody
remembers [nonprofit] to [limited dividend]
conversions of the late 1970s and early 1980s. NP to
LD conversions occurred because nonprofits of the
236 vintage didn’t have the capital to solve their
problems and they were forced by HUD or
encouraged by HUD to partner with for-profits who
would bring in capital and fix deals. For-profits…it’s
the scale issue. The larger the organization, the
more it cares about fixing the problems that are
adverse to the track records. And the larger the
organization, the more the organization will do
things at a portfolio level which are non-economic
on an individual deal level for the benefit of the
portfolio as a whole. That crosses both sides.
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HELEN DUNLAP: Before we go to the next point,
we’ve got at least one investor that I see in the room.
Anything that you want to add to this particular
conversation?
WENDELL JOHNS: All right. I guess I’ve been
drafted….I raise the question: “What is the
expectation for an investor, who is supposedly a
limited partner…to have some liability that
somehow extends well beyond putting their dollars
in….And I’d like to hear the panelists talk about that.
LILLIAN MURPHY: I think you’re putting your
money into this to do something good, but also you
get a very good return….I think the responsibility of
the investor is to insure first of all that the
economics of the deal are solid. And secondly, that
the sponsor is a good long-term owner. I think those
are the two things.
HELEN DUNLAP: …I would add one more. And
that is that the investor community has to push the
allocator community to change the underwriting
standards that create the outcomes we’ve been
talking about. And developer fees are only a piece of
this….
WENDELL JOHNS: …we have to remember that the
marketplace needs more investors….And we need to
have investors that are motivated for the right
reasons…to bring in the kind of discipline that
you’re talking about. Unfortunately,…other
investors, I think,…decide,”I don’t…want all that
pressure, thank you very much. I’m not going to be
involved in the market place.
HELEN DUNLAP: Agreed. And we as a community
have to prefer investors that are responsible. And we
don’t do that sometimes….
UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT: If I can extend this
one further step. We’ve been talking about owners
as if owner is sponsor. And Wendell got up there and
said owner is limited partner—emphasis on limited.
But owner is partnership. Owner is a sponsorship
entity. One of the things I passionately believe is that
the fewer people in this boat the better. I like
corporate syndication with an individual investor
partner,because when Wendell and Lillian cut the
deal, the deal is cut.
I used to talk to a hundred million doctors, dentists
and Indian chiefs and I don’t want to do that again. I
like centralized ownership entities by committed
portfolio investors….I wouldn’t say we need more
investors, I’d say we need a cadre of people who buy
a lot of this product on a very competitive basis
because then they’re all sophisticated and they’re all
genuine partners. I need them to be limited and I’ll
negotiate their limits, but I need them to be partners.
HELEN DUNLAP: This gentleman has been patient-
ly waiting and he’s going to get to go and then we’re
going to ask the panel for one comment apiece....
BARRY HALLA: …As a nonprofit developer, I think
one of the best ways that you can determine a good
partnership is the split of the profits….We stay
focused as a nonprofit on making a profit, because if
I think that the nonprofit perspective is a long-
term,…integrated perspective. It’s caring about both the
financial bottom line and the social bottom line….What we’re
really about is building the community and helping people
empower themselves… –LILLIAN MURPHY
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we don’t…we can’t do good deals….
…I was at a recent conference and three of the major
banks…said, “We would not be sitting here if it were
not for CRA pressure.”…It seems like there’s a lot of
equity that chases the 9 percent tax credit
deals….CRA…maybe should be “X” for a 9 percent
deal, “X-plus” for a bond and 4 percent deal, and “X-
plus-plus-plus” for a non-tax credit deal, so that you,
in essence can satisfy…the financial institutions that
want the deal to be shored up — and there’s nothing
better than to have a bank as your partner….
HELEN DUNLAP: Thank you. Can I ask my
colleagues to wrap?…Lillian?
LILLIAN MURPHY: Just two final comments….I
think as nonprofit developers, we need to start using
the language that we are making investments in
these communities….The news last night here about
Boeing and the major tax deferment that the city is
willing to make. They don’t talk about that as a
subsidy. They talk about it as an investment. And so,
to use the word subsidy just for the poor, I think, is
really wrong and we shouldn’t be part of
perpetuating that.
And second, as a faith-based developer, I get very
concerned that the assumption by some in
government that the faith-based groups can take
over, pick up the slack of the federal government
moving out of investing in housing is really naive
and dangerous.
WENDY DOLBER: I think I want to say something
really different…which is that there’s safety in
numbers….Portfolio financing, I think, can be very
helpful. And there’s always going to be the weaker
property. There’s going to be the faith-based not-for-
profit who really wants to earn its stripes, it’s not
quite ready yet. And even in terms of tax breaks that
could be given or profit that could wash through a
portfolio and be used to, you know, enhance one of
the weaker properties, I think that it can be
tremendously beneficial and economical to go that
route….
HELEN DUNLAP: I would predict that in the next
few years, that will be a typical topic of conversation
that’s just beginning to stick its head through the
surface for us. Thank you for bringing it up.
DAVID SMITH: Today, for every deal we finance, we
turn down three or four. In that environment,
money rules. And in reverse, the rules by which
money goes out, determine who the winners are.
The financial rules, the allocation rules, the resource
rules, dictate the outcomes. If you don’t like the
outcomes, if you want the consequences that we
have described here, you must change the rules
even if that imposes hardship in a transition period.
So, my advice to you, as I said to Woodward and
Burnstein twenty-eight years ago, “Follow the
money.”
HELEN DUNLAP: Thank you. I get the last
comment, which is… in the context…of resident and
community….that’s why we’re here. But when we
come to conferences and start talking, we tend
to…focus on things like developers, as opposed to
why we need capital to do things that we need to
do….Thank you.
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SHEKAR NARASIMHAN: I’m going to introduce our
panel. Their bios are already in the book, so it won’t
be in great detail….And then we’re going to have
Wendell Johns...present some of the high points of
his paper…. We’re going to then have each panelist
talk a little bit about the paper…and any particular
perspectives they may bring. And then, frankly,
we’re going to open it up to you....
The first person to my left, Bob Odman, is the
assistant commissioner for the Minnesota Housing
Finance Agency. And in that capacity, and with all
the interest that Bob has had in affordable housing,
they’re the tax credit allocator, they’re also,
obviously, the allocator for Section 8, they also
oversee development, they do tax-exempt bonds.
They provide other sources of capital. So they are a
state-agency regulator and capital provider.
To his left is Joe Hagan. Joe is the CEO of the
National Equity Fund. Many of you know the Equity
Fund; hopefully, many of you have used the Equity
Fund. It’s the largest syndicator on the nonprofit side
for tax credits in the country, a long history, and
based in Chicago.
To his left is Larry Dale….managing director at
Newman & Associates, which…according to what he
said yesterday, in the last 11 years or 10 years, [is]
the largest underwriter of tax-exempt multifamily
housing bonds, and also, by the way, the least
expensive.
MR. DALE: And most efficient.
SHEKAR NARASIMHAN: And most efficient.
Newman & Associates is a division of GMAC
Commercial Holdings. But prior to joining Newman
in Denver, Larry was effectively the creator,
architect, designer of the Fannie Mae [Delegated
Underwriting Servicing] program, and before that he
was at HUD….
But Larry designed a delivery system, and...I kind of
Characteristics of Excellence
in Investments
Production Finance: Financing Sustainability
Lessons learned about capital finance – debt, equity and subsidy – allocation, terms, oversight, com-
pliance. Financing formulas that enhance or impair long-term excellence. How are risks and returns
balanced over the long term to the investors, developers, owners, residents and public/surrounding
neighborhoods?  How could financing better support long-term excellence of properties and long-
term strength of owners?
Lead Presenter: Wendell Johns, Fannie Mae
Moderator: Shekar Narasimhan, Prudential Mortgage Capital Company
Panelists: Larry Dale, Newman & Associates
Joseph Hagan, National Equity Fund
Bob Odman, Minnesota Housing Finance Agency
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challenged [him] to say, what would be a perfect and
really efficient way to do housing-production
finance in this country.
All the way to the left is Wendell Johns,...vice
president for Affordable Housing at Fannie Mae in
Washington, D.C. and the presenter of this
paper…which was not officially sanctioned by
Fannie Mae….
…Each of the papers that you have in your
binder…were done pretty much in isolation from
each other, which is why it is quite significant…that
there are some threads that run through [them]….So
why don’t we start with Wendell.
WENDELL JOHNS: Thank you, Shekar. I’ll make
this brief because the panelists here have a lot of
deep thoughts they want to share with you….I’d like
to thank Phyllis Klein, who’s right here to my
left…because Phyllis had just joined Fannie Mae
from her prior experience of being the chief
allocator of credits in the state of California. And that
background, along with her being a lender, was a
nice contrast to my developer, operations, financial
background. And so, we kind of put our minds
together for this particular paper....
There are 30 fundamental points I’m trying to make
in the paper. One is that the private finance sector
serves the affordable-housing community best when
we treat housing as real estate. And that’s not to say
that we don’t understand what community means,
and neighborhoods mean. But when it comes to
doing the kind of underwriting that’s required on
these particular properties and protecting other
stakeholders…shareholders and others, we have to
treat it as real estate. And real estate has with it
certain traditional kinds of disciplines that we ought
to bring to bear on the situation.
Now, the finance sector does a disservice to the
housing community when it doesn’t perform proper
due diligence — ask all the right questions to really
understand all the basic assumptions surrounding
the real estate. When we do not hold all of the
participants accountable and subject to high
standards, it’s going to hurt the community, and it’s
going to hurt the lenders and the investors in the
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long run because they aren’t going to receive what
they had bargained for to begin with.
We also do a disservice when we consider our
investing as charity. And a number of the early
investors in low-income housing tax credits treated
the industry as charity, and consequently didn’t
bring to the table the kinds of hard questions that
they should have…to really make sure that the
housing was well thought out.
And we also provide a disservice when the process
is overly complicated. And as a number of the
panelists here know, we’re working very hard to try
to make the delivery...of capital as efficient as
possible, but there is a long way to go. And because
of regulatory concerns along with various reporting
requirements, it remains complicated, and we have
to figure out how to get rid of those complications.
Now, another fundamental point…is that private
capital should flow to affordable housing for
economic reasons. CRA is a regulatory requirement,
and...it has provided additional incentive for certain
entities to invest in affordable housing. However, for
us to really reach the point where we have sufficient
resources and sufficient competition, that the market
is more perfect, if you will, we have to have
consistent economic results to bring forth to
investors and other financiers. So what will it take to
attract more investors? We’ll try to answer that later
on.
Capital needs an exit strategy. As we go into these
various housing properties, we have to concern
ourselves with what is going to happen at the back
end, not with a wink, but with a true understanding
of how that property is going to remain affordable
over a long-term period of time. We really need to
take the guesswork out of it….
…These are considered tax-advantaged investments
in the private sector. Sometimes those tax incentives
work against you. For instance, accounting methods
for these particular investments have changed over
time. And one of the main reasons they have
changed over time is because one of the additional
benefits — the tax losses — depending on how much
investment that particular entity has done over time,
become a liability and not a benefit to that
organization because the tax losses bring down
earnings per share. And so, a number of
corporations can’t afford to have their earnings per
share diminish because of the fact that they have
these high tax losses. And so, consequently, you’ve
seen certain discouraging attitudes taken towards
bond transactions, for instance, where bond
transactions were deemed a way to get around the
lottery process and help provide more housing
faster.
Thirdly, I’d like to say that subsidies don’t have the
same discipline as equity. I think we’ve heard this
point made in a number of the earlier panels. Why is
that? Well,...we have to answer to our regulators to
make sure that we have, in fact, invested prudently.
That requires us to have a certain discipline. And
that discipline needs to be there even to the point
sometimes where people have asked us, “Why do
you ask so many questions? Why don’t you just get
comfortable with what’s there?” We really want to
make sure that we don’t make any mistakes.
Subsidies don’t necessarily have that particular
discipline because there’s an expectation that
somewhere along the line the subsidy is there; it
may be deemed an entitlement. It may be deemed
that once you’ve received the dollars, that’s all you
really need to do going forward. But whatever those
reasons are, they don’t seem to have the kind of
discipline that’s necessary.
I believe long-term sustainability is possible. I’ve
seen it. February 1st marked the 30th anniversary of
a [Section] 236 co-op that I lived in back in 1971. And
that property has been very successful. It’s housed
low-income people all of its 30 years. So I know that
it’s possible. And there are hundreds of other
examples like that.
How do we replicate that with the current programs
that we have, or what do we need to do with the
current programs that we have in order to make
sure that that continues for thousands of other
projects? And with that, I’ll turn it over to the panel.
SHEKAR NARASIMHAN: Wendell, thank you. Who
wants to take a crack,….Larry?
LARRY DALE: Well, first of all, I want to both
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congratulate Wendell and Phyllis, and observe that
in all of my days we were colleagues — I think it was
almost 10 at Fannie Mae — I never saw an 8-page
paper so eloquently written from Wendell.
…There was only one point on the paper that I
wanted to at least highlight and maybe provide a
slightly different perspective on,…this notion that
bailing out yesterday’s properties is bad for
everyone. I think I understand what you’re saying,
which is using new subsidy dollars to fix old projects
doesn’t seem right; that the guy who has the
investment in the old projects ought to fix them.
I think as an industry, we have been very slow in
responding to problems that we’ve created, and I
think that’s hurt us. And so, as a business and as an
industry, when something goes wrong, it seems to
me that even though in our short-term economic
interest on a project level, it may seem like whoever
caused the problem ought to fix it. But if they’re not
stepping up to the plate, it’s going to hurt us all in the
long run if it doesn’t get fixed….
A couple other thoughts that came out of this
morning’s conversation....This notion that we’re
going to somehow come up with a one-stop shop,
streamlined, underwriting platform that’s going to
serve everybody.
I’m just betting that in a different world a couple
years ago, most of the people in this room were
saying, can’t you be more flexible? Here’s my
community needs. I need you to underwrite to this
community need. Here’s what I’m trying to do…in
the service of a specific housing project….It might
not work all over the place, but it works here
because. And we’ve got to come up with the right
blend of an underwriting platform that uses
technology efficiently, that may be able to be used by
not only equity providers but debt providers —
mezzanine debt providers — maybe grantors, maybe
public agencies, so there’s easy access to a common
base of information that may streamline and make
the process quick[er]….I’m afraid if we take this idea
of a one-stop, national platform of underwriting too
far, we’re going to find ourselves back into a mode
where the flexibility that we all need to do what’s
necessary in our communities is not there.
The second notion that I want to provide a little
caution on is this idea that preserving affordable
housing forever in every situation is the right thing
to do. I don’t think it is. Why should we force
somebody to live in a community where there’s lots
of abandoned housing, where the jobs have left, and
we’re going to try and preserve that housing forever?
It doesn’t make any sense. And in other
communities there may be a dichotomy over time
where you’ve had what used to be a poor
community that’s now a very vibrant community.
And rather than having all of the low-income people
in the housing project that was built 30 years ago,
maybe the right thing to do is to figure out a way to
mix that housing project more broadly into the
community….
…[Y]ou’ll see communities today that are essentially
ghost towns in the rural Midwest. Preserving
housing there probably doesn’t make a lot of sense.
You see other communities where the housing costs
are a quarter of a million dollars for a simple little
I want to provide a little caution on is this idea that preserving
affordable housing forever in every situation is the right thing
to do. I don’t think it is. Why should we force somebody to live
in a community where there’s lots of abandoned housing, where
the jobs have left, and we’re going to try and preserve that
housing forever? It doesn’t make any sense. –LARRY DALE
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apartment. And we’ve got to figure a way
to...preserve some low-income housing, or provide
some low-income housing there. So I think the
preservation concept has to be adapted to the needs
that are specific to individual communities....
I also want to comment on the distinction…between
not-for-profits and for-profits….when it comes to
proper ownership, and competent ownership, and
the capabilities to operate housing effectively, I think
it’s more artificial than real in many respects.
And I guess I would just sort of say beware and be
careful for what you wish for,…that is, you get a
zillion preference points, you get more
money,…then assume that people will try and fit
into that box….And you’ve seen people come to you
and say: “I want you to be a partner,” or “I’m going
to set up my nonprofit, because.” And when that
occurs, there will be people who stay well within the
line, and there will be people who go to the edge of
the line…and ultimately, that will come back and
hurt even the real not-for-profits.
Let’s try and lower the level of verbiage about the
distinctions between who’s best at getting there.
Because I think in the room this morning you could
find for-profit representatives who have been
around for 30 years and have been doing a good job.
You can find not-for-profit representatives who have
been around for 30 years and doing a good job. You
could find for-profits, people who have been
associated with failures in the past, and you could
find not-for-profit people who have been associated
with failures in the past. I think that may not be the
clear distinction, and we need to look at the right
kind of distinctions….
SHEKAR NARASIMHAN: Thank you, Larry. Joe?
JOSEPH HAGAN: Since Larry [Dale] is the chairman
of my board, I want to say that I agree with him a
thousand times.
At NEF we closed on 100 deals last year, and of those
100 deals, probably 30 of them needed first-mortgage
financing. And of those 30, probably 20 of them
needed first-mortgage financing less than $2 million.
And I want to tell you, from a multifamily financing
standpoint, trying to finance a deal under $2 million
is very difficult because there’s really not an efficient
system in place. And for me as an equity provider, I
like the idea of having another set of eyes looking at
my deal, and especially having sort of a good
underwriter from a perspective of first-mortgage
loan underwriter.
At Bank One CDC when I was there, we created a
first-mortgage program for small deals, and it was
for deals less than $2 million. And I have to tell you,
we never set a floor on that. And I remember the
first deal we closed was for $150,000. And it just so
happened that I was refinancing my house for
$150,000, and I looked at the documents that we had
for that $150,000 first-mortgage, multifamily loan,
and I looked at the documents that I had for my
$150,000 loan from my single-family home, there is
about four inches difference between the amount of
paper you needed for that loan versus a single-
family loan.
So I think what we have to do, if we have some
goals, is try to move towards becoming as efficient as
we have become on the single-family side. I think
we also have to figure out how we can do better at
providing first-mortgage financing for loans under
$2 million....
...and having another set of eyes that really look at a
deal from a different perspective....As an equity
provider, we’re looking at a deal to make sure that it
breaks even, but a first-mortgage lender wants to
make sure that it has at least a 20 percent cushion.
They also are another set of eyes looking at your
operating costs, et cetera.…
I used to work at a housing-finance agency, and I
used to be on the allocation side. I was one of those
great proponents of saying, hey, if you want tax
credits, you have to say it’s going to be affordable for
the next 200 years, and put that into the system. But I
think that what we all have to remember is after 15
years, there’s really no teeth there...you have these
sort of two-minute foreclosures, and something
happens that they can then walk away from the
property, and then make it a market rate.
I think we have some issues that we’re going to have
to deal with. And I think the only way we’re going to
be able to keep a lot of these properties affordable
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and under the tax-credit program is maybe
providing some form of tax credits after the 15-year
period. I think it’s a big issue that we’re going to
have to look to figure out.
SHEKAR NARASIMHAN: Terrific. Bob?
BOB ODMAN: Thank you. First of all, I’d like to
thank the Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation
for inviting me here and giving me the opportunity
to sit on this symposium and participate. I agree
with most of what Wendell said in his paper, but
there are a few points that I’d like to take just slight
issue with….The first...is that, at the end of the day,
affordable housing is real estate. I agree with that to
a point. At the end of the day, affordable housing is
real estate plus. It’s an investment in people, it’s an
investment in neighborhoods, it’s an investment in
community.
I agree with Larry on the point of it’s not such a bad
idea to bail out yesterday’s problems. Sometimes
that can be the most economical, affordable housing
that we have. If we lose it, we lose it at a far greater
cost than replacing it. None of us are perfect….We
all have to measure the risks. And part of measuring
that risk is, if we don’t take some degree of risk on
this property, we’re not going to be able to do some
other developments. If we put all of our money into
one property and make it debt free with a lot of
subsidy to assure long-term affordability and
adequate reserves for the long term, we’re going to
do that at an opportunity cost for some other
housing. And we always have to take that into
account when we make our allocation decisions.
I also agree with the notion that you have to look
closely at value, and cost is not value on affordable
housing. I think most everybody in this room will
recognize that, the economic value, what kind of
rents will be produced, will it be adequate to cover
the operating costs and sustainability for the long
term; that’s the value.
The difference between cost and that value is
subsidy. And unfortunately, we’re having to put way
too much subsidy in it. The deals are way too
complicated today. We’ve tried to overcome that by
getting as many funders together as we can in
Minnesota. We go out twice a year with a request for
proposals. Our main funding round is in the fall
when we forward-allocate tax credits for the coming
year, and we have sitting at the table with us
philanthropic funders, local funders, cities,
counties....We also have public housing authorities
that have joined us and are now project basing some
of their Section 8 in new construction developments
to help achieve greater levels of affordability.
One of the things we need to try to do, though, is — I
absolutely agree with Conrad Egan...get to a
common vision so that we’re only dealing with a
minimum number of income and rent restrictions.
We have made life far too complicated for you out
there operating these properties. I happened to be
looking the other day at a supportive housing
development. And I couldn’t believe it. We had
about five or six different rent and income limits on
this, and we expected that owner and property
manager to understand that. I could barely
understand that.
SHEKAR NARASIMHAN: Well, there’s a common
theme again....I don’t think that our panelists and
our presenter thinks that the current capital-delivery
system is particularly efficient. ...Let me throw you a
hypothesis….I’ve seen a study which was initiated
by Kent Colton on behalf of the Joint Center for
Housing Studies at Harvard. And, essentially, it
estimated how much money was being spent to
support rental housing in the country, federal and
state….It was about $40 billion annually, for federal
as well as state and local.
[The study] also looked at…the fact that it took on
any given transaction seven different capital sources
to make the deal work. And I’m sure each one of you
have stories of when it took 15 and 9 and 11. But
bottom line, it takes money for you to operate. You
need capacity money, you need…development
money, you need bridge money, you need equity,
you need construction loans, you need primary
loans and lots of stuff in between. And it traditionally
has come from different sources, everyone with a
slightly different angle, twist, motivation or
otherwise.
And so, there is a cost attached to the fact that that
occurs. And the cost is not just in how long it takes
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to do a deal because, traditionally, affordable
housing — and we’ve seen nonprofits that essentially
had to pay 20 percent premiums to buy the same
property just because of how long it took to get there.
And that was the cost of waiting, if you will, six to 12
months. And so they were front-ending a lot of the
benefits of nonprofit ownership, whether it’s the
property tax exemption or the 501(c)(3) bonds into
the price....
On a given deal, what is the cost every year of
having to maintain and track six different income
restrictions, file 14 different reports, satisfy nine
people who want to come and inspect it, and so on
and so forth. There’s a fundamental cost to
affordable housing that is not born in the
conventional market.
Two studies indicate that that cost could be as much
as 20 to 30 percent — i.e., if you had $40 billion being
spent on rental housing today to the federal and state
government, if for some reason you wave this wand,
and you got rid of these duplications and
efficiencies...you could theoretically create $8 billion
to $12 billion in new dollars for rental-affordable
housing. Okay? That’s just a hypothesis. I hope I
woke you up.
Now the question, if you even accept part of that
hypothesis — and there seems to experiential proof at
any rate — what do you do about that? How do you
then take some of the lessons — and I want to go
back to something Wendell said and re-emphasize it.
Keep the interest of the private capital markets.
Because it’s wonderful to have tax credits and get the
Congress to increase them, but if you don’t have
buyers, and if you don’t have buyers who are willing
to pay reasonable prices, you haven’t achieved
nearly as much. The reason we survive with our
tax-credit increase is the price of credits went from
40 cents to 80 cents during the course of the same
10-year period.
So how do you maintain private capital markets that
are both competitive as well as incented, create an
efficient system, and really, frankly, expand the
availability of capital for affordable housing?...
LARRY DALE: Well, I’m going to answer the tax-
credit investor question. I’m going to try and stick
with that for the minute, as opposed to all the capital
sources.
I think of the low-income housing tax-credit
marketplace as being a relatively small-niched,
specialized marketplace that’s in about stage two of
a classic three or four-stage development. It started
out with, as you say, prices in the 40’s and yields in
the high teens because nobody knew if it was going
to be there the next day, and nobody had worked
with it before, and it was very small.
We now have seen yields go down...and prices went
up, to the point that, frankly, a year ago, people were
paying too much for tax credits. And a lot of
investors backed away. They were paying too much
for reasons other than pure, disciplined investment
reasons.
It just so happened that I was refinancing my house for
$150,000, and I looked at the documents that we had for that
$150,000 first-mortgage, multifamily loan, and I looked at the
documents that I had for my $150,000 loan from my single-
family home, there is about four inches difference between the
amount of paper you needed for that loan versus a single-family
loan.  –LARRY DALE
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So this is the first time we’ve seen a correction
where yields have gone back up. That’s I think very
healthy. I think that’s a good sign in the marketplace,
because, ultimately, you’ve got to find a floor, and
then you’ve got to bounce along and do the
correction for a while before you’ll find where the
real marketplace is, and you’ll have a real volume of
buying and selling. And that’s sort of the classic
capital markets behavior. And it seems to me that
we’re in sort of stage two, and after we bounce
around a little bit, we should find some sort of real
secondary market, some real vehicles. And there
will be enough volume in the market now; there will
be enough experience in the market that people
begin to do risk-adjusted returns; people will begin
to feel like they know there is a secondary market
there, and they know how to access it. And I think
you’ll see this market mature to yet another stage
probably within the next three, four or five years.
Wendell, how do you attract new capital investors?
WENDELL JOHNS: Well, I think the easy answer is
yield and return. But I think that’s only part of the
answer. I think the other part of the answer has to do
with how do we ring out the inefficiencies.
You made the comment earlier, I think, about
conventional financing, and...affordable financing,
there’s a big difference in cost between the two. We
have to look at why....And I think a lot of it has to do
with regulation. A lot of it has to do with the fact that
these are tax driven, and a lot of your conventional
transactions don’t necessarily have the tax
complications that this system does. So maybe
there’s a way to get rid of that, if you will....
....there are still organizations that shy away from a
15-year investment. We still haven’t developed a
liquid secondary market for portfolios. There are
some that are sold and bought. And I think currently
there’s going to be a real good test as to how liquid
the marketplace is when you look at the portfolios
that are being placed on the market by certain utility
companies that are out of business. How long is it
going to take for those to sell. 
And so there are corporations sitting on the sidelines
that probably want to see how long that’s going to
take. Because if it takes too long, that will be
justification that, yes, there still is a very illiquid
market, and that’s not the kind of position that they
want to be in when they have to move dollars
around very quickly and change their strategy very
quickly.
SHEKAR NARASIMHAN: Bob, is there anything that
would prohibit the state of Minnesota from enabling
a secondary market? Would you guarantee credits to
investors?
BOB ODMAN: Guarantee credits?
SHEKAR NARASIMHAN: Yes.
BOB ODMAN: Explain that in more detail. Exactly
where are you going with that?
SHEKAR NARASIMHAN: Would you guarantee the
return?
BOB ODMAN: Guarantee a return? No way. No way.
We take risks. We expect the private investor to take
risks as well.
A big concern we have, as the price of tax credits is
dropping — and Joe Hagan came up to St. Paul about
two weeks ago and...made the comment that he was
concerned that there may be some credits that go
begging, that they go unpurchased, because as the
yields are increasing, and the price is dropping, and
the secondary market is coming into play with some
of the California utilities....[T]hat [is] going to have a
significant impact. That’s important.
Also, as the price drops, in order to get a higher yield
for the investor, we’re still seeing increased land
costs, increased construction costs, so the gap is
going to be increasing. And unless we see a
significant increase in sources of subsidy funding
from whatever level of government, or whatever
source—be it philanthropic or publicly funded—I
think we’ll have some problems in being able to
utilize the cap increase.
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SHEKAR NARASIMHAN: So at least in the short
term, you’re saying the problem could actually get
exacerbated.
BOB ODMAN: Right.
SHEKAR NARASIMHAN: You might have to go look
for that 13th source of financing to fill the new gap
that’s just getting created.
Joe, your observations here? What do we have to
really do to stimulate this market?
JOSEPH HAGAN: In the last 10 years, we have
become very sophisticated. At NEF, we have 933
properties in our portfolio. And literally within that,
we can go to just about any city in the United States,
and we can give you a sense of what we think the
true operating cost is for those properties based on
real numbers.
So my point is that we now have a track record. We
have systems in place [so] that we really know
what’s going on with these properties....As a
result,...I think that we can become more
sophisticated. And I like the whole idea of figuring
out a way where we can maybe do a guaranteed
yield program….
SHEKAR NARASIMHAN: Joe, what you’re saying,
basically, is create more data, provide more
information, and give more value. What I also heard
both Wendell and Larry saying is, provide more
yield….
JOSEPH HAGAN: Well, here’s what I would love to
have happen. I could never figure out why the
federal government would first tell the state, here’s
how much tax credit you have each year, and then
go one step further; this is the maximum number
credits you give for a project. Why can’t they just
say, State of Ohio, you have $13 million worth of tax
credits. You decide where you want to put those
credits, and you decide how many credits can go to
that project. Why does there have to be a cap on
each deal? ....Some deals might require more credits
because it’s in a rural area or they’re doing more
difficult types of projects. Other deals don’t require
as much credit because of the fact that there’s other
things to support it….
BOB ODMAN: …Should we increase the income
limit for the tax-credit program, which in turn would
raise the rent level, which in turn would get more
housing produced in the marketplace….Section 236
and Section 8 programs…started out as mixed-
income programs. [Then] they started to ratchet it
down to serving the poorest-of-the poor. You ended
up with larger concentrations of low-income people
and deeper and deeper subsidy requirements.
I present to you that a household with an income at
or below 30 percent of median income cannot afford
to pay operating costs. They must have a Section 8
subsidy or something like that to be able to afford
that housing. And I would also offer that I think a 30-
percent rent burden for a household at 30 percent of
median is too high. Under the original guidelines for
the Section 8 program, that household would have
been paying 15 percent of their income….
…And if you look at census data,…what portion of
their income does the average renter pay for
housing? Anybody in this room…want to venture a
guess?…
Yes, 22 percent…across the board, all renters. So if
you look at how does the marketplace
function…that’s what the average renter will pay or
can afford to pay across the board. Now that’s based
on 1990 census data. I don’t know what the 2000
census data will show. And clearly, it’s better to pay
30 percent, than 50 percent or 60 percent if you were
rent burdened before. But I think we need to take a
look at some of those things when we talk about
changing rental housing, or establishing a national
rental housing policy.
SHEKAR NARASIMHAN: I’d love to hear some
reactions.
UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT: Bob’s comment
about raising the income limits, I would strongly
oppose that….The conventional marketplace
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primarily and ordinarily takes care of the needs of
the middle and upper income. And in terms of poor
people, or lower-income people, we’ve had to create
this craziness that we’re going through right now
with these tax credits.
Has it built housing for the lower-income people
who need it? Yes. And I think we need to continue to
do that….
SHEKAR NARASIMHAN: So your concern is dilution
of resources.
PARTICIPANT: Yes....
SHEKAR NARASIMHAN: Okay, finally. Larry, can
you jump in?
LARRY DALE: …I think we’re in the midst of falling
into a classic trap, which actually started in the
1960s. Those programs that grew out of the 1960s
grew out of an environment where the federal
government felt that it had to be very prescriptive
and very directive in order to force housing into
communities that didn’t want it, for racial reasons,
for other reasons. There was a certain mindset that
was going on. And I think many of the programs
today continue that sort of ethic, that if the federal
government doesn’t specify where you dot every “i”
and cross every “t”, it’s not going to get done.
We’re in a somewhat different environment today.
And I would suggest that we need to be thinking
about a broad platform at the federal level. There’s
nothing magic about 4 percent and 9 percent. What’s
wrong with 7 percent and 13 percent? If you’ve got
very low-income housing that’s 13 percent, if you’ve
got mixed-use housing that’s 4 percent, if you’ve got
something in between that’s 7 or 9 or 11, what’s
wrong with different gradations in the percentage of
a [tax] credit?… Does the federal government really
need to tell us that this bush is depreciable basis
because it’s next to the house, and this bush is not
depreciable basis because it’s next to the road, that’s
pretty prescriptive I would suggest.
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And I think the concept we need to be working on is
the federal government provides a platform….And
then you need a lot of state, and local and other
decision making to say, okay, in our community we
need to add to that level to meet this need because
we in San Francisco want to have policemen and
firemen and service workers in our community, and
we don’t want to have to be paying a zillion dollars
to bring them in from Sacramento....And the federal
government can’t write a rule that’s big enough to
include that, and include Dayton, Ohio, and include
some rural community in South Dakota, and have it
all fit under the same rule, if it’s terribly
prescriptive….
UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT: This morning, a lot
of people nodded at the thought of including more
and more costs into projects to provide property for
asset-management services….I’d be interested to
hear from the panelists whether you have any
concerns about what might be a public policy time
bomb, that each time that total development cost
goes up — no matter for how many good reasons, the
per-unit cost goes up, and do we face the possibility
of somebody saying, my gosh, they’re spending
$300,000 a unit for affordable housing.
SHEKAR NARASIMHAN: And I would just tack onto
that. And if it becomes widely known that it cost 20
to 30 percent more than a conventional unit to build
that same unit — there are studies that say it — who
wants to take that on? How do you justify the
costs?…
UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT: I would build on
that by saying, what we get suckered into is talking
about cost per unit….We’re buying, in the case of
our state, 30 years of affordability, and likely many
years after that. In the other cases, you’re buying a
unit of housing which is at the whim of the market
from day one. So it’s two completely different things.
And we get suckered into fighting the cost-per-unit
battle when we need to be talking about the
affordability issue. What we’re really buying is the
long-term affordability of the unit to families at a
certain income level.
UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT: I’ve got to tell you
that [General Accounting Office] is going to come out
with a report very soon that shows [the]cost [of]
credits…per unit, compared to other subsidized
housing is extremely high….So I think it’s about to
get back on the radar screen in a way that it hasn’t
for quite a while….I simply urge vigilance on this
issue, and don’t stop talking….And give members of
Congress and their staffs alternative ways to see the
value and not just focus on the cost.
UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT: ...One of the
liabilities, to me, of the tax-credit program has been
that it doesn’t encourage — or even sometimes
enable very easily — mixed-income housing. I just
want to note that...it’s not something that’s easy to do
or encouraged with the current structure of the tax-
credit program. So in addition to thinking about
flexibility based on different cost patterns, I would
just suggest that’s a public policy goal that we ought
to be thinking about being able to do with tax
credits....
UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT: One thing I think
we need to look at is what is the total public
expenditure for providing housing and services in a
given location? Over the years, I’ve not been a fan of
rehab because operating costs have tended to be
higher, and the per-unit rehab costs have been
higher.
But of late, I’ve started to look more closely at what
are the benefits of doing that rehab deal. Do you
have mass transit available? Do you have job
opportunities, shopping, basic services, health care,
churches, schools? If you have all of those things,
and your fundamental public infrastructure—
sidewalks, streets, sewer and water—then within that
overall context, if you built that housing new in a
cornfield someplace in Minnesota, and you had to
bring all of that other stuff in, how would that cost
compare?
We’re too used to looking at things in isolation. I
think we need to look at things from a broader
perspective…[I]t’s not just the housing itself; it’s
what is the total public infrastructure cost that we’re
dealing with that I think we need to come to grips
with....
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SHEKAR NARASIMHAN: We have Michael Curran
here [President, Enterprise Social Investment
Corporation]. And I had prepped Michael a little bit
just to talk about the sufficiency issue; what are the
rules when you look at the HFAs, when you look at
the nonprofit national intermediaries? What could
these agents, if you will, do to better manage their
ends of a deal? What else could they be doing to
improve the efficiency of the system?
Michael, you want to comment on our conversation
or that question?
MICHAEL CURRAN: I don’t know if I will answer
the question directly, Shekar. It seems to me that a
lot of the conversation today — and to some extent,
even earlier today — was trying to impose a more
market-like discipline and way of viewing the world
on an industry that is very fragmented in serving a
wide range of people....
So the idea of efficiencies and streamlining, and all
of these things are good in one area but not
necessarily in other areas....I think more flexibility,
more local control is a much better way at getting at
some of these things.
SHEKAR NARASIMHAN: So you would deliver all
that to Bob and say, you figure it out. You trust him?
MICHAEL CURRAN: With some baseline guidelines
that Larry was just sort of alluding to, yes….
UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT: There’s a resource
that we haven’t really talked about and some choices
that local governments are making with programs
like HOME, which is a formula block grant. The
choices are essentially made at the local and state
level. And to the extent that we get $1.8 billion a
year, that essentially buys about 80,000 units a year….
I think there are lots of state and local choices that
don’t involve tax credits at all; that much of our
rental production really is one to four-unit
properties. From the HOME perspective, about 6
percent of our HOME projects have tax credits….
WENDELL JOHNS: I just wanted to support this idea
of providing as many resources as you can down to
the local level, because in looking back at one of the
comments that Joe made about the $2 million and
under loans,…I don’t think we’re going to fix that
situation until we have enough resources at the local
level where they can fill the gap….Somebody has to
come up with the dollars, and I don’t think the
private sector’s going to do it….
MICHAEL CURRAN: As a subsidiary of Enterprise
Mortgage Investments—set up in partnership with
Fannie Mae to help provide long-term financing for
these small loans. Fannie has been trying to
encourage all of its best lenders to go to that segment
of the market. Volume does not get you there. Every
deal you’re losing money on, which is $3 million and
below. It just doesn’t work.
It just so happened that I was refinancing my house for
$150,000, and I looked at the documents that we had for that
$150,000 first-mortgage, multifamily loan, and I looked at the
documents that I had for my $150,000 loan from my single-
family home, there is about four inches difference between the
amount of paper you needed for that loan versus a single-family
loan.  –JOSEPH HAGAN
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So Wendell’s absolutely right, in order to provide
capital to that segment of the marketplace, there has
to be some other resources brought to them, if you’re
talking about strictly private capital mortgage.
MARINA PEED: My name is Marina Peed at
Gwinnett Housing Resource Partnership in
Norcross, Georgia, which is a suburban community
in Atlanta, and we’re facing a lot of the challenges
that the urban ring folks are facing. And the issue
about the small deals is one that I think cannot be
ignored and be pushed off for another
discussion….Those two, two-and-a-half, three
million dollar projects where it’s not feasible to do
the bond or the tax credit is something that is of
concern to me…for a couple of reasons. One, we
went to all the banks in Atlanta. They weren’t
willing to work with us, but guess what? Those
predatory and sub-prime — I know they’re not
always the same — those folks that are working on
our homeowners in our communities were willing
to help us do the deal.
Now we actually had to think about wanting to do
that 18 percent money. At least we can get site
control, and then we can use HOME to…rehab…it.
Finally,…one of our local community banks stepped
up at prime plus a half….
But the efficiencies part isn’t just in a scale of the
program, or the project, it’s also the process, and the
hoops, and the limberness not only of the
organization who’s doing it but of the systems as
well. And I said to a lender we talked with for almost
one year about our project, “…I’ve given you
everything but my personal measurements.”...And I
just share that, that tax credits aren’t the only
mechanism.
SHEKAR NARASIMHAN: You’re absolutely right.
I’ve been [doing] multifamily lending for longer than
most of you want to know. But $10 billion of loans
later, this road of making small loans efficiently is
paved with good intentions — and carcasses and
scars….It is just infeasible to be done as either a
scale business or a business that is done automated.
I mean, it is something in between a single-family
loan and a loan that should be processed with some
due diligence at the local level.
The solution used to be, as you well know, savings
and loans, community banks. They were the ones
that understood. They could drive by. They knew the
owner, they knew the nonprofit, they knew the
community, and they could do that business
efficiently.
UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT: And when we
bailed them out,…I guess that wasn’t considered a
subsidy. But they didn’t go belly up from making
investments in our neighborhood.
SHEKAR NARASIMHAN: That’s a very good point. I
wanted to address one point,...but I did want to
challenge the assumption that was made this
morning, which is that we don’t need to use subsidy
money again on deals that have to get reinvented, if
you will. Because if we don’t have enough income in
the property to be able to do that rejuvenation, it’s
going to have to come from somewhere.
And the fact of the matter is that you should know,
we bail out banks all the time. We bail out savings
and loans all the time. If they do a conventional
product, and somehow nobody thinks that’s really
wrong — there’s an 18 percent foreclosure rate in
1991 on commercial properties. And I’m a private
lender, by the way.
My point is that I don’t think we should be defensive
about it, but I think we need to explain—and we don’t
do a very good job explaining — the fact that
revenues in affordable housing tend not to go up as
fast as expenses often do, i.e., if you started with a
cushion, the cushion has drained over time, and you
have regulatory burdens, which means the
resources to do the rehab don’t exist within the
project, and therefore, have to come from external
sources. And if that means every 10 years you have
to get grants to do it, well, that’s what you need
because that is what it takes to keep the property up
to date.
…We ought to react exactly the opposite…we do
want appropriations every year; and part of that
appropriation has to be to preserve and
rejuvenate….
Wendell, starting with you…you don’t have to define
whether it’s a nonprofit, for-profit….What are the
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characteristics of a good borrower, first develop, and
then maintain, and sustain affordable housing?
WENDELL JOHNS: Well, it’s much easier to
approve, if you will, a borrower who has a very
large balance sheet, has a large portfolio of
successful properties, and a history of managing
those properties well and putting money into those
properties if need be. Where it gets a little dicey is
where you don’t have that large balance
sheet,…maybe a little bit less than investment grade
rating, and you’re looking to a history of behavior or
depth of management, experience and confidence to
try to offset that.
It’s an area that we are being challenged and we’re
working on everyday, particularly as we’ve gotten
involved in underwriting 501(c)(3) deals, which we
have done. But we’re not at the point where we can
crank those through just as easily as we do, let’s say,
our standard conventional business with repeat
borrowers and developers, where we have all that
other information that supports their financial net
worth, if you will.
We have to and we will continue to work on better
ways to describe what that really is. But I think
probably if you look across this room there are some
groups here that we’ve financed and some that we
haven’t. And some of that may have had something
to do with the entity, some of it may have had
something to do with the property itself. We have to
look at all of those sides of the transaction.
SHEKAR NARASIMHAN: Larry, what do you think?
LARRY DALE: Well, I’m going to duck the question a
little bit. I agree with Wendell, the confidence and
longevity, and to some extent, money. But I’d like to
focus on the nature of the transaction. And I think
this morning we delineated sort of being clear on
what the objectives are. And I guess once we’re clear
on what the objectives are, if the transaction has the
interest of all the parties aligned to achieve those
objectives; that is, the owner, the syndicator, the
manager, the residents, the community....And where
you see alignment of the community interest,
residential interest, the owner’s interest up front, the
ongoing interest of the owner and the manager and
the operators, I think there you’ve got the chance for
a very high degree of success.
JOSEPH HAGAN: You’re exactly right. I mean, what
you have to do is first look at the project to make
sure the project is feasible….At NEF, of the $3 billion
portfolio, about 99.9 percent of those are with
nonprofit entities. And so, we’ve gotten pretty good
at underwriting nonprofit deals.
And one of the things that we have learned as a
result of looking at nonprofits that literally have
very, very little net worth, what we have found is
when there are problems that, basically, the deals
that we do with them, they’re a lot of stakeholders.
And it seems like those stakeholders will step up and
help get through the issues that are associated with
those deals, i.e., the state might have put some
money in or the local government might have put
some money in. There might have been a church
associated with it. And they seem to all get together
to figure out how to solve the problem. And that’s
one of the interesting things to me.
If it becomes widely known that it cost 20 to 30 percent more
than a conventional unit to build that same unit — there are
studies that say it — who wants to take that on? How do you
justify the costs?… –SHEKAR NARASIMHAN
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Now, working at Bank One, and going in and trying
to bring a deal with a nonprofit entity before a
committee that was so used to looking at other types
of borrowers — borrowers that had a net worth — it
took a long time for me to learn now to present those
types of deals to them. But at the end of the
day...really, they’re one in the same, and you just
need to understand what the difference is between
underwriting a for-profit developer with a huge
liquidity that, obviously, can go away the next day,
and a nonprofit entity that can lose its executive
director that has led that nonprofit entity to become
great...and that entity could change completely. So it
rests first with the deal, and then you have to look at
the other strengths of the general partner.
BOB ODMAN: I agree. You need to look at the
organization and their capacity to handle the type of
deal that you have in front of you; have they done
similar types of developments, how they handled
them; the long-term organizational capacity; did
they have succession planning, what happens if a
key person moves out, leaves the organization for
whatever reason, are there people there to...continue
its capacity as an asset manager. And liquidity is
obviously important, enough liquidity to handle
what they have on their plate at the current time,
plus the current deal, plus whatever else they might
be working on at the given point in time.
SHEKAR NARASIMHAN: I have one quick addition
to that, then we’re going to come back with one last
comment. And the last question… Do you believe
that we should have little mortgages that allow for
resets, or do you like long-term, self-liquidating
mortgages?
One of the things we look at when we lend to
nonprofits, whether it’s in 501(c)(3) bonds or not —
and it’s always been intriguing to me that the first
conversations we have, having actually worked in
one, I was asked the question of how they expect to
get funded three years from now. And it tends to
surprise a lot of them, so I’m preparing you for it if
you ever talk to us.
Most corporations have two elements. They have
people, which are very, very important, and then
they always have some recurring fee income or
recurring source of revenue that says they’ll be
around.
We’re doing a $26 million transaction with a
nonprofit that’s been around for five or six years,
that’s done a great job, that’s very well supported by
the city, but there is no fundamental answer to this
question in that case. And the answer is that we can’t
do the deal with them alone. That doesn’t mean they
can’t be part of a deal, but they’ve got to go find
someone who can answer that question because
what are we betting on here? I don’t want to own the
property or manage it, for that matter. That’s not my
job.
So anyway, just add to that the question of how you
will sustain yourself. It’s not whether you make a
profit or you don’t. I’m not creating value judgments,
What we get suckered into is talking about cost per
unit….We’re buying, in the case of our state, 30 years of
affordability, and likely many years after that. In the other
cases, you’re buying a unit of housing which is at the whim of
the market from day one. So it’s two completely different
things.  –UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT
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but do you have a plan? Do you have a business plan
or a strategy that shows you’re creating asset
management revenues and are going to be in some
form able to sustain at least your ownership and
asset management of that property. And if you can’t
answer that question for me, we can’t do any
business.
So, balloon question. There’s always a healthy
debate, and everyone agrees that adjustable-rate
financing long term for affordable doesn’t make
sense because volatility of debt service, and you
don’t have the same ability to raise rents and so on.
But the question is, should you have 10-year fixed-
rate loans—I think we see 10-year, 15-year, 18-year,
30-year, 35-year, and 40-year, so, obviously,
[different people] believe in different things. What’s
the right answer?... 
JOSEPH HAGAN: Ideally for us, it would be an 18-
year term, 25-year amortization, and maybe 30-year
amortization, but don’t like to go beyond 30-year
amortization. We really want to go a little bit beyond
the tax credit….
Usually, at the end of 18 years, that’s when we’re
going to see the partnership change. Most likely
you’ll see an exit of a limited partner, and you’ll be
bringing in another entity. And at that time you’ll
want to be able to refinance. If it’s a little bit less than
18 years, you might not make the time period.
SHEKAR NARASIMHAN: Wendell, you guys
invented the 18?
WENDELL JOHNS: Yeah, the 18 came about to
allow some time after the end of the compliance
period to gain some financing and not to put all that
pressure in year 15 or year 16, to have all these
events converge at the same time. So it just tried to
allow some cushion.
And speaking of cushion, and really getting
comfortable with these transactions, you’re talking
about risk mitigation. And all of these transactions
have some risk to them. And hopefully, you come up
with a way that if something goes bad, you have
something you can rely upon.
In the early days of the program, it was price. There
was enough cushion in the price that you could put
some dollars in, if you had to, to fix something later
down the road. Today, with the price being where it
is, that’s not available anymore. I see the terms on
the debt as being how much risk can the property
really stand. And sometimes it might be justifiable to
do a shorter period of time, particularly if the goal of
the nonprofit is, you want to be in a position where
you can own it out right. And if you don’t have to
worry about debt or refinancing some debt, you can
get to that position a lot faster.
Also, you have to be concerned with the residents.
Why have a shock 10 years out when the
compliance period isn’t even over, where you have
to be concerned, what happens when I try to
refinance this? What’s going to happen to the rates?
LARRY DALE: The capital markets are sophisticated
enough now to allocate risk in appropriate ways. I
guarantee you, if we were in a 15 percent interest
rate environment, and it was steep-yield curve, we’d
all be looking at doing short-term rates….It’s a risk
allocation….
So I think you can make an argument for either case.
I think in today’s market you can find vehicles that
don’t blow up before the 15th or 18th year, but that
do provide rolling resets of interest rates and various
kinds of caps and swaps that protect investors and
owners adequately, and probably provide
marginally lower cost financing over the term of the
loan.
BOB ODMAN: And I agree with Larry. In today’s
market, though, I prefer fixed-rate, fully amortizing
30 years. That’s what we’re doing.
SHEKAR NARASIMHAN: Excellent. Well, be careful
what you wish for. Too much efficiency, too much
federal governance. A panel that is extraordinary
and certainly, I think, shared a tremendous amount
of its intellectual wisdom with you. So thank you.
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EVELYN FRIEDMAN: I’m Evelyn Freedman. I’m
from Nuestra Comunidad Development Corporation
in Roxbury, which is part of Boston....
Our lead speaker will be Michael Bodaken, who
serves as the president of the National Housing
Trust, which is a national, nonprofit organization
devoted to the preservation of federally-assisted or
insured multifamily housing. As head of NHT
Enterprise Preservation Corporation, Mr. Bodaken
focuses on the direct purchase of multifamily,
affordable housing properties by joint venture of the
National Housing Trust and the Enterprise
Foundation. 
Next to him is Dan Anderson, who is a senior vice
president and director of the Bank of America’s
Public Housing Initiative. He leads the bank’s overall
effort to provide products and services relevant to
the bank’s credit product offerings for financing
needs of public housing authorities. 
Then we have Jesse Chancellor. Jesse Chancellor is
the principal of Chancellor & Associates LLC, a debt-
advisory and construction services firm based in
Columbia, Maryland. Immediately prior to starting
his advisory business, Mr. Chancellor had been the
senior vice president for Investments at Municipal
Mortgage and Equity LLC, MuniMae, where he was
responsible for managing the activities of a
specialized team that originated tax-credit
multifamily housing bonds nationally. 
Then we have Janet Falk. Janet is the CEO of the
California Housing Partnership Corporation. Prior to
joining CHPC, Ms. Falk served as co-director at
Community Economics, Inc., a nonprofit
organization that provides technical assistance in
housing finance to nonprofit housing developers and
local governments and tenant organizations.
And finally, our moderator, Chuck Wehrwein.
Chuck is currently the vice president of Mercy
Housing, Inc., one of the largest nonprofit
developers, owners and managers of service-
enriched, affordable housing in the United States.
His prior positions include chief operating officer of
the National Equity Fund, deputy assistant secretary
for Multifamily Housing Programs at HUD, and
deputy administrator for Multifamily Housing
Programs at the Rural Housing Services. I’ll turn it
over to Chuck.
CHUCK WEHRWEIN: Thank you, Evelyn. We’re
going to start with a presentation from Michael
Risk Capital for Preservation
Acquisition
How does the availability of risk capital support the preservation of our affordable housing stock and
the growth of strong preservation entities?  Risk capital usually demand high rates of return. Can
public capital be used for risk capital to mitigate the return requirements and achieve public benefits
over the long term?
Lead Presenter: Michael Bodaken, National Housing Trust
Moderator: Chuck Wehrwein, Mercy Housing, Inc.
Panelists: Daniel Anderson, Bank of America
Jesse Chancellor, Chancellor & Associates LLC
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Bodaken....And once Michael completes his
presentation, we’ll get back to some questions on
our panel. So Michael?
MICHAEL BODAKEN: I’m going to try to...refocus, if
you will, our attention on good ownership entities,
and in particular, focus our attention on building
sustainable, excellent preservation entities in the
affordable housing field.…
The first reason we need such entities, obviously, is
we need to have a reason for preservation. And
thanks to the good work of the Joint Center for
Housing Studies and the Low-Income Housing
Coalition, we all know there’s five-to-15 million
households, depending on how you count, who have
worst-case housing needs in this country. And
generally, there are two ways to solve that very
difficult dilemma. 
One would be to produce or give vouchers to five-to-
15 million families. I think that would solve that
problem overnight. And the last time I looked at the
HUD budget, I think there was 32,000 vouchers in it,
and we counted that a success. So the other way to at
least begin to look at it is...to also preserve and
improve what we have, which is truly affordable. 
And today, if I impress upon you anything, it is that
critical mission that I think we need to focus on.
Very often we look at that problem from a resource-
allocation standpoint. We look at what we need to do
for a particular deal. We need to know the amount of
equity, or the amount of debt, or what kind of soft
money we need to do for a particular deal. But if
there’s something that I think is missing from the
debate, it is, in fact, creating excellent affordable
housing organizations. And how do we do
that?…We have a significant need, we have a
significant problem coming at us, and the real
question is, how do we build and sustain
preservation entities of all stripes?
…I think that the first thing that I would submit to all
of you is that this needs to be a core national
objective. This is not, I believe, something that can
be done at the state or local level only. There needs
to be a general, national recognition that there is a
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need for sustained excellence in this field, and that
needs to be recognized at the national level.… I
would discriminate that statement, however, by
saying that doesn’t mean they all have to be national
entities.… I think it can be local, state, regional,
national; in fact, it should be all of those things.…[I]f
you accept the premise of the need for such entities,
what kind of capital is willing to invest in such
entities at its formation stage? If you look at any
really rational business plan for an Internet start-up
or anything else, venture capital…takes a little bit
higher rate of return than…[what] I argue is most
likely for preservation entities.
Basically, preservation entities are steady-Eddie type
investments, and that what you really need is patient
capital, sometimes extraordinarily patient capital to
seed such entities. And I think it’s very important
that we not overstate what we can do.
What we can do in this business is preserve and
improve housing, create neighborhood assets, turn
something bad into something good. What we can’t
do is solve everybody’s problems and create a rate of
return for investors at 15 or 20 percent per year.
That I don’t believe is sustainable, and I think it’s
very important that we talk about needing, at the
very early stages, grants or very low interest-rate
investments for both nurturing and seeding our
preservation entities.
As you may know, the National Housing Trust…saw
that need and created our own internal seed model
to create a preservation entity called NHT
Enterprise. We did that because we didn’t think we
could go to the capital markets or anybody else
could go to the capital markets, to create and sustain
those kinds of entities.
Another model that has been used from time to time
is a government-grant model. National Housing
Development Corporation actually received a huge
government grant for its own organization to create
a preservation entity. There is a bill that was
pending in Congress — H.R. 202 — which basically
would have created a competition among local, state
and national entities for the federal government to,
in fact, provide operating support for preservation
entities. But I would think that today we need more
than those models. And I think that we are now on
the verge of a model that is more of a foundation
government-grant matching model. That kind of
thinking I think needs to emerge in this discussion. 
Paul Grogan, in his book, Comeback Cities: A
Blueprint for Urban Neighborhood Revival, talks a lot
about the great thing we did with the National
Community Development Initiative….Basically, the
foundations and governments saw a significant need
to build up community development corporations.
They decided, wise or not, to focus on 23 cities, and
for the government and these foundations to
essentially match over a 10-year period, sustaining
these CDCs through a mix of grants and low-interest
loans. Lots of discussions about the outcome of that
particular initiative, lots of back and forth. But a
significant national priority was set, done at the
federal level. And it was done through two
intermediaries, Enterprise and LISC.
I do believe that we are now in the place where we
can say to foundations and the government, now is
the time to pony up resources not only for CDCs, but
for national organizations, for everything in between
who are dedicated entities, who are dedicated,
mission-committed, business-driven entities who
are willing to invest their resources in this kind of an
effort….I’m very concerned that if we don’t do that,
we will continue to have these small efforts that do
some things for small neighborhoods, but don’t
really get to scale.
The kind of investment I propose is on the order of
$40 million a year, $20 million from the foundations
and $20 million from the federal government.
Not...an extraordinary amount of money, but I think
you would see a dramatic imprint on what could be
done….There are a number of funders who I think
are interested in this activity, and I would be remiss
if I didn’t at least mention those funders. NHT
Enterprise after putting its first investment was
provided a significant program-related investment
from the McArthur Foundation, who continues to
support our efforts and others’ efforts in this field.
The Fannie Mae Foundation has dedicated itself to
this kind of effort. The Ford Foundation in its earlier
iteration has done it. You probably know other
funders. The W. Alton Jones Foundation in
Charlottesville is working on the preservation
project. 
There’s lots going on in this field that I think we
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could take advantage of. And I think it’s important
for us to begin the discussion of a collaboration that
focuses not only on the resources, not only on the
deal points, but on how do we build ourselves to get
to scale so that we really do in the end — 10 years
from now — say we really did something. We built
something up. We not only built it, but we did it
right.
So that’s the essence of what I wanted to say, and we
can go from there.
CHUCK WEHRWEIN: Thank you, Michael. I think
your paper is an excellent springboard from this
morning’s discussions on what type of entities and
assets were successful, and what we need to think
about in terms of the preservation context. So with
that in mind, again, we’re going to sort of cut this
down into three segments. I think a lot of folks who
had a lot of comments they wanted to make this
morning about entities and resources and changes
that they’d like to see happen will have an
opportunity to do so here today….So Janet, I think I’d
like to start with you….Have we, in fact, created
sustainable nonprofits or preservation entities, as
Michael has described them in his paper? And if so,
what has the government — and that would be
federal, state or local — done to assist in both creating
and sustaining those organizations?
JANET FALK: Well, I come from California, and
when I talk with Michael and Chuck and other
people, they usually say, “Oh, California’s different.”
And it is. But I would contend that maybe you’re
going to end up being there too in a few years....
I want to make the pitch for, I guess, the opposite
model. I certainly recognize there’s a need for these
large national organizations. We certainly heard a
lot of discussion this morning that seemed to push
things in the direction of needing to have large
organizations, nonprofit or for-profit, in order to be
efficient and operate well in the marketplace. In
California, we have a number of organizations that
have been around for over 30 years; nonprofits, who
have nowhere near 10,000 units, but they have
substantial numbers. And they’ve operated well and
are doing preservation purchases....
Chuck asked the question, “What can be done to
help sustain these, or how have these groups that
have been around for 30 years managed?” And it’s
been kind of interesting as I’ve watched them,
because they started getting most of their support out
of CDBG funds, so it was, in fact, federal money at
the local level. And they were getting operational
and administrative support. And as time went on,
cities began to use their CDBG money for other
purposes. So the developers turned to developer fees
from tax-credit projects, because that’s about when
those started happening, and they got into that area.
And that’s where they were getting a lot of their
organizational support; they’d use their developer
fees not just to do other projects but to sustain their
organizations. Also, most of the larger ones
developed management companies, which is not
always a plus and doesn’t always bring in positive
cash flow, but over time tends to help sustain the
organization.
And the last thing that I wanted to point out about
these groups is that I think they’ve diversified. And
they’ve diversified both in terms of where they get
their operational and organizational support, so they
now look to foundations, to CRA lenders, to
corporate funders. They do their own
fundraising….So I’ve seen groups, more and more,
[that] do new construction,…acquisition
rehab,…preservation,…special needs. They’ve really
got a diversity of experience….[O]ne of the things I
would be a little bit concerned about…is that if a
group is just focused on preservation…and
something happens [to the funding], how are you
going to sustain yourself over the long term?
MICHAEL BODAKEN: Well, first I want to be clear —
and I’ve tried to be clear — in the presentation in
here that I’m encouraging all types of entities to
enter into this field….I think the question we have to
ask ourselves is, as portfolios come on line, and
they’re not all located in L.A. or even Sacramento,
how do we handle the transactions that are going to
be difficult for one CDC to handle? And in our
experience, where we’ve found success is, where a
CDC can do it, we should work with that local
organization. But where it’s outside of that
organization’s general area, they have no interest.
There has to be some either national or regional
entity willing to take that task on….
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There will be a time when the Sacramento Mutual
Housing Association can do it without the National
Housing Trust or California Housing Partnership
because they don’t need us. And then there will be
10 projects offered on the Eastern seaboard, three in
Pennsylvania, two in Indiana and two in Florida,
and no local nonprofits at all interested in any of
those. And I think that we have to have the ability to
execute in all of those cases. And I’m not sure we
have the ability yet to execute beyond the CDC level
in any meaningful fashion….
CHUCK WEHRWEIN: Jesse, how do your
experiences match up with what both Janet and
Michael have set in terms of stronger CDCs in
California versus maybe what they look like across
the rest of the country?
JESSE CHANCELLOR: Well, I think I was asked to
come here for two reasons. One, is that at MuniMae
we built a 501(c)(3) bond business. We were one of
the first entities into the business, and what we
found was a very uneven group of borrowers across
the country. Although we wanted very much to do
business with strong and moderately-strong
nonprofits, we found that many of our borrowers
were weaker nonprofits who needed, and for good
reason, wanted to preserve housing in their regions
or areas….
The small nonprofits need a lot more handholding.
And there was no intermediary, no entity that was
set up at that time, to give them that type of help. So
we started pairing them with, frankly, consultants
that we found were reasonable, not greedy, were
willing to transfer knowledge. And after a couple of
deals where they’ve made a reasonable return as
consultants — or brokers, if you will — they walk
away. But they’ve transferred enough knowledge to
the nonprofit; the nonprofit can continue on.
So it’s uneven across the country. That’s the nature
of local conditions. My argument would be that we
take note of that by creating in our own minds
parallel systems. There will be a need for national
organizations to deal with the type of portfolio that
Michael mentioned. There will be a need for a cadre
of consultants — capacity-builders, if you will — who
can go and work with smaller nonprofits. I don’t
think there’s a one size fits all. There’s no national
policy. You’re going to have to basically go in and
make an assessment.
CHUCK WEHRWEIN: Thanks, Jesse. Dan, any
thoughts about other entities that are in this
business, other than CDCs and emerging regional
and national nonprofits?
DAN ANDERSON: Sure. And let me sort of talk about
the national model for a moment….[I]f a portfolio of
any meaningful size comes into play, you’re going to
run into capitalization-depth issues with regard to
that entity immediately. So it’s not simply its
existence; [but] its existence appropriately
capitalized, which I submit is a problem way beyond
$20 million of HUD money and $20 million of
foundation money for a couple of years. Some of
these portfolios are quite large….
It turns out that in the Northwest, governmental
entities are very, very active players in this area,
sometimes directly acquiring for their own account,
sometimes functioning as risk-share partners with
private not-for-profits through a variety of
mechanisms that we can get into later. And some of
them have built significant portfolios, I mean, not at
the [private-sector] 300,000 level, but at the two,
three, four, five, six-thousand unit level….And a lot
of these properties were acquired without the use of
tax credits, they’re not radically leveraged, and they
actually pump real recurring cash flow today. These
are pretty underwritable entities, and they can,
subject to the limits of their balance sheet, kind of go
out and buy the next one right now without a
problem and without a complex, interagency-
dependent, “Mother-may-I” exercise. So yeah, this
does happen on other models elsewhere in the
country.
CHUCK WEHRWEIN: Okay, thanks, Dan. Something
I think that we need to consider…only 40 percent of
the Section 8 inventory is in the geographic domain
of CDCs. So even if every CDC was strong enough to
take it on, they generally don’t have an interest, as
Michael alluded to, of going beyond some of the
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geographical boundaries. At least, most don’t as of
now. And that doesn’t even get to the issue of
capacity.
On top of that, we’ve got expirations happening over
a fairly finite period of time, over a period of four or
five years, depending on how long some of these
things drag out. So there’s a need for a lot to happen
at once, or for some other source or extension to
occur that will allow it to happen over a longer
period of time. So, I would truly be interested…with
any comments or questions that any folks in the
audience have about the capacity of CDCs or other
nonprofits to handle this, about other players in the
industry, and about any other assumptions that are
effectively presented in Michael’s paper. So any
comments or questions?
BILL SULLIVAN: Bill Sullivan from Rocky Mountain
Mutual Housing Association in Denver. We certainly
don’t have all the expertise necessary to do these
deals, but we’re not rookies in the business, and
we’ve established a good track record and a good
portfolio. And we’re continuing to do acquisitions
primarily but some new construction. And we’re
looking into preservation because the opportunities
are presenting themselves to us. We get into a
[preservation] deal, and it takes us almost two years
to close on 57 units.…
UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT: Chuck, could I
comment on that? For every one of those, I think
there are going to be the deals that are the cash
cows. I think, even in Chicago, you get rising prices.
Certainly what we’ve seen is a lot of mark-up-to
market deals. And the for-profits are after them like
crazy because they generate so much cash flow. And
they’re refinancible. A lot of them need a lot of
rehab, so it’s not going to take any longer to do that
part than it would on a normal acquisition project.
BILL SULLIVAN: In our area, they’re selling those
potential cash cows at the future value. And they’re
expecting us as nonprofits to use public money and
grant money to subsidize their sale price….Then we
have to go back and tap doubly our sources to get
the money to do that. And you’re right. There are
cash cows out there, but these sellers know that, at
least in our region, and they’re extracting every
nickel they can on it.
UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT: Well, they all want
market price, and that’s what you have to pay.
BILL SULLIVAN: That’s right. And then your public
sector says you paid too much for it; we can’t give
you a grant.
UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT: …this is not to
contradict what Michael’s doing with NHT/
Enterprise [Preservation Corporation] or the need
for national entities…but I think that Bill does bring
out an important aspect: You have place-based
organizations that are basically increasing their
places….They’re a very different animal from a
CDC, which is a very neighborhood focused and
which is not going to be able to take on generally the
200-unit project, even if it falls into their
neighborhood. They still need Michael to come in
and help them figure out how to do it….
The question, I think, is still there of creating
working capital for those organizations, because to
take full advantage of the opportunity they often
have to expand, they have to find talent, and
transactional risk capital.…
MOSSIK HACOBIAN: Mossik Hacobian, from Urban
Edge Housing Corporation, in Boston. I think the
question is, are you trying to secure the property or
are you trying to build community and build
residents’ involvement and control, and who’s the
best entity to do that, and are there enough
resources to do both? Somehow, all three of those
questions have to be answered before we can decide
what makes sense from a public policy point of
view….If your goal is to make sure there’s resident
control in community buildings, I think you don’t
start out by talking about national entities, because
those are not the best positions to build a
community. It’s a little unclear to me where to go
with this conversation until we bring those other
two factors into the discussion.
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CHUCK WEHRWEIN: Well, how about that? I think
some may question Mossik’s assertion that the only
way to bring true resident input into the process is
through a community organization. And there’s
some argument about whether community
organizations have the capacity to survive with
lower numbers of transactions coming through and
the like. Does anybody want to agree with Mossik’s
contention?
GUS DOMINGUEZ: Hi, I’m Gus Dominguez, from
the Greater Miami Neighborhoods….The need for
the neighborhood-based organizations to do the
community type of work, and to get the resident
involvement is extremely important. The problem is
that that it is not recognized by funders, and
neighborhood groups are forced to become
developers of things that they don’t necessarily have
the capacity or the willingness to do….So instead of
community-based groups, you have now
community-bound groups. They dig themselves in a
hole, and they cannot get out of it.
CHUCK WEHRWEIN: Bill?
BILL SULLIVAN: I agree with Gus. And to follow up
on Mossik’s assertion, which I agree with too, is you
can’t do everything….If you’re going to provide any
resident services to the tune of what, Mossik?…$600
dollars per unit per year…you put it above the line,
they say you’re too expensive on your expense line.
You put it below the line, they say you’re making too
much money off the deal. And so, you sit there and
make a decision organizationally whether you’re
going to do it or not to preserve affordable housing.
And maybe over the years you can attract more
capital to the deal to provide those services that
you’re so good at doing....
MICHAEL BODAKEN: Mossik, I will say this. I think
that it’s easy, with respect to national organizations,
to paint them with one brush. I know of national
organizations—at least two—that only do deals where
the residents actually support the deal, and only do
deals, in our case, where both the residents
supported the deal, and create a community
advisory board in the community. And the residents
are on the corporation, the 501(c)(3) that runs the
deal.
CHUCK WEHRWEIN: Last point, we’ll go to David
Smith.
DAVID SMITH: …I think we fall into a trap of fixed-
pot thinking that says there is a certain number of
dollars; where are we going to commit them? I
believe that there are more dollars in the well of the
federal government, and the state government, and
the local government, and the CRA lender if you
show you’re going to get good bang for them….
Most organizations can live better and earn more fees by
focusing on garden-style apartments, 1980s-vintage, buying
them as right as they can, puff-and-powder rehab, and just
running them for cash flow. And frankly, those are the easier
deals to underwrite, those are the easier deals to understand.
And that’s a sustainable business plan that doesn’t take two
years and get you 57 units... –JESSE CHANCELLOR
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I like the issue of going where the projects are….In
development, you pick your neighborhood and
design your project. In preservation, the project
picks you, and then you try to figure out whether to
save it or not. I think if we as a constituency are
clearer about what will get more bang for the dollar,
we will get more dollars to do it with….If you have a
coherent vision to show a solution,…money will
come out of people’s pockets. And I think it is a real
mistake to get into fix-pot thinking, because then you
get into for-profit versus nonprofit, and big versus
little, and regional versus state. And that’s not what
we’re about. We’re about the need, and getting more
dollars, and showing that we’re worthy of being
given those additional dollars.
CHUCK WEHRWEIN: Jesse,…do you believe that
there are sufficient resources flowing into
organizations?…What is your sense about the
sustainability of organizations that have been
created?…
JESSE CHANCELLOR: Well, what I’ve observed is
there are organizations engaged in preservation
with a capital “P” and preservation with a small “p”.
And we act as if the world cares about the
preservation with a capital “P”. We know it should,
but, frankly, most organizations can live better and
earn more fees by focusing on garden-style
apartments, 1980s-vintage, buying them as right as
they can, puff-and-powder rehab, and just running
them for cash flow. And frankly, those are the easier
deals to underwrite, those are the easier deals to
understand. And that’s a sustainable business plan
that doesn’t take two years and get you 57 units;
that’s going to take six or seven months and get you
350 units. And you can do that on a scale that runs
an organization and that sustains an organization.
So ultimately, it becomes a question of the business
plan and how the business plan is focused….
CHUCK WEHRWEIN: Dan, as you’ve looked at
lending to organizations who are in the business of
affordable housing, do you have any concerns about
their sustainability and capacity? Do you think that
we ought to be considering consolidations or
expansions of territories in order to allow groups to
strengthen themselves?…
DAN ANDERSON: Sure, as a lending institution that
plays on both coasts and multiple points in between,
we are concerned about this. We have had entities
which we have financed go out of business,
sometimes in a ragged, disorderly fashion,
sometimes in an organized consolidation with a
sister organization that is the survivor, and sort of
various flavors in between….There are
underwriting issues both around projects and
organizations, and you attempt to address both of
them….
CHUCK WEHRWEIN: Janet, you mentioned that a
lot of California groups have been entrepreneurial in
the way that they’ve changed as the landscape has
changed and as opportunities have arisen….Do you
think California has moved more in that direction
than the rest of the country?
JANET FALK: Well, I think that we’re starting to see
that happen in lots of other places. The model in
California has not been a real CDC model; it’s been
more of a housing development corporation model —
groups that have been focused primarily on housing
and not so much on the neighborhood issues. But
they all started out with local community bases.
And what I certainly have seen in the San Francisco
Bay area when I first started many years ago is that
the groups pretty much had their own territory, and
nobody crossed over and did anything in anybody
else’s territory. And then development pressures
started, and vacant land became scarce, and we
didn’t have all that much to rehab at that time. And
so, groups sort of began…leapfrogging and going all
over, until now, we have many regional groups, and
some that even operate state-wide….So the capacity
of these groups has grown to take on much larger
territories, but they still tend to have local
operations, local people on the ground.
I just have to comment on this. We’re getting so
business oriented in here — and believe me, I’m the
last person who would want to do a deal that’s not
economic — but I think with preservation…we’ve got
to remember, there are low-income people in these
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units, and that’s why that’s so important. And when
that housing goes…in California we’ve lost about
20,000 units already of both assisted mortgages and
Section 8 opt-outs. We produce under the tax-credit
program 7,000 a year. That would be three full years
of tax-credit allocation just to replace what we’ve
lost already, and it’s increasing. So this is not a
problem I think that any of us can really afford to
ignore. And I’m sure those statistics are writ large on
a national scale.
CHUCK WEHRWEIN: Any other thoughts,
comments, questions for our panelists on the issues
of sustainability and the capacity of the nonprofits to
jump into this game?…
JESSE CHANCELLOR: I want to return…to the
theme of transition….There’s a need for something
bigger and something newer, and it’s partly federal,
largely private, but with federal incentives…because
we’re in this transition period similar to where we
were in the industry, pre-tax credit. We’re all trying
to figure it out. We’re all making mistakes because
there’s no federal help. We’re doing some very
creative things, but ultimately it’s going to lead
us...to sort of the next program, the next product, the
next series of groupings that make this all work….
…And what that is going to lead to is I think a
connection with what’s happening generally in the
financial markets. The financial markets have taken
note of affordable housing because it’s the growth
game. There’s no growth game that they can find in
their regular housing finance markets….So I think
there are partners out there and capital pools out
there who are looking to understand this. And that’s
why we have to think in different ways, because
there are partners who can probably help us…if we
continue to keep our minds open to the fact that this
is a transition period,…and look for the partners that
are out there trying to understand how to make
money at this and serve their self-interest.
UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT: First, I’d like to say
that I think preservation of the existing stock is just
absolutely critical….But…what I have to do to put a
project together,…it’s brain damage, and it is so
inefficient. It cost so much because of the time that’s
involved with putting it together, the layers and
layers of lawyers, accountants and everything else
that comes into play. We actually would save money
if we could clean up the housing-delivery system
and come up with something that would work
better….
CHUCK WEHRWEIN: I’d like to bring one more
comment from this morning in, and that was a
consistent approach to underwriting or a single
template for underwriting….Bill [Sullivan] talked
about how many resources he had to apply to a
particular deal, and clearly, that’s a sustainability
issue. If one spends a lot of resources on a couple of
those deals and you’re a small organization, you’re
going to be gone if the deals don’t come to fruition.
So I think it’s a critical point....
What sorts of examples can we come up with that
can allow preservation organizations to sustain
themselves better? I can tell you from personal
experience that the inability to collect what are
called dividends and our asset-management fees like
we talked about this morning — if we could ever
clearly define what asset management is. But the
ability for nonprofit, for instance, to share
economically in a transaction like an old for-profit
organization I think is a critical step. So what other
sorts of changes in federal or state program
approaches, or even in conventional underwriting,
would make it easier for these organizations to
sustain themselves?
JEFF STERN: This is Jeff Stern. I’m with Enterprise
Mortgage….One of the things that I would love to do
as a lender is not just to say to a CDC that lacks
capacity, “Go find a partner.” They hate that, but
that’s what they need, to go find some sister CDCs,
consolidate, focus resources in a larger group to
cover a larger area. Don’t compete block by block,
compete area by area or city by city. Yes, politically,
that’s tough. Yes, somebody, unfortunately, may be
out of work, but talk about efficiency, talk about
better use of resources, and talk about the ultimate
product, just good management, and asset
management, and preservation. I think if you could
do that, you’d also see tremendous efficiencies, not
from the program side but from the production side.
EVELYN FRIEDMAN: Maybe that can happen in
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another world, but in Boston I think it would be
really hard. And I think the reason is, if it’s
community development, it’s not the CDC; it’s the
board of the CDC that doesn’t want to do that, which
are community people who live and work in a
certain neighborhood and have an investment in
that neighborhood. But I think that the issue is, the
CDCs can be supported if somebody says, “Look,
this CDC must get this fee, it must get cash flow; that
one point zero debt-service coverage is not
adequate.”
ELLEN SEIDMAN: I’m the director of the Office of
Thrift Supervision. I find this conversation
interesting because I hear the same thing from small
thrifts all the time. “Oh, we can’t merge, even though
we’re all dying on the vine because of the board, this
is a family-member organization....” And at the same
time I hear, “Wait a minute, why don’t all those
nonprofits merge because in a new financial world
there aren’t enough of us to give handouts,
particularly grants, to all of the ones that have
sprung up over the years.” We work real hard on
our guys when they’re having trouble to suggest that
merger’s a good idea, and I think that the nonprofit
community needs to be doing the same thing.
DAVID SMITH: Two parts, including hopefully a
suggestion for Chuck. The first part is, what we’re
sounding is the thematic difference between
development and acquisition. Development can be
very place-based….Acquisition is more driven by a
product that is perceived to be a risk….Acquisition
is…all fly balls should be caught; no outfielders
should run into one another. You should find ways
to coordinate what you’re doing so that you see
yourselves as being part of the same team playing
defense rather than competing [with one another] on
offense.
In answer to your question, Chuck—the answer is
differentially score CRA. Give extra bonus points for
equity-type investments. Give extra bonus points for
capacity building. And I would give multiple extra
bonus points for levered capacity building—
challenge grants or variations like that. And I’ll give
the mike back to Ellen.
ELLEN SEIDMAN: I would like to invite all of you to
participate in the 2002 redo of the CRA regulations. It
is coming up. And what I’d like to say is that we as
the bank regulators want to get this right.... We’re
going to try to set up a series of focus groups. We’re
going to try to do this in a way that generates a lot of
synergies among the large and small banks and the
community groups, and I really do invite you to
participate.
MOSSIK HACOBIAN: I just want to expand a little bit
on Evelyn’s comment about CDCs and mergers. I
have been involved in conversations with directors
of three or four other CDCs over a 15-year period
about the possibility of a strategic alliance or a
merger….But I also should turn the question around.
Everybody tells us to merge and consolidate, but
nobody’s prepared to invest in that effort. They think
that merging means you’re going to cost less; we
think merging is going to mean you’re going to do
more, not cost less….I’m ready to consolidate and do
more over a larger area, but I don’t see a whole lot of
support….So put your money where your mouth is,
and you’ll see a lot of consolidation going on.
UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT: One comment on
the reality of consolidation after having gone
through it at Mercy. We can tell you that we expect
to see benefits over the long term, but in the short
term it is not an easy process, like any consolidation.
And, actually, there’s going to be a Ford study that
will be coming out on it soon that I think will be
interesting for anybody who’s considering it.
PETER RICHARDSON: Peter Richardson,
Vermont….Organizations that are locally based do
things that are not redundant of one another. So that
a consolidation doesn’t necessarily create efficiency;
it can simply create less work done, not more work
done. The experience that we had when I was run-
ning housing in Vermont was that we always part-
nered with local groups….It’s hard to do and it’s not
efficient, but the vitality would have suffered tremen-
dously if we had abandoned that.
JANET FALK: To follow up on Peter. Let’s not lose
the other model of joint venturing. We don’t have to
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consolidate organizations, but there are ways to
partner together on a given project. I’ve seen many
of those work very well. There’s always a little
uneasiness, but people do memos of understanding,
and figure out who’s going to do what role, and it’s a
way to bring in expertise that one organization has
with the local base that somebody else has, or other
kinds of skills.
CHUCK WEHRWEIN: Let’s move on to the final
element of Michael’s paper, where we talk about
ideas and concepts around funding sustainability
and organizational capacity. And, Michael, if you
could just review the two or three thoughts that you
laid out in your paper.
MICHAEL BODAKEN: Again, this is about
strengthening existing organizations of all types, I
want to lay that groundwork. There’s nothing in the
paper, for example, about consolidation. There is a
lot of discussion in the paper about strengthening
and expanding existing organizations of all types.
And I laid out three ideas. The first general idea…
[is] not for transactional work; it’s for operating
support at a national level of 10 years of funding at
$40 million a year for, again, existing organizations
on a competitive level, like NCDI….It is $20 million
from the federal government, $20 million from
funders on an annual basis for operating support
only, not for transactional work, because of the
balance-sheet issues that I think are inherent in
trying to do portfolio acquisitions and others….It
should not be limited to any particular geographical
area. It should not be politicked out,…and it would
be for all kinds of housing—organizations that seek
unsubsidized as well as subsidized housing because
I think both are necessary to preserve and protect.
The second is [a] federal grant…the H.R. 202
model…that passed in the House….It was at the
level of $10 million, and now it’s for national,
regional and local organizations to do preservation
activity.
And then the third was the internal-seed model that
NHT/Enterprise employees – we essentially put
money into ourselves. Our sister organizations
created another entity and attracted funders that
way.
What I’ve heard today, which is a fourth idea that is
a kind of interesting idea to me….Perhaps if we re-
scored the CRA in a way that did make sense and
gave bonus points for equity investments in
organizational development, then, perhaps, that
would be a way to also begin to get
at…organizational capacity [and] critical-mass
issues which I think [are] so fundamental.
CHUCK WEHRWEIN: Thanks, Michael, for that
refresher. Dan, what do you think about these
models, and how viable are they, in your view, from
a capital standpoint?
DAN ANDERSON: …[T]here are basically two
approaches: There’s gifts, grants and entitlements…
and there’s retained earnings….One of the great
perversities of this marvelous tax-credit machine
we’ve grown over the last 13 years is it has a very
strong bias against the generation of anything that
looks like earnings.... We’ve sort of — for better or
One of the great perversities of this marvelous tax-credit
machine we’ve grown over the last 13 years is it has a very
strong bias against the generation of anything that looks like
earnings.... We’ve sort of — for better or worse — raised a
generation of development-fee junkies with extreme
development-fee dependence.  –DAN ANDERSON
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worse — raised a generation of development-fee
junkies with extreme development-fee dependence.
And I submit that it’s probably not ultimately stable
and accordingly not sustainable.
Frankly, one of the things I don’t hear talked about is
how much of this discussion was sort of bounded by
this sort of hyper capitalization of real estate
experience that’s characterized the last three, four,
five years. There was a very different experience in
the first half of the 1990s. And I’ve got a lot of clients
who bought property right and left using every form
of 100 percent debt financing, and they didn’t use tax
credits. And they have big-time cash flow, which
goes to retained earnings off of those properties….
…[T]he thoughtful strategy from a standpoint of the
socially motivated investor-owner is to…buy things
when they’re cheap not when they’re dear.
CHUCK WEHRWEIN: So you think that David’s
clients are going to get a chance to see again how
they react in a recession?
DAN ANDERSON: Yeah. And I can’t tell you whether
that’s this year or five years from now. But yeah,
there will be another real estate recession. It will
have a different flavor from the ’89, ’91, ’92
recession. It will be very diagnostic as to who the
competent strong players are, as David mentioned
this morning. And for the folks who have sort of
succeeded in keeping their shoes out of the worst
parts of the ooze, it’s going to be a hell of a buying
opportunity, as all real estate recessions are.
CHUCK WEHRWEIN: Janet, I know that you’re
focusing on some policies in California that deal
with organizational capacity and support of that.
Can you comment a little bit on what’s going on out
there that might prompt some comments or
suggestions from the audience?
JANET FALK: Well, what we’re working on is
actually not so much organizational capacity as
transaction financing. We have a bill that’s in the
state legislature right now to provide acquisition
financing for preservation deals. Right now, our
state-housing finance agency has an acquisition,
short-term loan program of two years at about 5
percent interest, but will only fund 70 to 80 percent,
like most lenders….This program would provide,
basically, the equity piece, the top 20 to 30 percent
funded at the state level at a 3 percent interest rate to
allow for 100 percent financing for preservation….
Dan,…of course, it makes good business sense to
buy cheap, but when these projects come up, they
come up. And if we don’t get them now, they’ll
convert to market….We don’t have any control over
that, so we have to deal with what we’ve got.
DAN ANDERSON: You need to pursue both tracks.
One is ultimately dependent on third-party public or
private sector largesse; the other one you build
yourself….
JANET FALK: I would also suggest retaining
earnings is great, but, of course, in order to have
earnings, you have to keep having higher rents or
you have to have more subsidy in the project….And
Chuck, you mentioned increasing dividends for the
nonprofits. I would also say that at the same time all
these things are a double-edged sword because
there’s competition out there in the marketplace that
wants to make money on these deals. So the more
dividends there are, the more we’re going to get for-
profit competition that can bid up the prices….
We’ve seen deals where developers have taken out
huge amounts of cash. And if there were some
public way of limiting that, that would help decrease
the competition in the market, the bidding up of
prices. People pay way over market. Agencies like
the bond and tax-credit allocating agencies let them.
And if we could somehow put some cap on that so
that we at least weren’t paying over market, we’d
have a better shot at those deals.
CHUCK WEHRWEIN: Jesse, any experiences with
any state programs or local programs that might
have helped build capacity for preservation entities?
JESSE CHANCELLOR: Can I answer a different
question? Because I don’t have the answer to that
question….I think if we focus on the tempo of our
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business, it’s increasing. And it’s increasing toward
integration, it’s increasing toward people
understanding it in a broader way, but we’re still in
— and I’ll say it again — cylinders of thinking. We
think about public monies, we think about tax-credit
monies, we think about our game, and what we’ve
been doing for the last 10 years…in preservation and
acquisition is, frankly, taking money with square
wheels and trying to round them off. And we’ve
been going to sources of money that don’t do what
we want them to do, we’re asking them to be equity,
and they don’t like to be 10-year equity. We’ve asked
them to be bridge lenders, and they want to be
permanent lenders, all those mismatches….
So I would just suggest that if we want policy
changes that are going to work to our advantage, we
need to bring partners to the table who will change
policy because it’s in their self-interest. Just as
Fannie Mae was creating residential mortgage-
backed securities, but they didn’t become the norm
on Wall Street until Wall Street took an interest in
them. And there were no changes in Washington to
make them happen until Salomon Brothers and
Goldman Sachs started catching the train down to
Washington lobbying for changes to make the
housing market happen.
And I think that’s where we are. If we get those
partners…interested…and we keep our minds open
to them, not shutting them out because they’ve been
outside of our business, we’re in a transition phase
to bring them in, and use them as policy partners,
deal partners, all kinds of partners.
CHUCK WEHRWEIN: So how do we incent those
folks to come in as we think about housing policy in
the new millennium, a broader policy? What
incentives can we offer to help support and invest in
the capacity of organizations?…
Michael,...your paper asserts that the preservation
crisis that we face is large, it’s coming at us quickly,
and there’s a need to have the ability to act quickly
geographically, broadly, and, obviously, the
resources that are needed to deal with larger,
disparate portfolios. I think that does entail a
different capacity than a deal-by-deal type approach.
How can we build a capacity in existing
organizations ... so that we have the capacity within
the country to deal with the multiple expirations, the
public-housing tear-downs, and the loss of
unsubsidized, affordable housing.
MICHAEL BODAKEN: …Over the next 10 years we
need to preserve and improve over 100,000 units a
year in this country at the very least…and we’re not
even getting close to that….
CHUCK WEHRWEIN: Okay. We’re going to have to
wrap up….Jesse, final point?
JESSE CHANCELLOR: We say we can’t define asset
management. Until we define it, we’re not going to
get long-term capital to come to the table with
comfort, period.
CHUCK WEHRWEIN: Dan?
DAN ANDERSON: I agree with the folks who say it’s
ultimately a local, state and federal political
problem. Turn up the heat.
MR. WEHRWEIN: Janet?
MS. FALK: I agree.
MR. WEHRWEIN: Michael, you get the absolute last
thought.
MR. BODAKEN: I thought this was a Cisco support
group. I’m sorry, wrong place. In general, I’m so
excited. This meeting couldn’t have occurred two
years ago….And it’s important for us to really
analyze what’s happening in our industry and what
we’re doing. It’s so great to see all of you here. I’m
very happy that we’re talking about this issue.
CHUCK WEHRWEIN: All right. Thank you very
much.
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SANDY WILLIAMS: My name is Sandy Williams. I
am with the NeighborWorks® Multifamily Initiative,
and I would like to take a moment to introduce our
panel.
William Frey is the director of the New York office of
the Enterprise Foundation. And under Mr. Frey’s
leadership the foundation’s New York program has
forged an innovative partnership between the City of
New York, private corporations, banks, foundations
and over 80 nonprofit community-based organiza-
tions to efficiently develop decent and affordable
housing.
Pat Costigan is with The Community Builders, Inc.
He’s senior vice president. And their Community
Initiatives division coordinates economic opportuni-
ties in support of services for 15,000 residents living
in TCB housing.
Trinita Logue is founding president and CEO of
Illinois Facilities Fund, which is a statewide, com-
munity development financial institution. Under her
leadership, the IFF has become a national leader in
innovative, nonprofit financial solutions with total
assets of $46 million. 
Janet Maccubbin is a consultant with ICF
Consulting, and she works with owners and man-
agers of assisted housing to communicate a simpli-
fied understanding of complex federal programs....
And with that, I’m going to turn the program over to
William Frey.
WILLIAM FREY: Thank you.…Several years
ago...there was a great deal of housing that was
being rebuilt and rehabilitated through various
means, some through low-income housing tax cred-
its, some through state-government financing, some
began to be developed through a combination of pri-
vate and public financing.
In one case in the South Bronx, we were working
with a local church that was developing some hous-
ing. And they went to the local community board,
and they said, “We’d like the authority to develop 27
units of housing. We’re prepared to support this and
we have good management.”…And they turned it
down. They said, “We don’t want any more low-
income housing in our community. We’ve been satu-
rated with low-income housing.…
And [the church] said, “Well, in the housing we’re
building a childcare center, which will…not only
serve the residents of the building but serve the resi-
dents of the community. And [the local community
board ] said, “We’ll be supportive of that because
you’re bringing a resource to the community.”…
Funding for Services
Outcome-targeted services can improve both the social and financial performance of affordable housing, but
funding these services remains a challenge. What kinds of services bring the most powerful outcomes?  How can
we design capital funding to include some service provision in operating expenses? What other revenue streams
can offer incentives for delivery of high-quality services?
Lead Presenter: Patrick Costigan, The Community Builders
Moderator: William Frey, Enterprise Foundation  
Panelists: Trinita Logue, Illinois Facilities Fund
Janet Maccubbin, ICF Consulting
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And we’ve seen the long-term benefits…the housing
looks good, the community is very supportive of it,
and it’s a project which really drew people in as
opposed to being an isolated project that people
identified as “another one of those low-income hous-
ing projects.”…
To a certain extent we’re not looking at, in this par-
ticular discussion today, just buildings, but at com-
munities.…A point I wanted to bring up as well in
terms of housing, there’s always been the desire,
especially by community-based organizations, to
have multiple agendas. We want to do housing for
low-income families…and then we want to provide
certain kinds of services….
I’d like to…raise a couple of things that we might
want to talk about in this discussion.…Siting of pro-
grams: What is important in terms of the kinds of sit-
ing that goes on?… And one of the big questions is,
obviously, how do we pay for these programs and
how do we pay for the services?
One of the major conflicts we’ve always had is, gov-
ernment has a mandate…to spread its subsidy out as
much as it can to produce the most housing units
that it can. At the same time, we all know that if
there’s housing that’s done right, it will last longer.
And it’s always a conflict,…and we struggle with rec-
ognizing there is a housing shortage but also recog-
nizing there’s a way that we can look at these things,
and we have some lessons learned to help us do it
well.
So with that, Pat, I’ll turn it over to you, and you can
run through some highlights from your paper.
PATRICK COSTIGAN: Thanks, Bill. My job today…is
to get us going by talking, and your job today is to lis-
ten. But I would very much appreciate, if you get
done before I do, let me know that, so we can move
right along.…
How can we more actively build out [the] service
side of what we do?…In thinking about this question
of supportive services, the role in our housing devel-
opments, where we site them [and] how we pay for
them,…I came to three basic questions [that] I
thought might be useful as we go forward in this dis-
cussion.
Number one,…think about housing as a platform for
people to move into the American mainstream…the
housing platform that we build somehow magically
creates this process or pathway into the main-
stream…And I’ve always said, “Well, what is that?”
If we build the housing,…we make the neighbor-
hood nicer, but exactly how does a person get from
the house into the American mainstream? I think we
need to think about what the set of activities — what
the methodology — is for actually helping people
move from a subsidized housing platform into the
mainstream….I’m not always sure that that assump-
tion holds up.
The second thing,…what’s the proper focus for us as
housers, for people that live in our housing? And I
think that’s a different question than what is support-
ive services, what is human services, how do we
help people move from poverty into the American
mainstream.
And the third question, which really is fundamental I
One of the major conflicts we’ve always had is, government has
a mandate…to spread its subsidy out as much as it can to
produce the most housing units that it can. At the same time,
we all know that if there’s housing that’s done right, it will last
longer.   –WILLIAM FREY
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think to all of this discussion, is how the heck do we
pay for it? There are folks from the foundation com-
munity in the room. I’m not going to talk about sort
of the conventional, passing-the-cup routine. We all
know how to do that, we all need to do that; it’s part
of what we do. But it seems to me that as housers, we
ought to be thinking a little bit differently about how
to pay for this. And the question I’m trying to ask our
organization, “Is there anything inherent in the
structure of housing financing or in the development
process itself that can have us think differently about
how we pay for the supportive services that we’re
talking about?”
So those are the questions in addition to the ques-
tions that Bill has raised that I want to kind of push
us on a bit.
The first question that really comes up is the proper
focus for our activity. Right now, we seem to define
what supportive services should be as a little bit of
everything, a little bit of anything. I know when I
came into the Community Builders, we have 60 staff
and 25 different sites. And I sat down and I said, well,
what is it we do? I heard cradle to grave. I heard pre-
natal care, I heard soccer leagues, I heard youth pro-
grams, I heard after school, I heard seniors, I heard
work force, I heard daycare — the whole nine yards.
And it seems to me what we’ve got to think about
[is]…what kind of housing we’re building, who lives
in the housing, where the housing is, what the needs
are, what the assets are, and think more particularly
about that.
At the Community Builders we are primarily work-
ing with people who live in public and HUD-assisted
housing, and we have a responsibility to help those
people succeed in our housing. So what is it that we
should be doing for very low-income people who
may not have had another experience besides public
or assisted housing?…
…We think that the proper focus should be on eco-
nomic self-sufficiency, economic
independence.…I’m a firm believer in what William
Julius Wilson had to say about the truly disadvan-
taged, that it really comes down to jobs; that eco-
nomic security is fundamentally what’s going to
sustain our activity when all of us are gone in five or
10 or 15 years. So we have a strong bias about an
employment-based approach to supportive services.
How that gets organized we think is primarily, fun-
damentally through case management. Case man-
agement means a lot of different things. I’m
assuming that there are social workers in the room.
There’s a very defined notion of what case manage-
ment is in social work. We look at case management
in a very specific way of working with a family as a
coach on a long-term plan to help them achieve their
goals, their dreams, and that economic self-suffi-
ciency.
So fundamentally, we believe the focus ought to be
on jobs, the ability to produce income and build
assets. And the methodology to achieve that is really
by working with a proven case-management process
to help families move in that direction.
We’ve been fortunate in our work to partner with a
wonderful organization based here in Chicago called
Project Match. How many of you are familiar with
the Project Match Workforce and Employment
Development Methodology? While you’re in town,
I’d encourage you to take a look at it. It has a 17-year
track record of working with folks primarily in pub-
lic housing. It started at Henry Horner Homes, pri-
marily in public and low-income housing and
helping folks that have been out of the workforce,
the structurally unemployed, really move into the
workforce. We’ve partnered up with them and have
learned from them about that case-management
methodology.
So we would argue, jobs, case management.
And...we’ve got to make all that really mean some-
thing for the family. And by that I mean, a mini-
mum-wage job or even a job with an EITC [Earned
Income Tax Credit] on top of it is not always going to
get the family there. We need to really think about
building the assets of that family…changing circum-
stances in their life…to position them to have greater
choices; to move from assisted housing into market-
rate housing, or to buy a home. We really ought
to…leave families when we’re done working with
them with a set of assets so that they can have more
choices over their lives, have more control over
what they do.
So these are the biases that I bring to this discussion
about jobs, making jobs pay, augmenting jobs with
things like earned-income tax credits. In our world
at the Community Builders, we think it’s important
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to not only see that someone has a job, see that they
sign up every year for EITC, but also to make sure
that their kids have access to child health care,
which is now available in every state in the country,
but we still have folks live in our housing that are not
taking advantage of some of these other sort of asset-
supporting, if you will, kinds of activities that are out
there. So we like to think about wrapping the job
with other supports that are out there to help people
move forward.…
We all understand now about TANF.... temporary
assistance to needy families, in terms of the time lim-
itations.…So, there’s a reality out there now that pub-
lic assistance is really about work anyway. So
whatever we may think about the proper focus,
there’s a social policy...about a work-based approach
to managing lives, to managing subsidies to the
safety net. And that’s something that’s part of our
social reality now.…
And there will be some harsh realities as we start
now to face the five-year end of the clock that we’ll
begin to see with families living in our housing that
we need to be mindful of.…It’s in our economic self-
interest to think about how we can help families
build their capacity to earn income, build their
assets, so that they can continue to pay their portion
of the rent and perhaps by a home in one of our
developments. So we think about it not only as the
right thing to do but also probably the smart thing to
do in terms of being a property manager.
The other reality…is that…we’re being offered con-
tracts that measure us for producing actual out-
comes: how many people get jobs, how long they
keep the jobs, how they improve their career…by
getting better jobs, how well their children read in
third grade. That’s actually a question on a HUD
baseline report under the Hope VI program; that the
United States Congress has decided that we all need
to worry about: Are our children reading well in
third grade?
So there is a whole mentality out there that what we
ought to be doing in supportive services is no longer
about process and coaching and intervention and
solving crises and problems, but it’s really helping
people achieve tangible outcomes that are going to
help them have their own income, their own assets,
choose their own schools, have their kids succeed in
schools.…
How do we pay for all this?…I’m just going to com-
pletely neglect the conventional fundraising
approach of going around to foundations and to cor-
porations with your hat out.…We all know that
one.…But…how we can use the development
process to think about funding services in a different
way?
There is direct funding still available from the gov-
ernment....HUD still offers considerable support for
resident-related services under resident-service
coordinators for both multifamily housing and eld-
erly developments; drug-elimination funds that have
a wide latitude on what you can do with them,
including child care and workforce and employ-
ment-development support.
Youth Build is a wonderful program.…If you don’t
have one in your community, get one as fast as you
We all understand now about TANF…as we start now to face
the five-year end of the clock…it’s in our economic self-interest
to think about how we can help families build their own
capacity to earn income, build their assets so that they can
continue to pay their portion of the rent and perhaps buy a
home in one of our developments. –PATRICK COSTIGAN
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can.…And certainly, Hope VI has set a wonderful
precedent that there ought to be proper funding for
supportive services.
Under Hope VI, those of you that work with it know
that up to 15 percent of the total development cost of
the budget can be satisfied with a firewall to support
resident-services cost. When [developers] come up
with sort of development shortfalls, they can’t come
over and grab that 15 percent.…
The second thing, and probably more important as
we think about the next four years, is a lot of money
from federal agencies is being devolved through the
states into local government. Not only with HUD
funds;…the Department of Labor, for example, has
an enormous budget allocation for Welfare-to-Work
funds which states and localities can pretty much
choose to spend in the way that they want.
Excess TANF funds,…there’s a lot of flexibility with
these kind of funds. So we ought to pay attention to
federal funds as they work their way through state
government and down into local government….
…Let’s talk not just about a vision of rebuilding the
housing, but let’s talk about the…holistic compre-
hensive approach to all this. Let’s sell that up
front.…In other words, we won’t come in and
develop the housing unless you buy into the support-
ive services approach to this, and by the way, we
need you to pay for that. And that ought to be part of
the negotiations up front.
We’ve actually had some success with that in non-
Hope VI settings with large HUD-assisted projects.
Going in, “You want us to redevelop this? Here is the
vision that we think the community really wants,
and we’ve got to figure out a way to pay for it.”
There are opportunities up front in negotiating set
asides for resident services, for reserves, in the
development budget, and…it doesn’t necessarily
have to rob Peter to pay Paul. It can come from other
sources in the city government.…
Same kind of notion in operating budgets. As we
build these developments and we are committed
under finance-agency guidelines, under tax cred-
its…to provide supportive services for 25 years…one
of the things that we try and insist on…is to create
enough margin in the deal where we’re setting aside
$50,000, $100,000, $150,000 a year, depending on the
size of the development, for an ongoing, resident-
services budget. That’s above the line. That is, it gets
taken out before we pay debt service back to HUD or
to the first-mortgage lender. It needs to be negotiated
that way as an important part of the housing-devel-
opment activity, an important part of protecting the
asset….And we’ve been very successful at putting
those in each of our budgets.
Tax-credit projects. Of course, in the reverse wisdom
of what’s going on at the finance agencies, they say,
oh, we want you to take care of everybody for 25
years, then you need to say, okay, great. We’d like to
then capitalize a reserve for $250,000, $300,000,
$500,000 to do that for 25 years, and we’d like that to
be worked into your underwriting. That can work,
depends on what state, but it’s certainly something
that we ought to be thinking about.
Incentive-management fees in tax-credit deals can
also be used. If you do a good job in your lease up,
and you meet certain targets…you get an incentive
management fee. Well, let’s use it to help people take
the next step and get better jobs, or build IDAs.
A lot of that goes back to the point I made earlier
about the time to do that is to negotiate it up front;
that is there are opportunities in structuring the
financing with financing sources, whether it’s
Fannie Mae, or the Ford Foundation or the
Enterprise Foundation, block grants,
whatever.…Think about negotiating that into the
deal up front.
Even though I work for a nonprofit developer we try
to think like a for-profit developer.…That is, where
are the opportunities out there to earn money, to
earn fees…tax credit projects…historic [tax credits].
You can syndicate a work-opportunity tax credit
that’s now available in enterprise communities. The
Welfare Reform legislation has tax credits in it that
can be syndicated,…or you can get a discount from a
for-profit employer as you try and negotiate their
participation into a deal precisely because they will
be able to claim this credit if you’re brokering it and
making it possible for them. So there’s lots of ways to
think about, like developers do, how to go out there
and earn fees on the financing structure to benefit
service activities.
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There are other things that folks have been
doing…take a “cut” of loan origination fees and use
it for something else. Why not take 25 basis points
and put it aside to do something?…Why not think
about arbitraging something—get a large chunk of
capital from the Ford Foundation or…a bank enter-
prise award?…Why not mark up your two, three, or
four percent money, put it at market rates at seven or
eight percent, take the spread and devote it to…sup-
portive services?…
Why not have an incentive fee for working with the
folks that live in your housing to make sure that they
minimize their rent delinquencies, that we reduce
the number of evictions? That can all be quantified,
by the way, and essentially negotiate that into the
structure of the management fees that are going on.
So there’s all kinds of opportunities to think about.…
And lastly, I read an article by Angela Glover-
Blackwell in the New York Times a couple of weeks
ago saying a tried and true thing. Why not do land
banking? She called it community-building banking
or something like that, where essentially you’re just
like any other developer. Go out and buy some land
where you know we’re going to have major real
estate activity going on, and try and capture the
increased value over that land over time to benefit
the other things that you want to do. Every city in the
country has a land-banking program that nonprofits
can tap into. And then down the road as the land
depreciates, work it into some kind of a buy-out
structure where you get financial return on it.
I’ve talked enough. I just want to lay out those ideas
for folks to take where you want it.
WILLIAM FREY: Thanks, Pat. Trinita, I’m going to
turn it over to you. And you can either speak from
some of the ideas that were presented by Pat or talk
about your facility fund.
TRINITA LOGUE: Sure,…What we do, of course, is
work with nonprofit, human-service agencies on
real estate development and lending. So we do
everything but housing. In our experience as a
lender and developer of facilities for nonprofits,
we’re always surprised that the funding coordina-
tion between housing and the government-funded
social service structure is not greater.…
In an ideal world, when you develop affordable
housing, or housing for low income, or very low-
income individuals — which I think is what we’re
talking about — you would go to the service sector
and arrange to have all the needs-based services
brought in and all the costs covered.…
Many CDCs we’ve worked with don’t want to have
partnerships with traditional human-service agen-
cies; they want to deliver the services themselves,
and they have good reasons for that. Others are per-
fectly happy to have partnerships, to have a child-
care provider come in and manage a program on
their site or to send the children across the street to
the child care, or down the street to the Y. So I think
those are structural issues that have pros and cons
and do need to be decided first.…
Now, the managed-care model from the health
industry is alive and well in human services, as Pat
mentioned. Everything is performance-based,
including taking care of a 13-year-old fire starter
who’s been in and out of juvenile-detention facilities.
It’s performance-based. And this is a very difficult
thing and a huge transition in the human-service
world.…And this simply affects you because you
need to understand it if you want to go and try to
work with that world.…
My final comment…is programs that are open to the
larger community always seem to do better. Aligning
the property management mission with the mission
of delivery services might be the hardest part. The
elderly do move on. Children from birth to five do
grow up. And so, you’re seeking stability in families,
but yet, the people do change and their lives change.
And if you develop services around a group of people
who are going to move on in their age, if not move
out, you may wonder 5 or 10 years from now why
you did it. So anything open to the larger community
does seem to work better in our experience.
I just want to tell you one more fact for Illinois. In
order to qualify for the childcare subsidy in Illinois,
you have to be making less than $23,000 for a family
of four. We’re talking, real, real poor. That’s all I’ll
say for now.
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WILLIAM FREY: And Janet has a national perspec-
tive on the issue we’re discussing, and I thought that
you might give us some of your thoughts.
JANET MACCUBBIN: I work for ICF Consulting, and
we have a contract with HUD to help coordinate
their Neighborhood Networks Program. It is a pro-
gram that has 640 centers across the nation as of
now in multifamily-assisted housing. HUD provides
seed capital for that program through anything from
rent increases to uses of residual receipts, reserve or
replacement dollars in their multifamily housing. So
there is a sort of seed-capital way of getting money.
The reason there’s really been a growth in
Neighborhood Networks, the common element is a
computer center...And it can be everything from
computers...[to] childcare centers, to music pro-
grams, to elderly programs. It can be everything if
the community wants it to be....And...unlike other
HUD programs that are mandated from the top; it is
something that’s really driven from the bottom. The
community creates its own plan of what kind of
services are going into that community, and HUD
provides initial capital, then, to fund it.
To date, it’s been an unfunded program....Secretary
Martinez and the president have appropriated $80
million in [fiscal year 2002] to start funding those
centers, which I think could be very exciting for cen-
ters that really have made it on a shoestring budget
for many, many years.
We were talking about underwriting and operating
expenses this morning and how there’s so much of a
shortfall. I would have to say that [with] services,
that is magnified by about 10. If you’re in the com-
munity trying to do services, you’re patching
together tons and tons of small pieces of money to try
and make it work. You’re often expecting folks who
are running those programs to make 20,000 to
$25,000 a year, yet, you’re expecting them to get peo-
ple self-sufficient and to have the skills and
resources to do that. And I have to say that, in my
opinion, that doesn’t work very well.…
But the programs…that have been very successful
are very well-funded; programs where you can have
an $80,000 per year person that can oversee five or
six different centers and can put together some high-
level outcomes and objectives and programs, and
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can help the on-site folks, who may be your sort of
lower-paid folks, start to think about what kind of
programs do we need in this community and how do
we get them in there.
Funding sources. It gets tougher every year. And I’d
have to say when I saw Neighborhood Networks
start, HUD put a lot of money into it from the prop-
erty perspective. And every property was on its own.
You didn’t have $25 million grant funds that 3,000
people were competing for. You had your own prop-
erty resources. And to the extent you maximized and
used those resources well, you had money left over
for services and for programs, and that was very effi-
cient.
But as days have gone on, and we’re renewing
Section 8 contracts, and we’re doing mark-to-market,
money has become less and less available for those
services.…It’s very hard when every year you have
to go out and you have to find new dollars.…
The Department of Education has a Community
Technology Center Grant Program and a 21st
Century Learning Center Program, both of which are
very well funded.…The Department of Commerce…
funds technology initiatives.…Job-training programs
that are based on technology are pretty much imper-
ative these days for upward-mobility career pro-
grams.
So those are just some of the things that
Neighborhood Networks has worked on nationally
and that we have seen.
WILLIAM FREY: I’d like to open it up to people here
and get your comments.
UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT: I’d be interested in
hearing anecdotes from anybody about things you
tried that either worked spectacularly or surprised
you by failing spectacularly in this whole economic
empowerment area. Getting people who don’t have
jobs to have jobs, or acquire job skills, or build
assets. What really worked, or what did you think
would work and turned out not to...?
RACHEL ISKOW: I’m Rachel Iskow, Sacramento
Mutual Housing Association. And when we started
getting into those kind of services, we were doing
leadership development, and that’s where we
focused our energies. Then when TANF was coming
down with the five-year limit, we decided to start
looking at this whole economic-independence
approach.
And we started getting [Memorandums of
Understanding] with organizations out there that
supposedly were good at what they did. And they’d
come in for about six months and have a lot of trou-
ble and, forget the MOU, they were out of there. And
I think that working where people live is very differ-
ent than working in an agency where people walk in
or your social worker from the Department of
Human Assistance sends you.
So then we started working with agencies and kind
of getting them to know the sites and working with
them on specific grant proposals, where they would
come in and we’d work together on a model that we
thought worked.…
Specifically, with regards to employment-related
things...we have a tendency to say we’re going to do
this job training program on this site, and this is
going to work for everybody.…Be careful about
cookie-cutter job-training programs and thinking
that everybody’s going to fit in that box. Because I
think one of the things our folks have learned is you
have a pretty high failure rate when you assume that
everybody will necessarily be interested in that high-
tech training program that you’re going to offer.
PAT COSTIGAN: I would take that to another level of
insistence, if you will. That is, as housers we ought
not to be running training programs…we ought to be
running — call it case management, coaching, pack-
aging, whatever you want — some kind of a process
that lets people have choices. Do they want this kind
of training? Do they want to work on their GED? Are
they ready to go into the labor force right now? Do
they need career advancement? Are they underem-
ployed? We ought to be focusing on that because one
size does not fit all.…It would be a horrible mistake
to bring in a one-size-fits-all program into a housing
development and expect it to work for folks that live
there. It just won’t.
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CATHY McKINNON: Cathy McKinnon, Mutual
Housing Association of Greater Hartford. All of you
have talked a little bit about the scale needed to do
these kinds of programs we’ve been talking about,
sort of the on-site learning center versus neighbor-
hood versus borough. And the properties we own,
we have units from 14-unit properties to 80-unit
properties. And I’m just trying to get a feel for what
kind of scale we would need to really implement
something.…
JANET MACCUBBIN: I think the neighborhood is
key. We’ve had some very successful neighborhood-
network centers that have not necessarily been
located on the property because the property didn’t
have the resources to do it. But there was a commu-
nity center, and there were four other properties in
the neighborhood that could be partnered with
where the center could serve all four properties. And
combined, those four properties had a enough
resources to sort of bring it together.
So I think it’s making sure you look around your
neighborhood and see what’s there as opposed to
just serving your 14 units or whatever.
PAT COSTIGAN: It’s a hard one, what you’ve all said
about trying to partner up with somebody else. If you
don’t do property management, maybe your prop-
erty management firm has interest in other proper-
ties that are broader than just your property, and
maybe there’s a way to look for a vehicle, an inter-
mediary, a long-standing player in the community
that you can sort of tap into. I think all of us sort of
implicitly are saying, don’t do the service yourself;
find somebody who can do it, connect to the Boys
and Girls Club, work with the PAL...YMCAs and
YWCAs are wonderful resources.
So when you’re struggling with scale issues, some-
times your best bet is to just go find the best player
you can and maybe invest some of your honest
resources and negotiating and MOU to get some-
thing very specific for your kids, your seniors,
whomever.
WILLIAM FREY: Questions? Suggestions people
might have?
ALBERT SULLIVAN: We have a number of develop-
ments on the west side [of Chicago] where there’s a
lot of open-air drug traffic. And talking about neigh-
borhood revitalization, that’s what we need to get to.
The streets are not safe and there’s a lot of activ-
ity.…At any rate, my problem is that we have com-
mitted a lot of money that we can better use on
upgrading services and what not or facilities to grap-
pling with this community policing problem. We
need to transition now from this very expensive
process into some community involvement. It’s a dif-
ferent take on community services, but it’s some-
thing that’s integral to stabilizing this community
and keeping it going.
And I don’t know if anybody’s ever grappled with
this.…I just kind of wanted to throw it out because
we have a very viable resident-service program, we
have a computer learning center, we have commu-
nity gardens. We kind of have the whole range of
normal resident services, but that doesn’t stem the
We were talking about underwriting and operating expenses
this morning and how there’s so much of a shortfall. I would
have to say that [with] services, that is magnified by about 10.
If you’re in the community trying to do services, you’re patching
together tons and tons of small pieces of money to try and make
it work. –JANET MACCUBBIN
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flow of drug trafficking that occurs on the street. And
until we really grapple with that, I think we’re kind
of pushing soft rope on a very steep hill.…
FRANCES FERGUSON: …In choosing and identify-
ing which services you can focus your energy on, it
begins [with] not just the needs of the residents, but
in light of managing this asset,…you’re making a
strategic selection about where you focus those serv-
ice and human-development efforts. And sometimes
it’s not the kids that you have to start with; it’s the
crime you have to start with…
TOM LAY: My name is Tom Lay, with Neighborhood
Housing Services in Boise, Idaho. And I don’t know if
this is depressing for you or maybe a glimmer of
hope. We’ve struggled with the same problem.…We
knew that despite any other services we might try to
provide…if we weren’t providing, one, a safe, livable
condition for our residents; and two, avoiding being
the focal point of something that was going to run the
entire neighborhood down, then we couldn’t even
get started.
Initially, we put our own security on site because we
had limited response from our local police.…And
then we followed it up with a visit with the chief of
police and the mayor and described what we had to
do.…We recognized that we are not just looking out
for our asset as an organization, but we are looking
out for a neighborhood; that is our responsibility.
…[W]e’ve maintained our private security, just
changed its days and lessened the number of days. It
was too costly to maintain on an every-night
basis.…Then discussed with some other people what
we’re trying to accomplish.…It gave us an opportu-
nity to demonstrate to the community at large and
governmental agencies that we’re committed to that
neighborhood and we’re committed to have some
things happen there, and we’re equally as committed
to have some things not happen there, which it
sounds like you’ve certainly done.
PAT COSTIGAN: Let me just throw out some very
conventional wisdom, but maybe wisdom that we
don’t pay attention to enough. And that is turning to
boys and girls clubs, services, off-duty cops, block
watches. All those things are good, but they’re all
collateral to two fundamental things. And I spent the
better part of six years battling a drug market in the
neighborhood and learned the hard way.
And I think the answer is think like a banker, think
like a speculator, think like a middle-class person
that you are. If a drug market was going down in
your neighborhood, what variables would you
manipulate to control it?
For my money, they come to two. One is leadership.
You would get together the people who have the
most ability to sort of push on the police, to push on
the mayor, to push on who can bring you larger sup-
port, and you would push leadership.... 
The second is don’t neglect the real estate. Drug
activity is a place-based activity just like housing.
And the only way that we were successful in getting
rid of our drug market was we bought the damn
thing and we built houses over it. And that may
sound a little cynical, but think about that. Drug
activity goes on in space or goes on inside of some
space. And if you can control the space, you can
often times control the activity.
So if we think about this problem like a middle-class
person, like most of us are—if it was going down in
our neighborhood, what the heck would we do. We
would get the leaders out. We would just beat on the
mayor relentlessly, and we would think about where
the problem is situated, and we would work to con-
trol it. Those two variables I think really are proba-
bly fundamental to solving the drug traffic.…
UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT: Could you talk a lit-
tle bit about making sure that our programs meet the
needs? We’ve gone through a number of different
ways of trying to figure out what that need is....
JANET MACCUBBIN: What we use in Neighborhood
Networks is actually a resident survey that tries to
identify what are some of the issues that the resi-
dents have, whether that’s a barrier to jobs, a barrier
to employment, service needs that they have. And
trying to collect those surveys, sometimes that’s
going door to door with a survey and actually walk-
ing through that with the residents....
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The way I’ve seen this really done effectively is that
the results are brought to a sort of board, and that
might be an advisory board that has a good chunk of
residents on it. That advisory board is then responsi-
ble for looking at the resources, and then looking at
the results of the surveys and making the allocation
decisions about what happens on this property.
But by having residents involved in every stage—resi-
dents who really understand the larger property as a
whole, the real resident leaders—I think you get a
much more effective ownership of those programs
that actually happen on your property.…To me, the
key is to keep your residents as involved as possible.
UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT: Just to put a context
around that. Whether it’s surveys, it’s having the lux-
ury of having resident coordinators or case man-
agers that can begin assessment processes and
initiate relationships, it’s the best way to get the
information. That is, not just trying to capture that
one point in time, but to set up a process where
you’re working with folks over time.
I think the larger context is that there should be a
process for getting information and data from a lot of
different points. And data can come from hard data.
You could get actual information from the property
management firm, from HUD, from the housing
authority, from the city. Most cities now are getting
pretty hip to organizing neighborhood-level data.
There’s going to be a rich mine of opportunity with
the 2000 Census data out there....
So don’t forget data, hard data on one level. And on
the other end of the equation is, don’t forget just talk-
ing; if you want to learn more about youth, don’t
send somebody out with a survey. Get some kid to sit
down with a bunch of other kids who can basically
run a conversation and pull the information out, and
bring it back to a larger body to sift through. If you
want to talk about what seniors really want, don’t
send a guy like me in there to talk about it. Sit down,
get a couple of the senior leaders to sit down and talk
with the seniors.
I certainly would urge that those conversations need
to be structured, perhaps facilitated beforehand,
because there is a danger of just hearing from the
folks that show up and saying the same old thing all
the time. But there’s a way to use kids, to use seniors,
to use moms, to use dads who don’t live on the prop-
erty, to get an understanding of what’s going on with
those subgroups to shape your planning. But that’s
the operative word...planning....
UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT: Pat, I’d be interested
in anything you can say about who makes a good
case manager? Who are the folks you look for when
you’re trying to find somebody who’s going to be
really good at this?...
PAT COSTIGAN: Go somewhere that has a good 
reputation for doing good case management, and 
sit down and talk to their case managers, and you’ll
learn pretty quickly what to look for.…
A good case manager is a networker. A good case
manager doesn’t really run anything in particular
but knows everything, knows everybody. I’ll give
you an example of a Project Match case manager sit-
ting in a training session here in Chicago.
We were in a hotel across town. And it was about
2:30 in the afternoon, and there were some of our
people coming in that couldn’t check into their
rooms because the rooms weren’t made up. And she
said, “I’ll be back in 15 minutes.” And to her, what
light bulb went off was, they’ve got a problem here in
getting their rooms done, and I’ve got a supply of
people that I know are going to be better at cleaning
the rooms on time. I can solve their problems. Well,
the fact of the matter was, they had a large absence
that day. She went in, and she negotiated five job
commitments on the spot.
A case manager’s got to have that kind of mentality
because you’re dealing with individuals. You’re not
dealing with set programs. You’re dealing with every
family, trying to think what works for that
family….So the case manager’s got to be very nimble
on his or her feet and a real networker, a real entre-
preneur.…
And that person’s got to command the respect of the
residents that they’re working with. And I think
that’s an intangible that you’ve just got to feel out.
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JANET MACCUBBIN: Is there an average caseload
somebody can handle?
PAT COSTIGAN: The project-management caseload
that Project Match recommends is about 60 or 70 to
one. But Toby Herr would say, that is a non-hover-
ing, case-management methodology. That is, the job
isn’t to sit down all day and listen to problems, and
try and solve what to do about the kid who’s got a
drug problem and who’s in high school. The job is to
connect that person to someone else in that network
of resources that’s going to be able to take the time
and professionally respond to that particular situa-
tion. So it’s a non-hovering, case-management
methodology, and we run them at 1 to 60, 1 to 70.
UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT: The private sector,
we don’t give enough credit to. In my previous life, I
worked with a private developer in the South Bronx,
mom and pop owners of about 2,000 units of hous-
ing. But I remember talking about some financing 
package, the rehabilitation of several hundred units,
and a several million dollar deal. And he had just 
called Ms. Jones to pay her $215 rent. And I said,
“Joe, we’re talking about millions of dollars here;
you’re collecting Ms. Jones’ rent?” And he says,
“This is the most important thing….You have to talk
to her. You have to pay attention. This is your bread
and butter.”
He talked to her. She pays $215 rent. He gives her $5,
asks about the family. This is how you run good 
small businesses when you don’t have the resources 
to really bring on all the kinds of services.
WILLIAM FREY: I think some of what I’ve heard
here is that, obviously, scale makes a difference. And
I think we’ve heard that same theme over and over
again today, about the importance of having large
resources. It allows you to do more things. But that’s
where the majority of us are not at, I think, in terms
of the kind of development that we’re involved with.…
And obviously, the theme of building services, and
having good case workers for a longer period of time
where they can be shared with other kinds of devel-
opments within the community, where there might
be a limited period of time where you can build that
into the financing, is very critical in terms of the
long-term asset management of these particular
buildings to help people adjust to the community
and help the community to adjust to the buildings
themselves. And that is something that’s very impor-
tant.
And the last point is, that sometimes we don’t have
the luxury of having case management, and that’s
really the sensitivity that we have to build into the
affordable-housing development. That’s part of your
job, not just collecting rent, but talking to the resi-
dents and making the logical connections that they
need to have made here.
That’s some of what I’ve heard here, and there’s lots
more that I’ve heard….Anybody else from the panel?
Well, I want to thank the panel, and thank all of you.
In choosing and identifying which services you can focus your
energy on, it begins [with] not just the needs of the residents,
but in light of managing this asset,…you’re making a strategic
selection about where you focus those service and human-
development efforts. And sometimes it’s not the kids that you
have to start with; it’s the crime you have to start with. 
–FRANCES FERGUSON
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FRANCES FERGUSON:…I’m really pleased that
Nick Retsinas is moderating our last panel, and Jim
Logue from Michigan State Housing Development
Authority — a real leader in the HFA community —
has agreed to provide a commentary and be our lead
presenter for our wrap-up session.
NICHOLAS RETSINAS: Thank you, Francie. Good
afternoon, everyone….Let me give you some sense
of the format we’re going to follow….In a
moment,…Jim Logue will give his comments…
[from] the perspective of the resource allocator, the
funder, the person and the entity that many of you
said you don’t really understand…. Then we’ll have
each of the moderators…I’m going to give them a
head start now by laying out two questions….
Now that we’ve listened to this wonderful series of
presentations, so what. And, my two
questions:…Given what [you’ve] heard,…given
[your] own experiences, what counsel would [you]
give to those in the affordable housing business who
are looking out upon a portfolio of some projects?…
And, as we consider additional activities, additional
projects, additional developments, what are some of
the things we might think about?
…Jim Logue is an old and dear friend. He has many,
many pasts….Among those pasts, he was once the
executive director of the New Jersey Housing and
Mortgage Finance Agency,…he served a stint in the
United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Multi-Family Housing, spent a time with the
National Council of State Housing Finance Agencies,
and, for the last several years, has been with the
Michigan State Housing Development Authority,
which is more than just a housing finance agency,
but also is a key urban advisor to the governor of
Michigan.
He’s had a chance to listen in and be a part of many
of the panels here today, and he’s going to share
some of his reactions and thoughts. Jim.
JAMES LOGUE: Thanks, Nick….I feel a little bit like
NASA after they sent out a deep space probe and had
fifteen years of information they’ve got to digest and
it’s literally going to take them fifty years to analyze
it….I’m not sure that any of us is in a position, at this
moment, to know what we should do with all this
stuff, because there’s so much and there needs to be
some greater communication, dialogue, and
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understanding of what it is we’re trying to achieve,
because there are so many different things that folks
are trying to achieve.
One of the things I wanted to talk about, because it
has come up in most of the sessions that I have
attended,…is the tension between resource
allocators, which I represent, [being from] a state
housing finance agency that allocates the tax credit,
mortgage revenue bonds, non-entitlement home,
and CDBG, [that] manages a huge portfolio of
Section 8 vouchers as well as a variety of McKinney
Homeless Funding and a variety of other funding
that we at the state level allocate, and the resource
users, whom I think most of you represent….
…Let me suggest the tension between resource
allocators and resource users is not surprising. It is
not unhealthy. In fact, I think it is very healthy. And,
if the relationship between the users and the
allocators is good, constructive, open, and honest, I
think it can generally lead to very good success in
developing programs that meet the needs of the
community or the state, the region that you’re all
doing housing work in....
Let me ask this question: How many of you have
attended every qualified allocation plan here in
every state where you are applying for tax credits?
Raise your hand….Okay, there’s one, there’s two….If
you think qualified allocation plans and public
hearings are pro forma…that may be true in some
states…it’s not true in Michigan. I know it’s not true
in a majority of the states that I am familiar
with….In most places…it is an open process. And, if
it isn’t, there are things you can do about it…but the
reality is if you are not participating in the process
that allocates the majority of funding for your
projects…you’re missing the boat….
…It’s important that you participate in that process
and, make your case on issues that relate to your
state, and your locality, and your particular type of
program….
…And, that goes for home and CDBG on the state
level, even the local level. There are plans that have
to be publicly debated, public input is expected to be
received on. That, I would say, is your first avenue of
work and effort.
There may be a national agenda to be developed out
of this debate. I can tell you from…having
worked…with Congress on reauthorization and
expansion of the tax credit and a mortgage revenue
bond program, those are difficult tasks. There was
some talk in at least a couple of the sessions today
about a new housing program that maybe removes
all the complexity…there was some moaning and
gnashing of teeth about how difficult it is to put all of
this stuff together, and that’s true. Unfortunately,
that isn’t going to get you a new housing program.
Just because it’s difficult and complex and hard to
do, isn’t compelling [enough] for Congress to say,
“Oh, well, I guess we’d better develop a new
program that meets your needs.”
If that were the case, the tax code wouldn’t be what
it is. It’s a simple fact.
My suggestion…is this: We have…a workable
delivery system for affordable housing in this
country, with a combination of the low income
housing tax credit…I think, two thirds or more of
Congress co-sponsored the increase in the tax credit
program….To me, that is a wonderful base upon
which to work.
We have other wonderful programs that are doing
the job. They’re just not funded to levels that are
necessary. HOME is…a great program for
enhancing affordable rental housing in combination
with the tax credit and for a variety of other uses. It’s
flexible, it’s usable, it meets the needs of local
communities and, in combination with the tax credit
and other resources, it can produce very affordable,
very good rental housing.
CDBG works. We’ve got mortgage revenue bonds
which, on a smaller scale,…has a role to play in
providing affordable rental housing….
Certainly, in other areas, there are challenges that
haven’t been met. But, let me suggest that we have
the elements of a good workable, affordable housing
delivery system in the country, and I would suggest
to you that making it simpler is not, in my mind, the
first priority. Increasing the resources should be the
first priority. We’ll make it simpler if we’ve got the
resources, but maybe we do need additional rental
production program. Maybe there is room for a new
program that would, in conjunction with these other
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resources, help in increasing the level of affordable
rental housing.
…What can we propose to augment the current
system, because, the current system has, frankly, a
lot of political support. Tax credit is a very well
understood program by Congress…and I maintain it
is as good a program as any that’s been developed or
could be developed....
I’ll end by saying the keys to me are enhancing
communication, improving the quality and the
transparency of the data we have, and working very
hard to achieve a good understanding of our
perspective roles of allocators and users of
resources.
NIC RETSINAS: Thank you, Jim. As I said, we want
to ask each of the panelists to answer a couple of
questions. Again, the “so what” question. Now that
we have taken in this good advice, we have learned
lessons, or at least alleged that we have learned
lessons. What do we do about it? 
Georgia, your panel talked about the characteristics
in projects. You had an excellent presentation by
Charlie on some of those sort of characteristics.
Thinking of all that, what practical lessons did you
garner from that discussion that you might want to
share with us today? 
GEORGIA MURRAY: Well, I think the first and
foremost was…when you think about the
underwriting and you think about all the issues with
the underwriting…we really do need to rely on the
real data. As…we think about all the issues that we
talked about, a lot of it comes down to that initial
underwriting, both going in to the allocation and
getting all the financing in place. And, if we’re doing
it with numbers that are stretched...on the rents we
can achieve, or stretched on the occupancy we
achieve, and stretched on the fact that nothing will
go wrong and it will be the perfect staff and the
perfect property. And, we come down to a level that
is then not sustainable, that’s when we get ourselves
into trouble. So,…one of the things…is that we’ve got
to get some transparency to the data, we’ve got to be
able to kind of unite behind getting the data really
right, and support the efforts to do that. And, I think
if we did that, then it...might really help with the
preservation and the sustainability down the line.
NIC RETSINAS: Georgia, let me follow-up, if I
may…and, again, I’m asking everybody here,
aren’t…little white lies are okay because you really
want to get the project done?…David [Smith] talked
about the offering segments where you have to list
the risk factors. And, if any investor ever read those,
they would never invest in anything….
GEORGIA MURRAY: I always used to say during
There was some moaning and gnashing of teeth about how
difficult it is to put all of this stuff together, and that’s true.
Unfortunately, that isn’t going to get you a new housing
program. Just because it’s difficult and complex and hard to do,
isn’t compelling [enough] for Congress to say, “Oh, well, I guess
we’d better develop a new program that meets your needs.” If
that were the case, the tax code wouldn’t be what it is. It’s a
simple fact.  –JAMES LOGUE
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workouts…”Just pretend…that everybody who is
affected by this work out is in the room. And, would
you still take the same position?”…Think, your
mother’s in the room…would you still say it?
NIC RETSINAS: Helen [Dunlap], your panel talked
about ownership entities and characteristics of
ownership entities, but the discussion turned into
the creative tensions of mission and market and sort
of cultures and perspectives. From that discussion,
what advice can you share with all of us?
HELEN DUNLAP: I’m tempted to answer the last
question….I would pick on something that I heard
Lillian say. And that is the issue of images and
language….don’t define as lies…it’s really important
that we are clear about which set of beliefs we’re
triggering in people — positive, negative, or
otherwise. And, I don’t think…that means we should
undercut the criticality of issues that you were just
mentioning….
Second,…if we are responsible for taking something
forward, this group is simply too small….If our
interest is in building more resources, and not just
finding new ways to define programs, then we have
to tackle, in my perspective, two additions to the
group. One is the folks that aren’t here. And, that
represents…everybody from…the homebuilders —
that would bring an end to any nonprofit set-asides
in a heartbeat — to users, neighbors, residents…the
critical stakeholder, and yet they’re not here.
…And, one of the things our panel suggested early
on, but we passed right over, was the importance of
human capital. And, it’s good that we’re part of a
training institute…because we simply need to grow
a larger cadre of ourselves….
I would hope that, in our attempt to figure out what
we’ve done wrong, we also figure out what we’ve
done right. And, I thought David did some of that
well this morning. I would hope that we keep that in
mind. I think that we, as an industry, because we are
constantly reacting to somebody else’s opinion, are
constantly trying to change and fix something, and
yet there are a number of things that we do well....
NIC RETSINAS: Helen,…any thoughts of the kinds of
language and imagery we might use that would
resonate beyond the usual suspects?…
HELEN DUNLAP: …We need to look at
outcomes….We tend to value the dealmaking, the
structure, the financing, the resolution of all those
issues. That’s not what taxpayers and communities
and residents have any interest in….So, we need to
be about the business of healthy neighborhoods….
The Minnesota Family Housing Fund and Minnesota
Housing Now…did that study that shows that
children do better in school if they live in a stable
home environment….which we all go “duh,” but the
reality is that they took that image and they
produced significant increases in resources in
Minnesota for housing. So, those are the images, and
there are lots of them….
NIC RETSINAS: Okay. Shekar [Narasimhan], your
panel talked about financing sustainability. And, one
of the issues was…we ought to try to ring out
inefficiencies and try to have more
standardization…more transparency.
On the other hand, you talked about a trend toward
“commoditization” that can argue against
undertaking some of the developments that we’re
thinking about. Could you think about that issue as
you give your advice?
SHEKAR NARASIMHAN: Sure….I think we started
the conversation about financing because there
seemed to be mutual agreement, pretty much across
the board, that using the rates of financing sources,
using all kinds of gap mechanisms, six, twelve,
thirteen different capital sources on a given
transaction, has got to be inefficient. And, in addition
to costing time, which is obviously money, also cost
long-term burdens for the regulatory reporting
requirements, complex, and sometimes,
unfortunately, conflicting things that have to happen
within a transaction and within the project that
doesn’t necessarily make economic sense. And,
those were costs that were burdensome and were
being borne by affordable housing. And…I ended by
saying, “Be careful what you wish for,” which would
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be too much efficiency. Because…everybody who’s
working in neighborhoods and local communities
knows, their deal is really truly different and it does
require all those different pieces to get weaved
together. But it is going to be very difficult to deliver
efficiency using the prism of the private market
efficiency system. What we ought to be striving for
is, instead, a free flowing capital market.…
…This whole issue of transparency and common
definitions. There’s no question that we should be
able to write common definitions…we ought to have
large databases.…Can we have three thousand tax
credit deals that are monitored on a routine basis?
Can we actually know in 2003 what happened in
2002 when the [1982] deals came due that expired at
the end of fifteen years? Or will it all be anecdotal
and we’ll be sitting in cocktails saying, you know,
one went down and the other went south and the
third went private and market? Is there going to be a
way to manage this so that we can legitimately
answer the questions to the policy makers and then
the people ultimately that we need money from?
We did strongly, I think,…refute this notion that
came up…which was we should not be trying every
ten or fifteen years to appropriate money to fix deals
that we had done earlier, which is obviously the
forty year FHA with the twenty-year Section 8 kind
of example….Personally, and I think Larry Dale and
certainly others felt, look, this is low-income and
affordable housing. There is not adequate cash flow
built in here to be able to provide for major capital
improvements. And, they don’t have the built-in
equity increases to do refinancing. So, we’re going to
need capital grants, soft loans or something ten,
fifteen, twenty years into these deals to do it. So,
instead of, figuring out a way to build in five
hundred dollar or a thousand dollar reserves that
just simply won’t underwrite a deal, let’s just admit
that this is affordable housing. We’re going to
rejuvenate it and, every ten years, we’re going to
have to go to the Congress and get a capital grant to
do it….
But, the point was there was a strong sense that we
should be prepared to stand up for what it is we
really do. And, we can’t make it something it is not,
absolutely.
So, let me just finish by commenting on tax
credits….In the short term, there really is a little bit
of an issue, and it’s a combination of many factors
which are somewhat unrelated. One is that there has
been a diminution in the demand for them…and
that’s primarily because the industrial companies
that were buying them don’t need them anymore
because they’re not making any money. The “dot
coms” never bought them and they never needed
them. But, in addition to that, you also had another
group that had been in the business—utilities—that
not only are not buying them, but are actually selling
them. So, if you had a three billion dollar demand-
supply, this year, you could have as much as about
three quarters of a billion to a billion [dollars] in
additional supply....
In fact, prices are going down. This’s the first time
[it] has happened in the fourteen-odd years of this
program….We do have a supply-demand imbalance.
At the same time, we have…the IRS timed
rulings…which have some palling effect if you’re a
tax credit investor….
So, when you have uncertainty about…the credits
themselves going forward, you have a supply
demand imbalance, and you have the Congress
raising the effective supply in the future, starting in
2002, you should expect that people are now looking
much more closely at yield and return….So, there
should be some development work done, fairly
quickly, on yield and return, and on building a much
better secondary market. And, fast. Because, if you’re
being offered seventy-five cents [on the dollar]
today,…I would say three months from now, you
will be offered less, not more…[and] you [will] need
that ninth financing source to fill that new gap that’s
going to be created.
NIC RETSINAS: Shekar,…does the lack of
transparency have a benefit? And, if we make
everything transparent, might it undermine support
from the variety of funding sources that many of
affordable housing projects need?
SHEKAR NARASIMHAN: We did have that
conversation also. What does it cost to build an
affordable housing unit? I’ve seen some of the cost
data, and it’s sixty-five to two hundred thousand a
unit. And, does it cost more to build it because it’s
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affordable and has these tax or other subsidies
versus conventional. I’ve seen studies on that, as
well. And, if we really knew all those answers,
would we like the answer? Would we want it
published in the Wall Street Journal?…
But my response is that we need transparency and
data for today to understand performance, [not] so
much to try and figure out what the loan-per-unit
should be…but to understand performance history
and then to develop some indexes to benchmark risk
and return in different kinds of affordable contexts. If
it ultimately led to a major improvement in the
capital markets, efficiency of [what] credits trade for,
or where bonds can be sold, or, for that matter, if you
could sell the tax losses separately,…perhaps… that
would create more dollars for affordable housing.
But, at this point in time, I think we need to be very
careful that we don’t undermine the relatively small
constituency that supports us on the public-policy
side at the federal level….
NIC RETSINAS: Chuck, your panel talked about risk
capital for preservation acquisition….Talk a little bit
about that discussion, and, again, your advice to
everyone about financing for preservation.
CHUCK WEHRWEIN: Yeah, thanks, Nick. I think I’d
like to sort of break it up into…immediate
recommendations and then some broader ones. On
the immediate side,…it seems compelling to suggest
that, if one is considering taking on a preservation
asset or a group of them, that one would be very
wise to not lie to yourself. Because, if you miss on
these things, they’re big, they’re complicated, and
the train wreck could be much worse than with a
twenty unit or thirty unit tax credit deal. So, be true
to yourself, if not to anyone else....
I think the first thing we need to do is focus on
building stronger organizations, both from a
financial capacity standpoint, and a human capacity
standpoint. There wasn’t as much negative reaction
to the threat of different kinds of organizations
coming into this environment. The need is so
significant and so great. I think the only worries
about threats were about the financial resources that
might be available to do this and who would get
them first. But, in general, I think folks felt that it is a
large impending problem that really called for the
need for more organizations…and for the
organizations that do exist…to build financial and
human capacity.
I think the other advice that could come out of this
would be to make yourself stronger. Be ready for
some of the challenges that are coming. And, be
ready for some opportunities that might be showing
up in down-market economies. There may actually
be positive opportunities to create and sustain
affordable housing in those market places going
forward.…
Look at cooperating more. When we’re going to be
focusing on portfolios of assets that have a very
broad geographic context, they’re not going to fit so
well into the organizational geographies that we’ve
created. And, so it’s going to be critical that we think
about working together more and with other
organizations, and whether or not some
organizations might want to work together more
permanently.
And, finally, I was struck by something Jim [Logue]
said: “Show up at the hearings.” We need to do a
much better job, as Helen said, [of] speaking with
one voice, once we decide what the problem is and
what the solutions might be.…
MR. RETSINAS: Thank you, Chuck. Bill, your panel
talked about funding for services.…Sometimes
people need…more than the walls and the roof, but
need services.…Talk a little bit about what you
learned from the discussion, and again your advice
and counsel to your colleagues here.
WILLIAM FREY: We initially started out recognizing
that there is a significant…lack of affordable housing
for very low-income people around the
country.…Some of the things I heard were, in terms
of responsibly underwriting housing,…looking at
building in significant reserves and looking at
building in a significant amount of capital
replacement. And, then, we look at services. As part
of that, if you’re looking at long-term basis as far as
the asset management and operations of these
particular projects.
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There’s always going to be this tension. Is it housing
or is it going into services?…And there was some
recognition that in some of the HUD programs that
have been very successful…there has been a benefit
to having a large enough scale that there has been
some resources from the housing that’s been able to
go into the services. That’s not always going to be
the case and it’s probably more the exception than
the rule.
But, it’s not just the people that benefit from the
services, it is also the housing that benefits from
it.…And, in smaller kinds of developments, we
heard from some people in terms of…collaborating
with communities…really working with the
community residents and finding out what is the
right thing in terms of services.
And, finally,…the case work model: Whether it’s a
permanent casework person,…the critical way in
which they work is that they’re more
entrepreneurial in really connecting the people and
the buildings to other kinds of resources within the
community.…
NIC RETSINAS: Thank you, Bill. Let’s open it up for
a few minutes for questions.…
UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT: Yes. It’s a little bit of
a question and a little bit of a response.…The single
scariest and perhaps most profound statement that
I’ve heard today…tax credit prices, which have done
nothing but go up in cents per dollar for fourteen
years, have, in the last four to six months, dropped
ten percent. They’ve gone from about eighty-two
cents on the dollar to seventy-five cents on the
dollar....
And, related to that, there was something Janet
Faulk said at the preservation panel. She said,
affordable housing does really well in good times.
It’s hard to buy in good times, but easy to do in bad
times. I have news. It’s hard to do in bad times,
because poor people are among the first people to
lose their jobs or have their earnings impaired. So,
we may suddenly find that we’re differentiating
property quality and owner quality a lot sooner than
you think. So, I’m going to echo what Shekar said
about be careful what you wish for or you may get it.
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NIC RETSINAS: Let me ask a last question of the
panel.… We talked a lot today,…[and one]
implication…is [that] it costs more [to develop low-
income, affordable, subsidized multifamily housing]
than we are now getting. Help me answer the
obvious sort of trade-off question. That is, more
resources for one unit means not enough resources
with another unit. Help me with your sort of take on
that, Bill.
WILLIAM FREY: I think that’s the, the tension that
we’re all dealing with…I think that we all make
those decisions when it gets to a certain bottom line,
and we have to say no to certain things. And, I think
that, for a long period of time, people are afraid to
say no, especially the nonprofit industry, because
we’re afraid that nothing else will follow. And, I
think that there has to be much more of an advocacy
attempt to try to influence the decision makers.…If
you…have ten people lining up for affordable
housing, the question is do you spend more to build
all this in, or do you build more housing.… I think
we need to come to some sort of compromise.…
CHUCK WEHRWEIN: Nick, I think, first of all, the
question presumes that there are no additional
resources available to fill that gap. I think that’s a
presumption we ought not to make, although, we
clearly understand how difficult those additional
resources might be to come by. What strikes me is
there’s a couple of things that will happen.…As long
as allocators are requiring certain levels to achieve a
successful deal allocation, everybody’s going to keep
telling them what they want to know,…because the
one honest group is going to not see a deal next year.
And, it’s not like they’re taking a pass on, you know,
some levels of fees just to make the deal stronger.
They’re just not going to see the deal, and they’re too
weak to sustain too much of that.
SHEKAR NARASIMHAN: I think there clearly are
costs to be wrung out of the system;…just look at the
total cost of a single affordable housing
transaction…estimates run from nine to eleven
percent. There’s too many consultants [and] too
many lawyers in our business.… There’s got to be a
way to wring some of that cost out of the system.…
GEORGIA MURRAY: I don’t know what the answer
is. But,…the money is there. We spend it
differently;…if we could somehow…figure out how
to get those resources realigned so that they’re there
at the beginning. They’re there and you can point to
them and you can get them so that we don’t have to
go through the pain of having a workout.…
HELEN DUNLAP: Assuming that our resources are
limited and that we have rung the efficiencies out of
the system, we then have to choose what we’re
trying to achieve. And, I’ll use an example which
everybody can relate to and will inflame. Why are
we building more elderly 202 units in this
country?…There are plenty of apartments, basic
elderly apartments, in this country. But, because we
are trying to serve poor people who are elderly and
need a subsidy.…
NIC RETSINAS: Thank you. Let me just spend a
couple of minutes and give you my own take on the
day. Beside being a fascinating and at times
entertaining day, parts of it were
disheartening.…There was almost, pardon the
expression, a masochistic quality to the day, as we
all were sort of thinking about the mistakes we have
made over the years, and certainly, we have made
some.
In some ways…we could have been describing the
“dot com” phenomenon…where there are no profits
[and] we celebrate when we don’t lose as much as
we lost last year. We are consistently trying to lure
investors or subsidizers to make them think we’re
smarter than we think we are, and most of our time
is spent doing that, and lastly, we have no exit
strategy, we just sort of go on and on.
…The last time I spoke before the Neighborhood
Reinvestment Corporation…I used the line…by Sam,
the piano player in Casablanca,…which is, “the
fundamental things apply, as time goes by.” And,
much of what we talked about today are the
fundamental things that apply. Producing and
sustaining affordable housing is really, really
important. You all know that. In another month, [the
Joint Center for Housing Studies is] going to be
releasing our annual report on the state of the
nation’s housing. While we will continue to marvel
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at the overall prosperity of the housing market in the
United States, some of the statistics we will be
talking about, particularly relating to the rental
market, will be harrowing. Let me give you a
preview of some of them. We’ve lost about five and a
half a million units on the private market stock that
were affordable back in 1993, up until 1999. Two
thirds, seven point five million, of low-income,
extremely low-income families, pay over fifty
percent of their income for housing, and what’s most
interesting about that number, that’s up by a million
and a half during the longest period of prosperity
this nation has ever enjoyed....
Overall, we estimate that there are about four and a
half million unsubsidized renter households in the
United States who are low income, and we see the
private rental stock having about one point two
million units that are affordable. So, there’s a
supply/demand imbalance of about three million
units, just looking at raw numbers.
This issue is exacerbated particularly because most
of the rental stock in this country is aging. The
average age of multifamily units in the United States
is 34 years. And, in some places, it is much older. For
example, here, in Chicago, 80 percent of all the
multi-family stock generally was built before 1979.
In Boston, my home town, 82 percent. In New York,
it’s 92 percent. The improvement of that rental stock
will be a major agenda item.
As I listened to the lessons learned and the
admonitions, I’ve summarized them with six E’s. I
don’t have time to go over all of them in detail, but
let me kind of walk through them, because I want to
spend my last thirty seconds just on the last one. The
first one is economics. This is sort of the truth in
development, the truth in management. We heard
words like cash flow and market. Basic economics
have to be understood, have to dictate how we do
our work.
We talked about excellence. Much of the day was
about excellence. How do we build and oversee
developments that can be sustainable over time?
We talked about enterprise. We talked about this as
a business for professionals. For profit, nonprofit,
whatever it is….
We talked about environment in terms of the
community, the larger community of which these
developments, by their very nature, are only a small
part of. They don’t define the community. They are
affected by and affect that community.
We talked about energy. This is hard work. It’s hard
work in the good times, it’s hard work in the bad
times. And, it needs a sense of energy.
But, the last E I want you to leave with is equity.
And, I don’t mean…the word that isn’t debt. I mean,
real equity. Equity in terms of social justice. Equity
in terms of a promise where people have a decent
place to live. This is hard work. We’ve done a lot of
good things, we’ve done a lot of not so good things.
But we have to continue. The need is great. We have
to pay homage to the definition of this workshop:
“Strengthening neighborhoods by creating long-
term multi-family assets.” It’s…all about how do we
make affordable housing an asset building
strategy…for the individuals that live in that
affordable housing, and for the communities that are
defined in part and are affected by that affordable
housing? There is no more important task before us
than the task of asset building, for individuals, and
for communities. The session today, I think, brings
us one step closer towards that strategy. Thank you
all very much.
There is no more important task before us than the task of
asset building, for individuals, and for communities. The
session today, I think, brings us one step closer towards that
strategy.   –NIC RETSINAS
T
H
E
 N
E
IG
H
B
O
R
W
O
R
K
S
®
JO
U
R
N
A
L
SU
M
M
ER
 2
0
0
1
102
Speaker Biographies
Patrick M. Costigan,
Senior Vice President
The Community Builders, Inc
Patrick Costigan joined The Community Builders,
Inc. (TCB) as interim director of human services in
1998, and was appointed as senior vice president in
1999. He is responsible for TCB’s new Community
Initiatives division, which coordinates economic
opportunities and supportive services for 15,000
residents living in TCB housing. In this capacity, Mr.
Costigan oversees 60 staff working at 25 TCB sites.
Before joining TCB, Mr. Costigan served as vice
president of the Enterprise Foundation of Columbia,
MD, for 11 years where, among other
responsibilities, he helped to design and implement
the Foundation’s neighborhood transformation
program in Baltimore’s Sandtown neighborhood. 
William Frey,
Director of New York Office
The Enterprise Foundation
William Frey joined the Enterprise Foundation in
1987 as the first director of the New York office, after
13 years of directing four different community
organizations and development groups. Under Mr.
Frey’s leadership, the Foundation’s New York
program has forged innovative partnerships
between the City of New York, private corporations,
banks, foundations, and over 80 non-profit
community-based organizations to efficiently
develop decent, affordable housing. To date, the
Foundation and its partners have successfully
rehabilitated over 10,000 apartments in all five
boroughs of New York City. 
Trinita Logue,
President
Illinois Facilities Fund
Trinita Logue is the founding president and CEO of
the Illinois Facilities Fund (IFF), a ten-year-old
statewide, community development financial
institution (CDFI). Under her leadership, the IFF has
become a national leader in innovative nonprofit
financial solutions, and has grown to total assets of
$46 million. Previously, Ms. Logue served as
assistant director to the Chicago Community Trust,
where she developed the IFF. 
Janet Maccubbin,
Consultant
ICF Consulting
Janet Maccubbin joined ICF Consulting in 1997. She
has experience in the area of multifamily assisted
housing with a focus on public policy and resident
development programs. She has worked with
owners and managers of assisted housing to
communicate a simplified understanding of complex
federal programs. While at ICF she has worked with
the Rural Housing Service, the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the
Farm Service Agency to reinvent program guidance
and regulations. Prior to joining ICF, Ms. Maccubbin
spent five years with HUD as a policy analyst
specializing in project-based Section 8 and assisted
housing programs. 
Michael Bodaken,
President
National Housing Trust
Michael Bodaken serves as president of the National
Housing Trust, a national nonprofit organization
devoted to the preservation of federally assisted or
insured multifamily housing. His knowledge of the
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) insurance and subsidy
programs, finance, the affordable housing stock, and
affordable housing needs have been invaluable to
the stakeholders affected by recent dramatic changes
in housing policy and funding. Mr. Bodaken’s efforts
have directly led to the acquisition and rehabilitation
financing for over 4,000 units involving over $100
million in financing. As head of NHT/Enterprise
Preservation Corporation, Mr. Bodaken now focuses
on the direct purchase of multifamily affordable
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housing properties by a joint venture of the National
Housing Trust and the Enterprise Foundation. 
Chuck Wehrwein,
Vice President
Mercy Housing, Inc.
Chuck Wehrwein is currently vice president of
Mercy Housing, Inc., one of the largest nonprofit
developers, owners and managers of service-
enriched affordable housing in the United States. His
responsibilities include leading Mercy’s Acquisition
Initiative, which is focused on acquiring and
preserving portfolios of existing affordable housing
complexes across the country. Mr. Wehrwein also
oversees the Mercy Loan Fund and its Housing
Development Division. 
Daniel S. Anderson,
Senior Vice President and Director
Bank of America Public Housing Initiative
Daniel Anderson is senior vice president and
director of Bank of America’s Public Housing
Initiative. He is also an officer of Banc of America
Securities LLC, and specializes in housing and
community development uses of municipal
securities. Mr. Anderson leads the bank’s overall
effort to provide products and services relevant to
the nation’s public housing industry, and he recently
pioneered the development of the bank’s credit
product offerings for the financing needs of public
housing authorities (PHAs). His other activities
include helping PHAs to diversify their holdings,
reoptimize their real estate portfolios, and accelerate
the transformation of public housing. Mr. Anderson
also assists local initiatives and nonprofit
organizations to acquire, preserve and develop
affordable multifamily properties. 
Jesse M. Chancellor,
Principal
Chancellor & Associates, LLC
Jesse Chancellor is principal of Chancellor &
Associates LLC, a debt advisory and construction
services firm based in Columbia, MD. During his
career, Mr. Chancellor has structured and/or
originated approximately $900 million in real estate
debt and equity. Immediately prior to starting his
advisory business, Mr. Chancellor had been senior
vice president for investments at Municipal
Mortgage & Equity, LLC (MuniMae), where he was
responsible for managing the activities of a
specialized finance team that originated tax-exempt
multi-family housing bonds nationally. Before
joining MuniMae, Mr. Chancellor held a number of
positions of responsibility with the Enterprise
Foundation, including director of field operations
and director of housing finance. 
Janet Falk,
Executive Director
California Housing Partnership Corporation
Janet Falk has had extensive experience in the
development and financing of nonprofit housing.
She was appointed as CEO of the California Housing
Partnership Corporation (CHPC) in 1999. Prior to
joining CHPC, Ms. Falk served as co-director for 19
years at Community Economics, Inc. (CEI), a
nonprofit organization that provides technical
assistance in housing finance to nonprofit housing
developers, local governments, and tenant
organizations. Ms. Falk was involved in over 150
projects at CEI, including new construction,
rehabilitation, special needs housing, mobile home
parks, tenant purchase of rental properties, and
artists’ live/work space. She is particularly
knowledgeable in utilizing the low income housing
tax credits and tax-exempt bonds for nonprofit
projects and in the ways in which local and state
governments can most effectively assist the
development and rehabilitation of low and moderate
income housing. 
Wendell L. Johns,
Vice President for Multifamily Affordable Housing
Fannie Mae
Wendell Johns is Vice President for Multifamily
Affordable Housing at Fannie Mae. He leads Fannie
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Mae’s programs and initiatives to purchase bonds
and provide equity and debt for rental housing
targeted to low-and moderate-income families and
other rental markets that are underserved. Fannie
Mae provided over $4.5 billion toward these efforts
in 2000. Mr. Johns has over 24 years of experience in
the affordable housing industry, including his tenure
as vice president with the Oxford Development
Corporation in various financial, administrative and
accounting roles. He also worked with Coopers &
Lybrand as a real estate specialist and certified
public accountant. 
Shekar Narasimhan,
Managing Director
Prudential Mortgage Capital Company
As managing director for the Prudential Mortgage
Capital Company, Shekar Narasimhan oversees the
Agency and Funds Management business units.
These units cover Fannie Mae multifamily lending,
FHA-insured multifamily and health care loan
origination, and the commercial mortgage funds
management group, which specializes in core and
high-yield investments for institutional investors.
Mr. Narasimhan has been first chair of the
Commercial/Multifamily Board of Governors and
the Multifamily Steering Committee for the
Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA), and first chair
of the Fannie Mae DUS Advisory Committee. He also
was appointed to the Fannie Mae National Advisory
Council and served on the Executive Committee of
the National Rural Housing Coalition. 
Larry H. Dale,
Managing Director
Newman & Associates, Inc.
Larry Dale is managing director of Newman &
Associates, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of
GMAC Commercial Mortgage and a leading
investment banking firm specializing in financing
affordable rental housing. At the same time, Mr.
Dale is chairman of the board of the National Equity
Fund and president of the Center for Housing Policy.
He also serves on the boards of the National Center
for Lead-Safe Housing, the Community Preservation
and Development Corporation, the Denver
Enterprise Foundation and the National Housing
Conference. Prior to joining Newman and
Associates, Inc., Mr. Dale was president of Mid-City
Financial Corporation, a regional multifamily
development, financing, and management firm
based in Bethesda, MD. 
Joseph S. Hagan,
President and CEO
National Equity Fund, Inc.
Joseph Hagan is president and CEO of the National
Equity Fund, Inc. (NEF), the nation’s largest
nonprofit syndicator of low-income housing tax
credits. Mr. Hagan joined NEF in 2000 after more
than 20 years experience as an investor in and
manager of affordable housing development. Prior to
joining NEF he worked at Banc One where he most
recently served as director of its Capital Markets
Housing and Health Care Finance Group and co-
manager of its Low-Income Housing Tax Credit
Group. Prior to that, Mr. Hagan was CEO for Banc
One Community Development Corporation, which
he built into one of the largest federally chartered
community development corporations in the
country. Under his leadership, the Banc One CDC
grew from $17 million to more than $350 million in
assets over a five-year period. 
Bob Odman,
Assistant Commissioner
Minnesota Housing Finance Agency
Bob Odman has held the position of assistant
commissioner at the Minnesota Housing Finance
Agency (MHFA) since 1995. For the past seven years,
he has been a member of the Minneapolis/St. Paul
Interagency Stabilization Group, working on
stabilizing and preserving central city rental
developments. Previously from 1977 to 1995, Mr.
Odman was director of property management for the
MHFA. Before that he was a senior housing
management officer. 
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David A. Smith,
President
Recapitalization Advisors, Inc.
David Smith is founder and president of
Recapitalization Advisors, Inc. (Recap), a Boston-
based firm specializing in the finance of existing
affordable housing. Recap works with nonprofit and
for-profit owners and buyers, as well as government
agencies including the U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) and state housing
finance agencies (HFAs). Throughout his 25 years in
affordable housing finance, Mr. Smith has a track
record of designing and implementing innovative
but rigorously sound financial transactions,
including workouts, refinancings, resyndications,
sales, preservation recapitalizations, prepayments,
and debt restructurings. Numerous times a
Congressional witness, he was a principal member
of the informal Senate working group that
eventually led to the mark-to-market legislation
enacted in 1997. Since then he has participated with
HUD and various state HFAs in designing
preservation-related programs and strategies. Mr.
Smith is a prolific author, with more than 70
published articles in real estate, valuation, and
policy periodicals, and a textbook. 
Helen Dunlap,
President
Shorebank Advisory Services
Helen Dunlap is president of Shorebank Advisory
Services (SAS), the consulting arm of Shorebank
Corporation, and CEO of Shorebank Development
Corporation, Shorebank’s real estate development
company. Prior to joining SAS, Ms. Dunlap was
executive director of the National Low Income
Housing Coalition. Previously, she was a deputy
assistant secretary at the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) for four
years. Before joining HUD, she founded and ran the
California Housing Partnership Corporation and
worked with Caine Gressel Midgley Slater, Inc. (now
CGAdvisors, Inc.), both of which were consulting
firms. 
Wendy Dolber,
Manager
Standard & Poors
Wendy Dolber joined Standards & Poors in 1985. She
is managing director in public finance ratings and
manager of the Public Finance Tax-Exempt Housing
and Structured Finance Groups, which consists of 26
analysts, research assistants and support staff in
New York, San Francisco, Dallas and Chicago. The
Housing Group is responsible for the ratings on most
tax-exempt state and local housing transactions.
Under Ms. Dolber’s direction, the Housing Group
has taken the lead in developing rating products
expressly designed for unsubsidized affordable
housing products and Public Housing Authorities.
The Housing Group also has significantly expanded
its coverage of issuer credit ratings for state and
local housing finance agencies. The Structured
Group handles municipal transactions supported by
various types of credit and liquidity facilities, as well
as secondary market derivative products. 
Sr. Lillian Murphy,
President
Mercy Housing
Sr. Lillian Murphy has served as president of Mercy
Housing since 1987. She is a native of San Francisco
and has been a member of the Sisters of Mercy
Burlingame religious community for 41 years. She
has a master in public health from the University of
California at Berkeley and has 17 years experience
in healthcare administration.
Charles Wilkins,
Consultant
The Compass Group
Charles Wilkins is a consultant who works with
owners, managers, lenders and regulatory agencies
regarding affordable housing policy, finance, asset
management and property management. He is a
financial advisor to the U.S. Department of Housing
and Development’s Mark to Market program, and is
a member of the Public Housing Operating Cost
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Study team. He is the author of Shelter From The
Storm: Successful Market Conversions of Regulated
Housing, which explores the public policy,
affordability, operational and financial consequences
of introducing more market forces into affordable
housing. As senior executive with the National
Housing Partnership (NHP), Mr. Wilkins was
responsible for asset management of NHP’s 60,000
units of affordable housing, and for its relationships
with Congress and the U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD). He teaches asset
management to government housing professionals
through the University of Maryland. Mr. Wilkins
was a member of the Senate Banking Committee
working group on Mark to Market and president of
the National Affordable Housing Management
Association.
Georgia Murray
Georgia Murray is a trustee of the Urban Land
Institute, and serves on the board of directors for
Capital Crossing, the Friends of Boston’s Homeless,
and the Women’s Educational and Industrial Union.
Ms. Murray previously served on the board of
directors for Lend Lease, and at various times was
responsible for leading the Property Management
Group, the Asset Management Group, and the
Investment Real Estate Group. She was a principal
at Boston Financial from 1973 through 1999.
Joy Aruguete,
Executive Director
Bickerdike Redevelopment Corp
Joy Aruguete has served as executive director of
Bickerdike Redevelopment Corporation for the past
six years. She also supervises the work of Humboldt
Construction Company, a for-profit subsidiary of
Bickerdike Redevelopment Corporation. Ms.
Aruguete is president of the Chicago Rehab Network,
which is comprised of community-based nonprofit
housing organizations focusing on neighborhood
revitalization of Chicago’s communities. Ms.
Aruguete also serves as a Mayoral appointee to the
City of Chicago’s Community Development Advisory
Committee (CDAC) and is currently co-chair of the
housing subcommittee of CDAC. 
Daniel J. Burke, 
Vice President for Development
Chicago Community Development Corporation
Daniel Burke has served as vice president of
development for the Chicago Community
Development Corporation (CCDC) since 1988. In
this capacity he has been involved in the acquisition
and rehabilitation of CCDC’s portfolio of 1,650 the
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD)-assisted apartments. Mr. Burke
also has served as a development consultant for
resident councils and nonprofits purchasing housing
units under HUD’s Preservation Program in Illinois
and Wisconsin. Mr. Burke is an attorney with over
twelve years experience as an affordable housing
developer specializing in the preservation of at-risk
HUD-assisted housing. He specializes in
representing nonprofit organizations and residents
of HUD-assisted properties in class action lawsuits
for the preservation of their homes. 
Leslie A. Steen,
President and CEO
Community Preservation and 
Development Corporation
Leslie Steen is president and CEO of Community
Preservation and Development Corporation (CPDC),
a nonprofit that creates and preserves financially
sound, socially responsible affordable housing, and
works in partnership with residents to establish
service programs that increase opportunities for
community and individual growth. Formerly, Ms.
Steen served as director of portfolio finance for the
National Corporation for Housing Partnerships
(NHP), where she developed tax-credit-eligible
projects for low-income housing and worked with
lenders and the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) to refinance troubled
properties in the NHP portfolio. She was also the first
executive director of Twin Cities Housing
Development Corporation, a nonprofit, affordable
housing developer created by the cities of St. Paul
and Minneapolis and the Minneapolis/St. Paul
Family Housing Fund. 
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The Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation
was established by an act of Congress in 1978 (Public
Law 95-557). A primary objective of the Corporation
is to increase the capacity of local community-based
organizations to revitalize their communities, partic-
ularly by expanding and improving housing. 
Currently there are approximately 215 independ-
ent, locally led nonprofit community development
corporations that comprise the NeighborWorks®
Network. A key to the success of NeighborWorks®
organizations is their partnership-building approach
to neighborhood revitalization, uniting residents,
private-sector businesses, foundations and local and
state governments.
Launched in 1999, the NeighborWorks®
Multifamily Initiative is the collaborative portfolio
management program for NeighborWorks® organi-
zations whose primary mission is development,
ownership or management of affordable multifamily
housing. Currently, 43 NeighborWorks® organiza-
tions, operating in 30 states and Puerto Rico, belong
to the Multifamily Initiative. Together, they own over
20,000 affordable housing units. 
The goals of the Multifamily Initiative are to:
A. Develop and preserve 10,000 units between 
1999 – 2003
B. Attract $600 million in investment in these 
affordable properties
C. Strengthen portfolio performance and asset 
management systems of members
D. Expand learning centers, thus supporting 
personal asset building by residents of multi-
family properties and
E. Increase multifamily resident leadership in 
member organizations
As a capital partner, the Multifamily Initiative has
formed the Neighborhood Capital Corporation
(NCC). NCC speeds access to capital designed to
enable the preservation and development of afford-
able multifamily housing.  NCC provides predevel-
opment loans of up to $150,000 and interim
acquisition loans for the “top” 10 to 25 percent of
value for a property to be acquired for preservation
or development. Initially capitalized by
Neighborhood Reinvestment, the NCC is now build-
ing its capital base through both direct investment
and through agreements with lenders who would
like to participate in this type of lending. u
Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation, the
NeighborWorks® Network and the NeighborWorks®
Multi-Family Initiative
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